Scan, Shuffle, Rescan: Two-Prover Election Audits With Untrusted Scanners

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Abstract. We introduce a new way to conduct election audits using untrusted scanners. Post-election audits perform statistical hypothesis testing to confirm election outcomes. However, existing approaches are costly and laborious for close elections—often the most important cases to audit—requiring extensive hand inspection of ballots. We instead propose automated consistency checks, augmented by manual checks of only a small number of ballots. Our protocols scan each ballot twice, shuffling the ballots between scans: a “two-scan” approach inspired by two-prover proof systems. We show that this gives strong statistical guarantees even for close elections, provided that (1) the permutation accomplished by the shuffle is unknown to the scanners and (2) the scanners cannot reliably identify a particular ballot among others cast for the same candidate. Our techniques drastically reduce the time, expense, and labor of auditing close elections, which we hope will promote wider deployment.

1 Introduction and motivation

Election outcomes are determined by tabulating the votes cast in the election and identifying the winner: for plurality elections, the winner is the candidate who received the most votes. In the United States, the electorate is relatively large and ballots are often complex, and (unusually) ballot processing and tabulation are typically performed by machine [33].

Machines provide efficiency, but do not guarantee accuracy. Individuals, corporations, and nation-state actors all have strong incentives to influence the results of political elections. Even absent deliberate tampering, election machinery—for scanning, tabulation, or otherwise—may have software bugs or be misconfigured for a particular election. Such factors can cause incorrect election outcomes that may be hard to detect.

(Statistical) post-election audits [8,30] (aka “risk-limiting audits”) provide safeguards to assure election officials and the public that the ballots cast were tabulated and reported accurately—or alert them if not. The standard way to conduct a post-election audit is to (1) inspect a random sample of ballots by

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** Work done while at UC Berkeley and MIT. The author is now at Google Research.

5 See Jones [28] and Bajcsy et al. [1] for more on U.S. ballot processing technology.
hand, and (2) assess the likelihood of such a sample supposing the reported outcome was incorrect. This can give a rigorous statistical guarantee about the election outcome’s likely correctness based on the sample, without the need to hand-count every ballot. But such statistical guarantees come at a cost that can be significant to often underresourced local election officials [33]. In close elections, statistical audits require laborious manual inspection of many ballots, and in very close elections a full hand recount may be needed to get a meaningful statistical guarantee (such as in Georgia’s 2020 election in the U.S. [22]).

Recognizing the importance of verifying election results and detecting errors, some states now require post-election audits by law for at least some contests, and all U.S. states allow recounts for close elections [33,45,34]. The EAC surveys post-election audits [16]. Verified Voting and Citizen for Election Integrity Minnesota have produced an excellent report on post-election audits and recounts [47], which notes that many recounts are actually performed by “rescans” (the topic of this paper). Recent U.S. elections and political discourse (e.g., [29,35,49]) further underscore the need for transparency and public confidence in electoral systems. Such confidence is as much a sociopolitical as a technical phenomenon: as such, technical transparency and verifiability are needed, but are not sufficient by themselves.

In this paper, we ask: can partial automation improve post-election audit efficiency for close elections, by reducing the costly manual labor required? Inspired in part by multiprover interactive proof systems [3], we propose a new kind of post-election audit, called a rescan audit, with the potential to reduce labor in close elections to handling just tens of ballots for a range of realistic parameters—at the cost of 2–3 times overhead in mechanical ballot processing, and two assumptions on communication and ballots (Section 3.1). The overhead and assumptions are more suitable in certain election contexts than others, and the assumptions are not plausible for all election contexts, as we detail later.

We formalize a threat model and security guarantees for rescan audits, then propose two rescan protocols for election auditing, and prove statistical concrete soundness guarantees for them.

**Our approach** Our rescan audits compare the ballot-by-ballot results from two separate scans of all ballots. The second scan provides consistency checks that can be used to obtain statistical guarantees for the correctness of the election outcome reported by the first scan, without trusting either scanner to behave correctly. In practice, an additional scan of the ballots is already sometimes performed, for auditing or other purposes [10,23,9].

However, a second scan alone is insufficient to guarantee election integrity in the presence of colluding adversarial scanners. For example, the scanners may agree in advance on a set of indices and misreport the votes on ballots in those positions. If both scanners operate on the same sequence of ballots, their outputs would appear consistent. Similarly, if the scanners are misconfigured the same way—e.g., if they ignore the first batch of ballots, or are preloaded with the results of a prior election—they will produce consistent incorrect outputs. See Bernhard [6] for further discussion of adversarial attacks.

Thus, an additional scan only offers a useful guarantee if the scanners cannot coordinate their misreporting. To prevent coordination, we shuffle the ballots
between scans so the scanners do not observe the ballots in the same order. Thus, adversarial scanners will be unable to consistently misreport the same set of ballots—unless they misreport all ballots cast for some candidate. We can detect such extreme misbehavior by manually inspecting just a few ballots. Our audits are built from this basic sequence: scan, shuffle, rescan, supplemented with manual handling or inspection of only a few ballots.

