recent advances in Alloy

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outline

three advances in Alloy

- [,] a new modelling idiom
- [,] a new engine/API
- * a new analysis feature

what is Alloy?

Alloy

a software modelling language

- [,] small and uniform ASCII syntax for first-order logic with relations
- [,] binding by parameters (with funs/preds) and free variables (with sigs)
- subtype and parametric polymorphism without casts
- [•] dependent declarations, multiplicity constraints

an analysis tool

- ' exhaustive analysis and simulation with bounded 'scope'
- based on off-the-shelf SAT solvers
- customizable visualization
- ' available as API for use in other tools


influences


[,] Z, VDM, Larch, Syntropy, etc; model checking

scope-complete analysis

observations about analyzing designs

- , most assertions are wrong
- ' most flaws have small counterexamples





testing: a few cases of arbitrary size scope-complete: all cases within small scope

applications of Alloy

in teaching

- [,] taught in over 30 courses worldwide
- [,] not just FMs and modelling; maths too (eg, Huth&Ryan, Trinity)

in research and industry

- First Alloy Workshop, September 2006 with FSE
- [,] Airbus, AT&T, Galois, IBM, NASA, Navteq, Northrop Grumman, Telcordia

applications to date

- [,] design analysis
- [,] test case generation
- , code verification
- [,] automatic configuration

elements of alloy

alloy in 3 slides

signatures

- Provide classification hierarchy for sets
- composite structure of objects
- local name space for relations
- incremental development

relational logic

- ' simple and uniform
- [,] generalized join

facts, predicates and assertions

' simple packaging of constraints

signatures & fields

sig A $\{\}$

-- introduces a set of atoms called A

sig B extends A {}

-- introduces a subset B of A

sig C extends A {}

-- introduces a subset C of A disjoint from B

sig A {f: B}

-- introduces a binary relation from A to B called f

sig A {f: B->C}

-- introduces a ternary relation from A to B to C called f

relational operators

 $p + q \qquad \{t \mid t \in p \lor t \in q\}$

- $p q \qquad \{t \mid t \in p \land t \notin q\}$
- $p \& q \qquad \{t \mid t \in p \land t \in q\}$

 $p \rightarrow q \quad \{(p_1, \dots, p_n, q_1, \dots, q_m) \mid (p_1, \dots, p_n) \in p \land (q_1, \dots, q_m) \in q$

p.q { $(p_1, ..., p_{n-1}, q_2, ..., q_m)$ | $(p_1, ..., p_n) \in p \land (p_n, q_2, ..., q_m) \in q$ }

- $p \text{ in } q \qquad \{(p_1, \ldots p_n) \in p\} \subseteq \{(q_1, \ldots q_n) \in q\}$
- $p = q \qquad \{(p_1, ..., p_n) \in p\} = \{(q_1, ..., q_n) \in q\}$

```
eg, given sig A {f: B->C}, a: A, b: B, c: C
some expressions and their types:
a.f: B->C
f.c: A->B
b.(a.f): set C
```

constraints & commands

fact $\{F\}$

-- establishes formula F, as an assumption

pred P () {Fp}

-- declares predicate P; invocation equivalent to inlining Fp

assert A () {Fa}

-- declares assertion A, claiming that formula Fa is valid

run P

-- instructs analyzer to find instance satisfying facts and Fp

check A

-- instructs analyzer to find instance satisfying facts and **not** Fa

favorite example: hotel locks

hotel locking


recodable locks (since 1980)

- ' new guest gets a different key
- ' lock is 'recoded' to new key
- [,] last guest can no longer enter

how does it work?

Iocks are standalone, not wired






a recodable locking scheme

card has two keys if first matches lock, recode with second

if second matches, just open




a new idiom

local state

sig Key {}

```
sig Card {k1, k2: Key}
-- c.k1 is first key of card c
-- k1.k is set of cards with k as first key
sig Guest {
    holds: Card -> Time
    }
-- g.holds.t is set of cards g holds at time t
sig Room {
```

```
key: Key one -> Time,
prev: Key lone -> Time,
occ: Guest -> Time
}
-- r.key.t is key of room r at time t
```



