

Lecture #11

Last Time: Introduction to Linear Programs

weak duality, projection onto convex set, Farkas' Lemma

Today: Strong Duality and Complementary Slackness

Recall "standard" form

$$(P) \max c^T x$$

$$\text{s.t. } Ax = b$$

$$x \geq 0$$

$$(D) \min y^T b$$

$$\text{s.t. } y^T A \geq c^T$$

And Farkas' Lemma (proved last time)

Lemma: Exactly one of the following holds

$$(1) \exists x \text{ s.t. } Ax = b, x \geq 0 \quad \text{"(P) is feasible"}$$

$$(2) \exists y \text{ s.t. } y^T A \geq 0, y^T b < 0$$

Many forms of LPs, weak duality, Farkas' Lemma, etc

Once you have one, can obtain others by reduction:

Lemma: Exactly one of the following holds

$$(1') \exists x \text{ s.t. } Ax \leq b$$

$$(2') \exists y \text{ s.t. } y^T A = 0, y \geq 0, y^T b < 0$$

Proof: Let's map (1') into the form of (1)

Consider the linear system:

$$(1) \begin{bmatrix} A & -A & I \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x^+ \\ x^- \\ s \end{bmatrix} = b, \quad \begin{bmatrix} x^+ \\ x^- \\ s \end{bmatrix} \geq 0$$

slack vars

given a soln x with $Ax \leq b$, we can take

$$x^+ = \max(x, 0), \quad x^- = -\min(x, 0), \quad s = b - Ax$$

to get a soln to (1). Conversely given a soln to (1), set

$$x = x^+ - x^-$$

and it satisfies $Ax \leq b$.


Now appealing to our first version of Farkas' lemma, if (1) has no soln then

$$y^T [A, -A, I] \geq 0, \quad y^T b < 0$$

does. This is equivalent to

$$y^T A = 0, \quad y \geq 0, \quad y^T b < 0 \quad \square$$

Pictorially, the proof technique is:



This is a general pattern how to obtain alternate forms for facts about LPs.

Now let's prove strong duality.

Let $z^* \in \mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty\} \cup \{+\infty\}$ be optimal value of (P)
 \uparrow infeasible \uparrow unbounded objective value

Let $w^* \in \mathbb{R} \cup \{-\infty\} \cup \{+\infty\}$ " of (D)
 \uparrow unbounded \uparrow infeasible

Theorem If either (P) or (D) is feasible

$$z^* = w^*$$

assuming (P) is feasible, similar argument works if (D) is feasible

Proof. If (P) is unbounded and $z^* = +\infty$, then by weak duality $w^* = +\infty$.

Otherwise let x^* be optimal solution to (P), $z^* = c^T x^*$
we are looking for y with

$$\begin{cases} b^T y \leq z^* \\ A^T y \geq c \end{cases} \equiv \begin{cases} \begin{bmatrix} -A^T \\ b^T \end{bmatrix} y \leq \begin{bmatrix} -c \\ z^* \end{bmatrix} \end{cases}$$

If there is no such y then by Farkas' Lemma (alt version)

$$\exists x, \lambda \text{ s.t. } [x^T, \lambda] \begin{bmatrix} -A^T \\ b^T \end{bmatrix} = 0 \quad (*)$$

$$x^T \geq 0, \lambda \geq 0 \text{ and } -x^T c + \lambda z^* < 0$$

Case #1: If $\lambda > 0$ then rescale

$$x \leftarrow \frac{x}{\lambda}$$
$$\lambda \leftarrow 1$$

still feasible for (*) and $Ax = b$, $x \geq 0$, $c^T x > z^*$,
thus x^* was not optimal $\Rightarrow \Leftarrow$


Case #2: If $\lambda = 0$ then $Ax = 0$, $x \geq 0$, $c^T x > 0$

Now $x^* + x$ is feasible for (P), but strictly larger
objective value $\Rightarrow \Leftarrow$

thus there is a y that certifies x^* is optimal. \square

Let's see a powerful application, to zero sum games
strategies for B

Payoff matrix



A gets $+M_{ab}$
B gets $-M_{ab}$

Example: Colonel Blotto e.g.

(1) A has r armies, B has s armies both
divide their armies among two mountains

(2) A loses if he is outnumbered in either, otherwise wins

$$x \geq 0 \text{ and } \sum x_i = 1$$

$$y \geq 0 \text{ and } \sum y_i = 1$$

Theorem [von Neumann] There are randomized strategies x, y and a value v s.t.

$$(1) \quad x^T M \geq v \cdot \mathbf{1} \quad \text{"amount A can guarantee"}$$

$$(2) \quad M y \leq v \cdot \mathbf{1} \quad \text{"amount B can guarantee"}$$

Proof [sketch]: Set up (1) as an LP, then (2) is the dual \square

\uparrow \uparrow
 $\max v$ $\min v$

v is called the game value, and not only does the theorem above give a powerful characterization, it can even be computed.

Lots of things go wrong when not zero sum, or with more than two players.

Let's unravel strong duality further

Lemma [Complementary Slackness] Let x and y be feasible for (P) and (D). Then both x and y are optimal iff $x_i > 0 \Rightarrow (y^T A)_i = c_i$

Proof: Follow proof of weak duality: Because $y^T A \geq c^T$ and $x \geq 0$ we have

$$y^T b = y^T A x \geq c^T x$$


$\underbrace{\hspace{2cm}}_{=b}$

If for any i , $x_i > 0$ and $(y^T A)_i > c_i$ then " \geq " is actually " $>$ ", thus x and y cannot both be optimal.

If for all i , either $x_i = 0$ or $(y^T A)_i = c_i$ or both then " \geq " is actually " $=$ " which implies both x and y are optimal. \square

Now let's give an interpretation of duality thru physics

$$\text{Let } P = \{y \text{ s.t. } A^T y \geq c\}$$



Dictionary between LPs and physics

LPs

$-b$

rows of A^T

$$\exists x \geq 0, x^T A^T = b$$

$$x_i > 0 \Rightarrow (A^T y)_i = c_i$$

complementary slackness

Physics

"gravity"

normals to walls

forces balance at equilibrium

only walls touching, exert force

Note: If x and y satisfy complementary slackness, there is no duality gap. This can be turned into proof of strong duality, but details are subtle.