Pablo Azar

 About Me

Pablo's picture I am a Ph.D. student at the MIT Computer Science Department. I work in the mechanism design group in CSAIL, advised by Silvio Micali. My research is about how we can apply techniques from computer science to design markets and economic systems with good properties.

My CV is here


1. Prophet Inequalities With Limited Information
Joint work with Robert Kleinberg and S. Matthew Weinberg
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2014)

2. Super-Efficient Rational Proofs
Joint Work with Silvio Micali.
14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

3. Quantifying U.S. Supreme Court Decisions Using Authorship Attribution Techniques
Joint work with William Li, David Larochelle, Jay Cox, Robert Berwick and Andrew Lo
Stanford Technology Law Review, Volume 16, Number 3, 2013

4. The Query Complexity of Scoring Rules
Joint with Silvio Micali.
ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation. Forthcoming

5. Parametric Digital Auctions
Joint with Silvio Micali
4th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2013)

6. Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions
Joint with Costantinos Daskalakis, Silvio Micali and S. Matthew Weinberg
Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2013)

7. Rational Proofs.
Joint work with Silvio Micali.
44th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2012)

8.  Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions.
Joint with Jing Chen and Silvio Micali.
3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS 2012) .

Working Papers

9.  Budget-Balanced Maximization of Social Welfare Resilient to Unrestricted Collusion,        Privacy, and Beliefs.
Joint with Jing Chen and Silvio Micali.
Working version presented at the 2nd Brazilian Workshop of the Game Theory Society.

Selected Past Research

10. Sentiment Analysis in Financial News. Senior Thesis.

Lectures and Talks

A. Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions

  • North American Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2014. Philadelphia, PA.

N. Rational Proofs

  • China Theory Week 2012
  • Cambridge Area Economics and Computer Science Day, 2012
  • Institute of Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey
  • Columbia University Theory Seminar
  • Northwestern University Theory Seminar

C. Digital Parametric Auctions

  • 3rd Google Workshop on Market Algorithms
  • EC Workshop on Mechanism Design and Risk Aversion, Valencia, Spain 2012

D.  Query Complexity of Scoring Rules

  •  4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society
  •  MIT Economics Department Theory Lunch
  •  University of Chicago Theory Economic Theory Working Group

E. Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions

Previous Teaching

I was a lecturer for MIT’s Introduction to Algorithms Class (6.006) in the Spring of 2013.

I have been a Teaching Assistant for the following classes:

Resilient Mechanism Design
Cryptography and Cryptanalysis
Efficient Algorithms
Intelligent Machines: Perception, Learning and Uncertainty