@unpublished{BE20,
    author = { Carsten Baum and Hongrui Cui and Ivan Damgard and Kevin Esvelt and Mingyu Gao and Dana Gretton and Omer Paneth and Ron Rivest and Vinod Vaikuntanathan and Daniel Wichs and Andrew Yao and Yu Yu},
    title = { Cryptographic Aspects of {DNA} Screening },
    date = { 2020-01 },
    url = { https://www.securedna.org/manuscript/Cryptographic_Aspects_of_DNA_Screening" },
    urla = { <a href="https://securedna.org">SecureDNA</a> },
    abstract = {Securely screening synthetic DNA orders is crucial to minimizing the number of individuals and groups capable of accessing biological weapons of mass destruction, but it must be accomplished without disclosing information on potential bioweapons. Accomplishing this goal requires: 1) screening orders against a database of hazardous sequences, whose secrecy should be protected at the highest possible level while preserving usability; 2) protecting the privacy of the client synthesizer's queries. In this document, we propose a cryptographic screening protocol that accomplishes these objectives, providing accurate complexity-theoretical assumptions, precise security guarantees, and rigorous mathematical proofs. In addition to technical details, we also explain the reasoning behind our protocol design for the benefit of non-cryptographers.},
}