In order to prevent malicious scanners from coordinating their misreporting, our security proofs additionally assume that ballots cast for the same candidate are indistinguishable from one another. This assumption is not realistic in certain settings: e.g., high-resolution scanners that can identify paper fiber patterns. However, it is more plausible with some existing lower-resolution equipment, and we believe future study of scanning hardware and ballot design could further improve its plausibility, as discussed more in Section 3.1 and Appendix H. Future work weakening the indistinguishability assumption would also be of interest.

Figure 1 gives an overview of our rescan audit workflow. The set of ballots \( x \) is scanned on scanner \( S_1 \), to give a sequence of cast-vote records (CVRs) \( y \) indicating how the scanner interpreted each ballot. A labeler \( L \) then applies random-looking unique identifiers (labels) to the ballots (e.g., by printing), after which the ballots are permuted by shuffler \( \Pi \). The ballots are then scanned on a second scanner \( S_2 \) (possibly the same as \( S_1 \)), yielding a second list \( z \) of CVRs. Because each scan processed the same ballots, every CVR in \( y \) should also appear in \( z \), but the two scanners see the ballots in seemingly unrelated orders (so the order of CVRs in \( y \) differs from that in \( z \)). Hence, erroneous or adversarial scanners would have an extremely low chance of misreporting exactly the same ballots in \( y \) and \( z \).

The comparison logic does ballot-level comparison, finding corresponding CVRs in \( y \) and \( z \). To do this, it must know how the collection of ballots was permuted. This is achieved using the labels applied before the shuffle, which can be read by \( S_2 \) and included in the CVRs in \( z \). The labels can be generated using a secret key shared by the labeler and the comparison logic, but unknown to \( S_2 \). This allows the comparison logic to reconstruct the order of ballots seen by \( S_1 \), while ensuring that \( S_2 \) cannot do so.

In addition to comparing the CVRs in \( y \) and \( z \), our protocols require manual inspection of a small number of ballots. For single-batch two-candidate elections, a hand inspection of a few ballots sampled at random is sufficient. In more general settings, we introduce test ballots for each candidate that are distinguishable from real ballots by humans but not by the scanners (e.g. by edge markings). Test ballots allow us to ensure that all candidates, including those who received only a few votes, were correctly allocated their votes in each batch. Test ballots are unnecessary in many realistic settings, as when every candidate is likely to

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6 For simplicity, this discussion assumes a ballot contains a single contest. We discuss ballots with multiple contests later in the paper.

7 Alternatively, in place of the labeler, one could use a keyed shuffle to reorder the ballots in a way known to the comparison logic but unknown to \( S_2 \). Keyed shuffles pose more practical difficulty than unkeyed shuffles, as further discussed in Appendix H.
have received several votes in each batch of ballots. For ease of exposition and greater generality, the presentation in this work uses test ballots.

Labeling of ballots is not new. It is well established practice in ballot-comparison audits to add labels to voted ballots so that the electronic records scanned from those ballots can be matched to the original paper ballots [32].

Fig. 1: Flow diagram of an election with a rescan audit. Pink (hatched) components are untrusted (i.e., may have been corrupted by an adversary); yellow (solid) components are trusted, and unable to examine the votes on the ballots. See Section 3.1 for more detail on the threat model.

Evaluation We conduct an evaluation based on timing and cost data from the Rhode Island pilot study of risk-limiting audits [23]; while audit costs are likely to vary significantly, the RI report provides the best documentation currently publicly available on the costs and timings of risk-limiting audits under realistic conditions. Our analysis shows that for elections with margins under roughly 1%, rescan audits are competitive with or better than the best known statistical risk-limiting audits. The metrics we use for evaluation are: (1) number of ballots that must be handled manually, based on our security proofs; (2) estimated timings, based on the timings of key audit operations as documented in the Rhode Island pilot study and subsequent research; and (3) labor costs (excluding training and equipment), again based on Rhode Island data.

Risk-limiting auditing systems [30] typically require hand inspection of a number of ballots dependent on the proportional margin. To our knowledge, our protocols are the first where the efficiency of the manual audit depends instead on the absolute (reported) margin. We achieve this due to the fact that our rescan procedure already induces consistency checks on all ballots without any manual examination whatsoever, whereas the size of the sample of ballots inspected by a traditional hand audit must depend on the relative margin.

Since manual labor in rescan audits depends only weakly on the margin, the workload is identical for a wide range of margins. This means rescan audit workload is highly predictable in advance. In contrast, traditional risk-limiting

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8 If test ballots are not used, batches that lack reported votes for any candidate must be hand-recounted; the overhead of doing so depends on the per-batch vote distribution.

