@InProceedings{BHRVx17,
  Author =       { Matthew Bernhard and J. Alex Halderman and Ronald Rivest and
                   Poorvi Vora and Peter Ryan and Vanessa Teague and Josh Benaloh and
                   Philip Stark and Dan Wallach },
  title =        { Public Evidence from Secret Ballots },
  date =         { 2017-10-25 },
  OPTyear =      { 2017 },
  OPTmonth =     { October 25, },
  venue =        { Bregenz, Austria },
  eventtitle =   { {E-Vote-ID 2017} },
  eventdate =    { 2017-10-24/2017-10-27 },
  urla =         { <a href="https://www.e-vote-id.org/">conference</a> },
  urlb =         { <a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.08619">arXiv</a> },
  abstract = { Elections seem simple-aren't they just about counting?
                  But they have a unique, challenging combination of
                  security and privacy requirements. The stakes are
                  high; the context is adversarial; the electorate
                  needs to be convinced that the results are correct;
                  and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. They
                  also have practical constraints: time is of the
                  essence, and voting systems need to be affordable
                  and maintainable, as well as usable by voters,
                  election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not
                  surprising that voting is a rich research area
                  spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical
                  systems analysis, usable security, and
                  statistics. Election integrity involves two key
                  concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are
                  correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing
                  assurance that there is no evidence about how any
                  given person voted. These are obviously in
                  tension. We examine how current systems walk this
                  tightrope.
              },
}