@InProceedings{CCCCx10,
  Author = 	 { Richard Carback and David Chaum and Jeremy Clark and John Conway and
                   Aleksander Essex and Paul S. Herrnson and Travis Mayberry and Stefan Popoveniuc and
                   Ronald L. Rivest and Emily Shen and Alan T. Sherman and Poorvi L. Vora },
  title = 	 { Scantegrity {II} Municipal Election at {Takoma Park}: The first {E2E}
                   Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy },
  url =          { http://www.usenix.org/events/sec10/tech/full_papers/Carback.pdf },                  
  booktitle =    { Proceedings USENIX Security 2010 },
  date =         { 2010 },                  
  publisher =    { USENIX },
  editor = 	 { Ian Goldberg },
  OPTyear =      { 2010 },
  OPTmonth =     { August 11-13, },                  
  eventdate =    { 2010-08-11/2010-08-13 },
  eventtitle =   { USENIX '10 },                  
  venue =        { Washington, D.C. },                  
  OPTpages = 	 {},
  abstract =     { 
                  On November 3, 2009, voters in Takoma Park,
                  Maryland, cast ballots for the mayor and city
                  council members using the Scantegrity II voting
                  system---the first time any \emph{end-to-end (E2E)} voting
                  system with ballot privacy has been used in a
                  binding governmental election. This case study
                  describes the various efforts that went into the
                  election---including the improved design and
                  implementation of the voting system, streamlined
                  procedures, agreements with the city, and
                  assessments of the experiences of voters and poll
                  workers.  
                  \par
                  The election, with 1728 voters from six
                  wards, involved paper ballots with invisible-ink
                  confirmation codes, instant-runoff voting with
                  write-ins, early and absentee (mail-in) voting,
                  dual-language ballots, provisional ballots, privacy
                  sleeves, any-which-way scanning with parallel
                  conventional desktop scanners, end-to-end
                  verifiability based on optional web-based voter
                  verification of votes cast, a full hand recount,
                  thresholded authorities, three independent outside
                  auditors, fully-disclosed software, and exit surveys
                  for voters and pollworkers.  
                  \par                  
                  Despite some glitches,
                  the use of Scantegrity II was a success,
                  demonstrating that E2E cryptographic voting systems
                  can be effectively used and accepted by the general public.
                 },
}