9 E.g., for absolute margins of at least 100 votes, with risk limit $\alpha = 0.05$. 
audit workload varies much more, depending on the initial sample of ballots: particularly for close elections, unlucky samples may lead to workload escalation even to a full recount. The greater predictability of rescan audits is desirable for real-world audits subject to budgetary constraints and statutory deadlines.

Conventional risk-limiting audits can be more efficient for elections with wide margins, so in practice, a rescan audit could be invoked only when an election is close. Alternatively, rescan audits may be a desirable alternative when a conventional risk-limiting audit requires a full hand recount.

**Summary of contributions**
- We introduce a new paradigm, *rescan audits*, which utilizes additional ballot scans to substantially reduce manual labor in statistical post-election audits, subject to clearly specified assumptions.
- BasicAudit (§4) is a simple protocol designed for a single two-candidate contest where all ballots are perfectly readable by the scanners and have no distinguishing features (beyond the vote itself).
- 2ScanAudit (§5) accounts for *multiple-candidate* contests, where auditing may be done in batches (e.g., by precinct), and supports *imperfect scanners* that may make errors. 2ScanAudit, unlike BasicAudit, involves mingling clearly marked *test ballots* with the voted ballots.
- Our concrete security guarantees for BasicAudit and 2ScanAudit (§§B–D) allow precise specification of parameter tradeoffs for different risk limits.
- Our evaluation (§6) indicates that for close elections, rescan audits are competitive with or better than the best known statistical risk-limiting audits, in terms of number of ballots handled manually, timing, and labor cost.

**Prior work** Mathematical and cryptographic methods have long been studied as ways to protect elections from abuse and to increase confidence in election outcomes (for some examples, see [12,11,21,37]).

Introductions to post-election audits can be found in Stark [40] (which introduces the notion of *risk-limiting tabulation audits*), Stark and Wagner [39], Lindeman and Stark [30], Bretschneider et al. [8], Verified Voting [46], and NCSL [34]. Harrison et al. [24] discuss the challenges of printing labels on ballots.

Calandrino et al. suggested using scanners to assist in ballot-level audits, in 2007 [10]. They used an auditing tabulator that labels ballots with identifying numbers so that high assurance could be achieved by hand checking the scans of a few randomly selected ballots. We improve on this with a second scan of all ballots instead of manual checking of a few. Rescanning itself is not new: e.g., “transitive audits” [30] use a rescan to process ballot labels. Rescanning was pioneered in Humboldt County, California [18], and the Clear Ballot Group’s *ClearAudit* was certified in Florida in 2014 [20]. These audits rely on independently developed scanners and tabulation software to impede collusion between the scans. Our proposal is the first to suggest rescanning for comparison between scanned ballot values.

The developers of the *Rijnland Internet Election System* found that mingling test ballots with real ballots provides a useful test of voting system integrity [27]. Our use of test ballots is different, but we also mix them with real ballots.

Finally, our ideas are inspired by *multi-prover proofs* in cryptography [3], but our techniques differ because of the concrete statistical guarantees we seek.
and the practical constraints of physical ballot processing. Moreover, two-prover proofs require that the provers be unable to communicate, while our non-communication assumption is weaker, allowing the two scanners to communicate.

2 Background and terminology

An election has one or many contests. A general election may have many contests, each between a number of candidates. We focus initially on auditing a single two-candidate contest. We assume that all contests are plurality contests.

A voter submits (casts) a paper ballot that indicates the voter’s selections (or votes) for each contest. We assume that each ballot is a single piece of paper, ignoring elections with multi-page ballots. A paper ballot is voter-verifiable: a voter can confirm before casting that it correctly records his/her votes. A human examining the voter’s cast paper ballot will see the voter’s correct or true selection for each contest. Ballots may be scanned individually when cast, or may be collected into batches for later scanning—say, one per precinct. Ballots may be labeled with a unique ballot label by a labeler. The ballot label, if visible at the time of scanning, is included in the CVR for the ballot. Test ballots are ballots that the humans, but not scanners, can distinguish from cast ballots, those from real voters. Test ballots are mingled with the cast ballots before the first scan to create a stream of test-or-cast ballots. They remain mixed with the ballots until the end, when they can be separated by hand from the cast ballots. The votes on the test ballots are known in advance, so they can be subtracted from the totals regardless of the disposition of the test ballots.

The reported contest tally says how many votes are reported for each candidate in the contest. The reported contest outcome or reported winner is the candidate with the most reported votes. The true winner is defined similarly, based on the true votes cast in that contest. The reported margin of victory is the difference between the numbers of votes reported for the reported winner and the reported runner-up.

2.1 Scanners

An optical scanner (or scanner for short) reads a sequence of cast paper ballots to produce a cast vote record (or CVR) for each ballot scanned. The CVR is an electronic record giving the scanner’s interpretation of the voter’s selection for each contest, known as the reported selection. If a ballot has been labeled, we ask the scanner to include the ballot label in the CVR. Scanners may also provide digital images of each ballot scanned. We allow scanners to examine all ballots in a batch before producing the file of CVRs for those ballots.