events as objects

```
Room
                                                                   events/Event
                                                                                 key. Key
                                                                                             Key.
abstract sig Event {
                                                                    (post, pre)
                                                                                 prev. Kev
  pre, post: Time }
                                                                                     OCC.
                                                                    HotelEvent
                                                                                  Guest
abstract sig HotelEvent extends Event {
                                                                   guest: Guest
  guest: Guest
                                                                                        holds
                                                            RoomCardEvent
                                                                                        Card
                                                              card: Card
                                                                            Checkout
                                                                                       k1: Kev
sig Checkout extends HotelEvent { }
                                                             room: Room
                                                                                       k2: Kev
abstract sig RoomCardEvent extends HotelEvent {
  room: Room,
                                                             Checkin
                                                                       Enter
  card: Card
                                                              NormalEnter
                                                                           RecodeEnter
sig Checkin extends RoomCardEvent { }
```

abstract sig Enter extends RoomCardEvent { }
sig NormalEnter extends Enter { }
sig RecodeEnter extends Enter { }

constraining events

```
abstract sig Enter extends RoomCardEvent { }
```

```
card in guest.holds.pre
```

```
sig RecodeEnter extends Enter { }
  {
    card.k1 = room.key.pre
    key.post = key.pre ++ room -> card.k2
  }
```

frame conditions

```
sig RecodeEnter extends Enter { }
  card.k1 = room.key.pre
  key.post = key.pre ++ room -> card.k2
  prev.unchanged
  holds.unchanged
  occ.unchanged
pred Event.unchanged (field: univ -> Time) {
  field.(this.pre) = field.(this.post)
pred Event.unchanged (field: univ -> univ -> Time) {
  field.(this.pre) = field.(this.post)
```

frame conditions, Reiter-style

```
sig Room {
  key: Key one -> Time,
  prev: Key lone -> Time,
  occ: Guest -> Time
  Checkin.modifies [prev]
  (Checkin + Checkout).modifies [occ]
  RecodeEnter.modifies [key]
  }
pred modifies (es: set Event, field: univ -> Time) {
  all e: Event - es | field.(e.pre) = field.(e.post)
```

generating traces

```
open util/ordering[Time] as time
```

```
sig Time {}
```

```
abstract sig Event {
    pre, post: Time
  }
```

```
fact Traces {
    all t: Time - last | one e: Event | e.pre = t and e.post = t.next
}
```

is it safe?

```
assert NoBadEntry {
    all e: Enter | let occs = occ.(e.pre) [e.room] |
        some occs => e.guest in occs
    }
```

check NoBadEntry for 5

summary

to use idiom


- [,] open library module providing Event, unchanged, traces
- [,] add Time column to time-varying fields
- ' declare events with pre/post conditions

advantages


- [,] dynamic aspect doesn't interfere with subtyping of domain objects
- [,] classification of events factors out common elements
- [,] can express LTL properties and more

a new engine [Emina Torlak]


why a new engine?





why a new engine?



alloy 3 API









kodkod

alloy analyzer 4.0











kodkod




kodkod structure



- new translation to propositional logic based on sparse matrices
- new sharing detection based on compact boolean circuits

performance

analysis time, seconds



a new analysis [Emina Torlak & Felix Chang]

multiple choice

1. suppose analyzer finds a counterexample to an assertion

- A. assertion is wrong
- B. analyzer is **broken**

2. suppose analyzer does *not* **find a counterexample**

- A. assertion is **valid** and **design is correct**
- B. assertion is valid but **design is too strong**
- C. assertion is valid but **assertion is too weak**
- D. assertion is invalid, has counterexample in larger scope

research question

' can we detect 2B, 2C, 2D?

exposing the proof

when no counterexample is found

- SAT solver creates a proof of unsatisfiability
- ' just a resolution graph over the clauses of the CNF

sometimes, not all clauses are used in the proof

- ' unused clauses are irrelevant
- Alloy constraints that translate to unused clauses are also!

scope to small

Executing "Check NoBadEntry for 2"

Solver=minisatprover(jni) Bitwidth=4 MaxSeq=2 Symmetry=20 1647 vars. 86 primary vars. 3117 clauses. 32ms. No counterexample found. Assertion may be valid. 88ms.

