

Supervised Learning with Massart Noise

Ankur Moitra (MIT)

Simons Institute Bootcamp Tutorial, Part 3


In 1984, Valiant introduced the **PAC Learning Model**:

- (1) Given samples (X, Y) where the distribution on X is arbitrary and Y is a label that is $+1$ or -1
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
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


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Probably **A**pproximately **C**orrect

MODELS FOR NOISE


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Standard frameworks:

Random Classification Noise: Each label is flipped with some fixed probability




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


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[Blum et al. '98]: There is a polynomial time algorithm for learning halfspaces under random classification noise

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[Daniely '16]: Distribution-independent **weak** agnostic learning of halfspaces is **hard**

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Are there distribution-independent algorithms for learning with Massart noise?

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Can we achieve OPT efficiently?

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Theorem [Chen, Koehler, Moitra, Yau '20]: There is a polynomial time algorithm for learning **generalized linear models** under Massart noise

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In particular, this includes noisy logistic regression as a special case

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Additionally can give new distribution-dependent evolutionary algorithms that are resilient to drift from this connection

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
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


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The trouble is, the loss is **nonconvex** as a function of w

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
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


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


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
The loss function is convex, and achieving zero loss is equivalent to fitting the samples exactly

CONVEX SURROGATES, CONTINUED

What happens when we add noise?


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
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
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CONVEX SURROGATES, CONTINUED

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The ReLU loss is not representative of how many examples you are getting wrong

You could incur a huge loss for a single mistake, if it is far from the decision boundary, or incur a tiny loss for many mistakes as long as they are close

CONVEX SURROGATES, CONTINUED


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
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
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Intuition: For examples far from decision boundary, the gain when you get it right **offsets** the loss when its label is flipped (on average)

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A GENERAL FRAMEWORK

Consider the following two-player game

$$\min_{\|w\| \leq 1} \max_c \mathbb{E}[c(X) \ell_\lambda(-Y \langle w, X \rangle)]$$


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where c ranges over all distributions

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While you might do well overall according to the Leaky ReLU, because the adversary added less noise, the max player can always restrict to where you are doing poorly

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Unfortunately, optimizing over the max-players strategies is both statistically and computationally hard

A GENERAL FRAMEWORK, CONTINUED

Instead we work with a relaxation where the max-player can only restrict the distribution to **slabs along the current w**

$$\min_{\|w\| \leq 1} \max_{r > 0} \mathbb{E}[\ell_\lambda(-Y \langle w, X \rangle) | -r \leq \langle w, X \rangle \leq r]$$

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
We will show that any approximate equilibrium necessarily corresponds to a hypothesis with low error

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Definition: The **margin** is the smallest distance of any example from the true decision boundary


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Key Lemma #1 [Diakonikolas et al.]: In the Massart noise model, for any $\lambda \geq \eta$ and distribution on X with margin γ

$$L_\lambda(w^*) \leq -\gamma(\lambda - \text{err}(w^*))$$

Leaky ReLU loss on distribution

PROOF OF LEMMA 1

Proof: The key is to first condition on X , then randomness of noise

$$L_\lambda(w^*) = \mathbb{E} \left[\left(\mathbb{P}[\text{sgn}(\langle w^*, X \rangle) \neq Y | X] - \lambda \right) |\langle w^*, X \rangle| \right]$$

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Moreover, this is true even if we change the distribution by restricting to a part of the domain – **not true in agnostic learning**

ANALYZING THE GAME, CONTINUED


Key Lemma #2 (simplified): In the Massart noise model, suppose that $\text{err}(w) \geq \lambda$. Then there is some slab $S(w, r)$ with

$$L_{\lambda}^{S(w,r)}(w) \geq 0$$


Leaky ReLU loss on distribution conditioned on being in $S(w, r)$

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If the current direction w does not achieve small enough error, then the max-player can do well in the game

Thus doing well, with respect to the min-player, is equivalent to achieving small error

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which completes the proof by contradiction. 

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- Loss Functions and Convex Surrogates
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THE ALGORITHM

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- **Initialize** w to a vector in the unit ball
- **Repeat**
 - **Max-Player** finds the slab $S(w, r^*)$ that maximizes the loss $L_\lambda^{S(w, r^*)}$. If the loss is $\leq \epsilon$ then **return** w
 - **Min-Player** takes a step in the direction $-g$ where

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Full version needs to use the empirical loss, and restrict the max-player to search only over slabs with nonnegligible mass

BOUNDING THE NUMBER OF ITERATIONS

The key point is that by convexity we have

$$L_{\lambda}^{S(w,r^*)}(w) - L_{\lambda}^{S(w,r^*)}(w^*) \leq \langle -g, w^* - w \rangle$$

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Finally [**Zinkevich '03**] proved that projected gradient descent achieves low regret, so this cannot happen for too many steps

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

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We measure overall accuracy and accuracy on the part of the target group that is above \$50k



EXPERIMENTS

Target group: African Americans





EXPERIMENTS

Target group: Female




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Target group: Immigrant



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
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Many natural algorithms (e.g. logistic regression) amplify bias in the data – to achieve good overall accuracy they compromise the accuracy on various demographic groups

EXPERIMENTS

Target group: Immigrant



In contrast, our algorithm does just as well in overall accuracy minus the side effects – without knowing the identity of these protected groups

DISCUSSION

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However they are difficult to achieve

From a practical standpoint, is there a sense in which making an algorithm more robust can also make it more fair?

e.g. because it can tolerate heterogenous noise

Differentially private algorithms are robust, and have even been used for fairness, but our notions of robustness in learning theory tend to be quite different (not worst-case)

Summary:

- Polynomial time algorithm for learning a halfspace under Massart noise
- Extensions to Generalized Linear Models
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Thanks! Any Questions?