Scanners are much faster than hand counting. While precinct-count scanners are relatively slow, central-count scanners able to scan 800 to 1000 ballots per

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10 We assume throughout that ballot labels are unique. This is without loss of generality: while an adversarial labeler could print non-unique labels, this would cause a detectable discrepancy and so would only harm the adversary.

11 As a further fail-safe mode — in case of extensive controversy over an election such that such subtraction is insufficient to restore public confidence — removing all the test ballots can be verifiably achieved with comparable work to a full recount.
minute have been made [43] and speeds of 300 ballots per minute are now common [2,38]. Many high-speed scanners can be programmed to deliver ballots into 2 or 3 output hoppers to help separate ballots into 2 or 3 categories.

We define a perfect scanner as one that scans perfectly accurately: that is, its interpretation of scanned votes is always equal to the true votes. Real scanners are not perfect; errors may occur for many reasons.\footnote{The full version provides more data and discussion on scanner error in practice.}

2.2 Audits

A manual post-election audit may be used to assure that reported contest outcomes are correct when imperfect scanners are used. In these, cast ballots are selected for hand examination. A manual recount examines and tallies all cast ballots by hand, while a statistical audit examines only a random sample. When ballots are tabulated in batches, a batch-level audit may be used, recounting randomly selected batches to check batch tallies. All manual audits require auditors able to hand-interpret ballots.

Statistical audits are very efficient when the fractional margin in an election is large. These come in two main types. In ballot-polling audits, the sampled ballots are manually counted and tallied, while in ballot-comparison audits, each sampled ballot additionally is manually compared to the corresponding CVR. In each case a statistical test is performed to determine whether the manual count provides statistical support for the reported election outcome. A risk-limiting audit examines an increasingly larger sample of cast ballots in such a way that the total chance of stopping the audit and accepting an incorrect reported outcome is bounded by a given risk limit. Risk limits used by U.S. jurisdictions in practice range between 1–10\% [23,15]. All statistical audits require a process for drawing random samples [41].

3 Model

Basic notation We use boldface (e.g., \(v\)) to denote vectors, and subscripts to denote elements of a vector (e.g., \(v_i\) is the \(i\)th element of \(v\)). For \(N \in \mathbb{N}\), \([N] = \{1,\ldots,N\}\). We write \(\text{Sym}_N\) to denote the set of all permutations of \(N\) elements. If \(v\) is an \(N\)-element vector and \(\pi \in \text{Sym}_N\), we write \(\pi(v)\) to denote the result of applying permutation \(\pi\) to the positions of the elements of \(v\) (i.e., “shuffling” the elements of \(v\)). For \(i \in [N]\), we write \(\pi(i)\) to denote the index to which \(\pi\) maps its \(i\)th input element. For sets \(X,Y\), \(f : X \to Y\) means \(f\) is a function that maps each element of \(X\) to an element of \(Y\). For any vector \(x\), the number of nonzero elements of \(x\) is denoted by \(\|x\|_0\). For \(c \in [C]\), let \(c^{(t)}\) denote the \(t\)-tuple \((c,\ldots,c)\).

Ballots and ballot types Let \(N\) denote the number of ballots cast in an election; we assume \(N\) is known to all parties and devices. We assume that the election is for a single contest, unless stated otherwise. For a given contest, let \(C\) denote the number of candidates in the contest, and let the list of ballots cast for that contest be denoted by a vector \(x\) in \([C]^N\). We use \(M\) to denote an absolute margin of victory and \(m = M/N\) to denote a relative margin.

The type of a ballot is defined by the candidate preference indicated on the ballot: in a \(C\)-candidate contest, there are \(C\) ballot types (for simplicity of
modeling, we do not consider undervotes as a separate type). For $c \in |C|$, if a ballot indicates a preference for candidate $c$, we call it a ballot of type $c$.

**Manual ballot inspection** 

Recount($x$) denotes a full manual recount of the ballots $x$; it outputs a vector of results $y$ (and thus, implicitly, the true election outcome as well; the manual recount is correct by definition). HandInspect$_h(x)$ denotes a hand inspection of the first $h$ randomly sampled ballots among $x$; we will apply it to shuffled piles of ballots so that it represents a manual (“spot” or “hand”) check of random ballots. It outputs a vote vector $v = (v_1, \ldots, v_h)$ consisting of the results of the hand inspection of those ballots. Discrepancies found in such a manual check (with respect to reported values for those ballots) are called manual discrepancies.