with only two time instants

no Enter event can happen
 (since Checkin must precede it)

highlighting shows

* Event postcondition irrelevant

```
sig Checkin extends RoomCardEvent { }
   no room.occ.pre
   card.k1 = room.prev.pre
   holds.post = holds.pre + quest -> card
   prev.post = prev.pre + + room -> card.k2
   occ.post = occ.pre + room -> guest
   key.unchanged
abstract sig Enter extends RoomCardEvent { }
   card in guest.holds.pre
sig NormalEnter extends Enter { }
   card.k2 = room.key.pre
   prev.unchanged
   holds.unchanged
   occ.unchanged
   key.unchanged
sig RecodeEnter extends Enter { }
   card.k1 = room.key.pre
   key.post = key.pre ++ room -> card.k2
   prev.unchanged
   holds.unchanged
   occ.unchanged
sig Checkout extends HotelEvent { }
```

some occ.pre.guest

model too strong

Executing "Check NoBadEntry for 5"

Solver=minisatprover(jni) Bitwidth=4 MaxSeq=5 Symmetry=20 22023 vars. 755 primary vars. 55638 clauses. 257ms. No counterexample found. Assertion may be valid. 1136ms.

to prevent double issue, wrote

all e1, e2: Checkin |
 e1.card.k2 != e2.card.k2

highlighting shows

- Checkin is irrelevant
- ' can never happen!

meant

all disj e1, e2: Checkin |
 e1.card.k2 != e2.card.k2

```
sig Checkin extends RoomCardEvent { }
   no room.occ.pre
   card.k1 = room.prev.pre
   holds.post = holds.pre + guest -> card
   prev.post = prev.pre ++ room -> card.k2
   occ.post = occ.pre + room -> guest
   key.unchanged
abstract sig Enter extends RoomCardEvent { }
   card in guest.holds.pre
sig Checkout extends HotelEvent { }
   some occ.pre.guest
   occ.post = occ.pre - Room -> guest
   prev.unchanged
   holds.unchanged
   key.unchanged
run {some Checkout}
run {some Enter} for 2
fact NoDoubleIssue {
   all e1, e2: Checkin | e1.card.k2 != e2.card.k2 -- dor
   all e: Checkin | e.card.k2 !in Room.key.first -- don't iss
```

assertion too weak

Executing "Check MustHoldKey for 3"

Solver=minisatprover(jni) Bitwidth=4 MaxSeq=3 Symmetry=20 4873 vars. 213 primary vars. 10471 clauses. 306ms. No counterexample found. Assertion may be valid. 143ms.

assert MustHoldKey { all e: Enter | e.card in e.guest.holds.(e.pre) } check MustHoldKey for 3

assertion is just a restatement

of precondition of Enter

highlighting shows

other Event constraints irrelevant

abstract sig Enter extends RoomCardEvent { }

card in guest.holds.pre

```
}
```

```
sig NormalEnter extends Enter { }
{
    card.k2 = room.key.pre
```

prev.unchanged holds.unchanged occ.unchanged key.unchanged }

```
sig RecodeEnter extends Enter { }
  {
    card.k1 = room.key.pre
    key.post = key.pre ++ room -> card.k2
```

prev.unchanged holds.unchanged occ.unchanged

```
sig Checkout extends HotelEvent { }
  {
    some occ.pre.guest
    occ.post = occ.pre - Room -> guest
```


prev.unchanged holds.unchanged key.unchanged }

other ongoing projects

code verification

a new tradeoff

- fully automatic, deep analysis of rich specifications
- ' counterexample traces generated



code verification progress

two aspects of work

- ' demand-driven specification extraction for called code (Mana Taghdiri)
- [,] efficient translation of code into Alloy (Greg Dennis)

current case studies

- [,] libraries (OpenJGraph, Sun Java Collections)
- [,] Quartz job scheduler
- KOA electronic voting system

experience

- [,] discovered subtle bugs missed by testing
- typical performance:
 - few thousand kloc
 - scope of 5 (types, loop unwindings)

proton therapy project

collaboration with BPTC

- [,] Burr Proton Therapy Center at MGH
- ' methods for safer software
- dependability & flexibility

projects to date

- beam scheduler design analysis
- emergency stop analysis (code dependences)
- ' end-to-end dependability case



infrastructure development

recent news

' awarded \$800k by NSF (June 2007)

plans

- tool improvements
- [,] educational materials
- ' user community website
- , case study repository

for more information

about Alloy

http://alloy.mit.edu

about Kodkod

http://web.mit.edu/~emina/www/kodkod.html

about the Software Design Group

http://sdg.csail.mit.edu

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