**Hardware components**

Our audit procedures use three types of hardware components that handle paper ballots: scanners, labelers, and shufflers (as shown in Figure 1). **Scanners** are extensively discussed in Section 2.1. A **labeler** is a machine that takes a set of ballots and prints numbers or strings onto a specified part of each ballot (e.g., the left edge). A **shuffler** is a machine or procedure that takes a set of ballots in a certain order and permutes them into a different order. The permutation may or may not be known to the shuffler but is assumed to be random.\(^{13}\) An **unknown-shuffle** procedure $\tilde{x} \leftarrow \Pi(x)$ scrambles the order of ballots in a pile without knowing or revealing the permutation (consider strewing the pile of ballots on the floor and picking them up again, although that would not be appropriate in practice). A **known-shuffle** procedure $(\tilde{x}, \pi) \leftarrow \Pi(x)$ outputs the permutation $\pi$ alongside the shuffled ballots $\tilde{x}$ (such that $\tilde{x} = \pi(x)$).\(^{14}\) Section H discusses practical ways to achieve a known shuffle.

A shuffle procedure $\Pi$ is **hiding** if no efficient adversary given $\tilde{x}$ can learn any information about $\pi$. We require this property. Both known and unknown shuffles can be hiding, since the term (un)known refers to whether the shuffler itself knows the permutation, whereas the hiding property refers to whether the permutation can be learned just by looking at the output ballot stack. A **scanner function** is a function $S$ that maps a sequence $x$ of cast votes to a same-length sequence $y$ of cast vote records. We refer to a scanner as misreporting the $i$th ballot for input $x$ if $x_i \neq y_i$, i.e., if its output differs from its input at index $i$.

**Audit terminology**

A **risk limit** $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ is an upper bound on the conditional probability that if there is an error in the reported election outcome that the audit will fail to detect it. In other words, an audit with risk limit $\alpha$ will detect an error in the reported election outcome with probability at least $1 - \alpha$ (subject to any trust assumptions or cryptographic assumptions on which the statistical guarantees of the audit are based). Our terminology is consistent with the usual definition of a risk limit for a risk-limiting audit: whenever our audit detects an error in the reported outcome, it proceeds to a full recount to determine the correct election outcome, just as a standard risk-limiting audit escalates to a full manual recount.

\(^{13}\) Assuming a uniformly random shuffle simplifies the analysis but is not strictly necessary; a sufficiently entropic shuffle would suffice.

\(^{14}\) A **chosen-shuffle** procedure taking the permutation to be implemented as an input is more demanding, but a known-shuffle suffices for our purposes.
A rescan audit procedure $\text{Audit}$ for a single contest takes as input a sequence of $N$ ballots $x$, a risk limit $\alpha$, and (optionally) some additional parameters, and outputs $(\tau, y)$ where $\tau \in \{\text{hand, auto}\}$ and $y$ is a vector of length $N$ giving the results of scanning or manually inspecting the ballots in $x$. We say $\text{Audit}$ outputs the correct winner if the winning candidate $c_y$ based on the results $y$ output by $\text{Audit}$ is equal to the true winner $c_x$ of the contest. If $\tau = \text{auto}$, the accompanying $y$ represents the results of an optical scan. If $\tau = \text{hand}$, the accompanying $y$ represents the results of a full manual recount (which are correct by definition). The rescan audit procedure should be accompanied by provable guarantees that the output $y$ reflects the correct election outcome (i.e., the correct winner for each contest) with probability at least $1 - \alpha$ (subject to any explicitly stated conditions or assumptions). We say that an audit procedure accepts if it outputs $(\text{auto, \cdot})$.

3.1 Threat model and assumptions

Threat Model 1 BasicAudit and 2ScanAudit rely on the following set of trust assumptions (also expressed graphically in Figure 1 in Section 1):

- The scanners are untrusted (indicated in pink).
- The comparison logic—that is, the software that compares the scanners’ results—is untrusted (again pink), as its output can be independently verified.
- The labeler and shuffler used to implement a known shuffle are trusted not to communicate with each other (indicated in yellow). They need not be trusted to correctly implement a particular known shuffle.\footnote{We treat untrusted components as behaving arbitrarily, and possibly colluding with one another. Our protocols guarantee correction or detection of any errors due to adversarial (or otherwise erroneous) behavior of untrusted components. Our formal model and theorems assume that trusted components behave correctly. Section H discusses mitigating measures that could significantly improve our assumptions on trusted components in practice.}

We treat untrusted components as behaving arbitrarily, and possibly colluding with one another. Our protocols guarantee correction or detection of any errors due to adversarial (or otherwise erroneous) behavior of untrusted components. Our formal model and theorems assume that trusted components behave correctly. Section H discusses mitigating measures that could significantly improve our assumptions on trusted components in practice.

In order to avoid the necessity of trusting the comparison logic, we assume that both scanners’ outputs (CVRs and labels) are publicly released. This allows the comparison logic to be verified independently by any observer.

Assumptions Our protocols rely on two key assumptions. Their suitability in specific applications depends on these assumptions’ plausibility in those contexts.

- Non-communication assumption. We rely on the assumption (implicit in our threat models) that during the audit, the labeler and shuffler do not communicate with the second scanner. Our protocols are secure against arbitrary communication between the two scanners, and against arbitrary collusion between the labeler, shuffler, and scanners before the audit (e.g., they could be preprogrammed with a coordinated malicious strategy and shared secrets).

\footnote{Our election audits serve to check the outcome or winner, not the specific tallies for each candidate. In particular, $y$ may reflect the correct election outcome even if some of its reported ballot types are incorrect.}

\footnote{The shuffler’s intended operation is to mechanically perform a sufficiently entropic, unknown shuffle. Other parts of the protocol ensure we can figure out the permutation that occurred, after this shuffle is performed.}
whether by hardware/software developers or upstream supply chain links). Our non-communication assumption is needed because an adversarial labeler could otherwise transmit the permutation to the second scanner: e.g., by a covert wireless channel or by steganographic encoding in ballot labels. The 2021 EAC Guidelines [17, §14.2.E] strictly limit network connectivity in voting equipment. Non-communication between system components conforming to these guidelines can be enforced by physically separating machines, removing wireless ports, sealing wired ports, and limiting physical access. Note that close observation by officials and outside observers is a standard requirement for elections [19,44,13].

- **Ballot indistinguishability assumption.** Our security proofs rely on the assumption that scanners cannot identify a particular ballot among others cast for the same candidate. Without this — e.g., if ballots were uniquely identifiable by scanners — it would be straightforward for two scanners to collude to produce incorrect but consistent outputs.

Unfortunately, the ballot indistinguishability assumption does not hold for high-resolution scanners that can precisely observe paper fiber patterns or distinctive markings made by voters [14]. It may be more compatible with lower-resolution scanners: an area on which we would be keen to see further research (see Section H). We do not believe that the indistinguishability assumption holds in modern ballot scanning systems and recommend against real-world reliance on it in the near term. That said, we believe that our new audit paradigm is of theoretical interest and has the potential for future practicality. In that spirit, our results provide motivation for future work to weaken the indistinguishability assumption, as well as empirical and system design research on scanning hardware and ballot designs that are compatible with ballot indistinguishability.

Remark 1. When multiple contests are on the same ballot, malicious scanners could also use votes in other contests to distinguish between ballots to coordinate their cheating. This can be entirely prevented by use of a separate paper ballot for each race [4,48]. Alternatively, we could mask the scanners so that they only observe one one ballot column or ideally just one race, as discussed further in the next bullet and in Appendix H. Masking would also limit the ability of scanners to use stray marks to trigger cheating.

Remark 2. Appendix E offers a conjectural approach to improving these trust assumptions, at the expense of a third scan. We describe a protocol 3SCAN_AUDIT, conjecture its security, and discuss the challenges of proving its security.

4 BasicAudit

Our simplest model assumes a single two-candidate contest with perfect scanning equipment. Our protocol BasicAudit (Algorithm 2) uses two scanners $S_1, S_2$ and compares the results of the scans. First, $S_1$ scans the entire set of ballots. Then, the ballots are shuffled randomly before $S_2$ scans the ballots in shuffled order. These steps make up BasicAudit’s “scan-shuffle-rescan” or SSR subroutine (Algorithm 1). Our protocols depend on the scan discrepancy $d$,
Algorithm 1 Scan-shuffle-rescan (for $C$ candidates)

1: procedure $SSR_{S_1, S_2, \Pi}(x)$
2: $y \leftarrow S_1(x)$. // scanner 1’s output (on unshuffled ballots)
3: $(\tilde{x}, \pi) \leftarrow \Pi(x)$. // shuffle ballots
4: $z \leftarrow S_2(\tilde{x})$. // scanner 2’s output (on shuffled ballots)
5: $d \leftarrow ||\pi(y) - z||_0$. // # scan discrepancies
6: $\forall c \in [C], let q_c \leftarrow |\{k \in [N] : y_k = c\}|$. // tallies from $y$
7: $c_1 \leftarrow \arg \max_{c \in [C]} q_c$. // winner
8: $c_2 \leftarrow \arg \max_{c \in [C] \setminus \{c_1\}} q_c$. // runner-up
9: $M \leftarrow q_{c_1} - q_{c_2}$. // absolute margin
10: return $(\tilde{x}, y, z, \pi, d, M, (q_c)_{c \in [C]})$.
11: end procedure

Algorithm 2 Basic audit

1: procedure $BasicAudit_{S_1, S_2, \Pi}(x, \alpha)$
2: $(\tilde{x}, y, z, \pi, d, M, q) \leftarrow SSR_{S_1, S_2, \Pi}(x)$.
3: $h \leftarrow \left\lceil \log(\alpha) \log(1 - \alpha^2 / M^2) \right\rceil$. // # ballots to hand check
4: if $d = 0$ then // no discrepancies between two scans
5: $v \leftarrow HandInspect_h(\tilde{x})$. // check $h$ shuffled ballots
6: if $\forall j \in [h], v_j = z_j$ then // hand check matches scans
7: return (auto, $y$).
8: end if
9: else // one or more discrepancies between scans
10: $y \leftarrow Recount(\tilde{x})$. // full recount
11: return (hand, $y$).
12: end if
13: end procedure

the number of ballots that the two scans report differently. $BasicAudit$ concludes with manual inspection of a small number $h$ of ballots, and accepts only if the scan discrepancy is zero and hand inspection finds no other discrepancies. Otherwise, $BasicAudit$ triggers a full manual recount.

**Theorem 1** ($BasicAudit$). Let $S_1, S_2$ be scanner functions and let $\Pi$ be a hiding known-shuffle procedure. Let $x$ be the ballots cast in a contest. Then $BasicAudit_{S_1, S_2, \Pi}(x, \alpha)$ outputs the correct winner with probability $\geq 1 - \alpha$.

In contrast to cryptographic security guarantees, the risk limit $\alpha$ in risk-limiting audits is typically set to be a small constant such as 1% or 10% [30]. However, unlike existing risk-limiting audits, our scheme can also realize cryptographically small risk limits while still requiring hand inspection of only a small number of ballots, as discussed below.

Intuitively, the shuffling step serves to detect adversarial scanner behavior that incorrectly reports only some (but not all) ballots for any given candidate. To prove Theorem 1, we establish two important properties of $BasicAudit$: (1) an adversarial scanner behaves inconsistently on ballot types—i.e., if it assigns some ballots of type $a$ to one reported value and other ballots of type $a$ to
another reported value—then SSR will very likely detect this behavior; and (2) if a scanner is misreporting a fraction of the true winner’s votes, then hand inspecting a small number of ballots will very likely detect this. The full proof is in Appendix B, where these two properties are formalized as Lemmas 4 and 5.

Table 1(a) in Appendix C shows the number of ballots that must be hand inspected by BASICAUDIT, for different risk limits \( \alpha \) and absolute margins \( M \). As long as the reported margin is larger than 100, it suffices to hand inspect only five ballots to achieve a risk limit of 5%. Even with a reported margin as small as 10, it is sufficient to hand inspect only 10 ballots. These numbers demonstrate the potential power of our approach: with an additional scan, it suffices to hand-inspect an extremely small number of ballots even for very small margins.

**Parameter choice** The number \( h \) of hand-inspected ballots on line 3 of BASICAUDIT is chosen by balancing parameters to guarantee that if at least a \( \alpha^2/M \) fraction of ballots was misreported by the first scanner, then with probability \( 1 - \alpha \), one of the hand-inspected ballots must have been misreported.

**Implementing a known shuffle** We propose implementing a known-shuffle procedure using a labeler and an unknown-shuffle (i.e., a mechanical shuffler) as follows. (1) label the ballots \( x_1, \ldots, x_N \) with labels \( \ell_i = \text{Enc}_K(i) \) where \( \text{Enc}_K \) denotes encryption with a secret key \( K \); (2) apply an unknown shuffle to the ballots to obtain the ballots in a new order \( \tilde{x}_1, \ldots, \tilde{x}_N \); and (3) read and decrypt the labels on the permuted ballots to recover the original index of each permuted ballot, thus reconstructing the permutation implemented by the shuffle. Using encryption achieves the hiding property required by our protocols (see Section 3); otherwise, simply printing the original indices on the ballots would suffice.
Algorithm 4 Two-scan audit (main)

1: procedure 2ScanAudit$(S_1, S_2, B, (x_1, \ldots, x_B), \alpha)$
2: Let $t \leftarrow \lceil \frac{25}{8} \log \left( \frac{2^B C}{\alpha} \right) \rceil$. // # test ballots / cand.
3: for $b \in [B]$ do // batch-level audits
4: $(\tau_b, d_b, q_b, y_b, z_b) \leftarrow \text{Batch}_{S_1, b, S_2, b, C, B}((x_b, \pi), t)$.
5: end for
6: $c_1 \leftarrow \arg \max_{c \in [C]} \left\{ \sum_{b \in [B]} (q_b)_c \right\}$. // winner
7: $c_2 \leftarrow \arg \max_{c \in [C] \setminus \{c_1\}} \left\{ \sum_{b \in [B]} (q_b)_c \right\}$. // runner-up
8: $d \leftarrow \sum_{b \in [B]} d_b$.
9: $M \leftarrow q_{c_1} - q_{c_2}$. // margin
10: if $M \leq \max\{27 \cdot \log(2/\alpha), 8d\}$ then
11: // margin too small: recount
12: $\forall b \in [B]$ with $\tau_b = \text{auto}$, let $y_b \leftarrow \text{Recount}(x_b)$
13: $\forall b \in [B]$, let $\tau_b = \text{hand}$
14: end if
15: return $((\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_B), y_1, \ldots, y_B)$.
16: end procedure

5 \texttt{2ScanAudit}

In Algorithms 3 and 4, we present a rescan audit for more complex real-world scenarios: with many candidates, ballots audited in batches,\footnote{Since an election may be administered in many different places, it is impractical (and may be illegal) to move the ballots to a central location for auditing.} and imperfect scanners so long as the number of scanner errors does not change the outcome.

Unlike in the previous section, two scans combined and a hand inspection of a small sample of ballots does not suffice to audit the outcome with $C > 2$ candidates or with $B > 1$ batches. This is because the adversary may consistently misreport the votes cast for a candidate who received only a few votes in that batch, which would not be detected in a small sample. To address this problem, we introduce a fixed number $t$ of test ballots for each candidate in each batch. We define the \textit{test discrepancy} $\delta$ as the number of test ballots misreported by the second scanner. The test ballots serve to ensure that the stack of ballots contains at least a few ballots belonging to each candidate.\footnote{As noted in the introduction, test ballots can be avoided in many realistic situations.} By checking that the test ballots for each candidate are reported correctly by the second scanner, we can also ensure that the true votes cast for each candidate are reported correctly. This allows us to determine the plurality winner in elections with many candidates and to audit in separate batches. The use of these test ballots obviates the need for a hand inspection after the two scans. However, if too many test ballots in any batch are misreported, that batch is manually recounted. Moreover, if the reported margin is too small as a function of the risk limit or the discrepancy between the two scans across all batches is large compared to the margin, then all batches are manually recounted.
Theorem 2 ($2\text{SCANAudit}$). Let $S_1, S_2$ be scanner functions, let $\Pi$ be a hiding known-shuffle procedure, and let $x_1, \ldots, x_B$ be the ballots cast in batches $1, \ldots, B$ respectively. Then $2\text{SCANAudit}_{C_1, S_2, \Pi}((x_1, \ldots, x_B), \alpha)$ will output the correct winner with probability at least $1 - \alpha$.

The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix D. While its high-level outline is similar to the proof for $\text{BasicAudit}$, the analysis becomes significantly more complex due to the multiple candidates, batching, and imperfect scanners.

Efficiency In addition to the risk-limit property, it is desirable that an audit procedure only invokes recounts sparingly, when necessary to guarantee the correctness of the outcome. In $2\text{SCANAudit}$, a batch is recounted if at least $1/10$ of the test ballots for any candidate are misreported by the second scanner. All batches are recounted if either the overall reported margin is smaller than a function of the risk limit ($27 \log(2/\alpha)$) or the number of discrepancies between the scans is greater than $1/8$ of the overall reported margin. So, a recount is only invoked when there are many misreported ballots or a small margin of victory.

Parameter choices The value of $t$ on line 2 of $2\text{SCANAudit}$ is chosen so that with probability $1 - \alpha/2$, if the second scanner misreports a majority of the ballots for any candidate in any batch, then at least a small fraction ($1/10$) of the test ballots will be misreported, violating the test on line 6 of Batch. If the second scanner correctly reports a majority of the ballots for every candidate in every batch, the expected number of discrepancies between the scans is at least half the number of ballots misreported by the first scanner. The threshold for $M$ on line 10 of $2\text{SCANAudit}$ is then chosen so that with probability $1 - \alpha/2$, the number of ballots misreported by the first scanner is smaller than $M/2$.

Table 1(b) in Appendix C shows the number of test ballots $t$ and threshold margin $\tau_M$ for $2\text{SCANAudit}$ for various risk limits. We see that the number $t$ of test ballots per batch remains small for a wide range of risk limits $\alpha$. However, the margin threshold at which our analysis breaks down grows fairly quickly with the number of batches. Improving this dependence for better handling of many batches is a desirable future direction.

6 Evaluation of $\text{BasicAudit} \& 2\text{SCANAudit}$

We conduct an evaluation based on cost and timing data from the Rhode Island pilot study of risk-limiting audits [23]. While audit costs are likely to vary significantly, the RI report currently provides the best publicly available documentation on the costs and timings of risk-limiting audits under realistic conditions. The Rhode Island data is likely to provide a better estimate of realistic costs and timings than could experiments run in a research environment.

Our analysis shows that for elections with margins under roughly 1%, rescanning audits are competitive with or better than the best known statistical risk-limiting audits in terms of both time and monetary cost (provided that the assumptions required for rescanning audits are satisfied), as illustrated in Figure 2. An additional advantage of rescanning audits is their more predictable workload, since the workload of rescanning does not depend on the margin, and escalation to a

\text{19} Instead of using the fractional threshold $t/10$, we could instead test on line 6 whether any test ballot was misreported. This would also yield a valid audit, but could unnecessarily invoke a recount if a very small number of test ballots are misreported.
full recount is less likely (i.e. is required for a smaller range of margin values) in a rescan audit than ballot-polling or ballot-comparison audits. Election officials have indicated that a more predictable workload may be preferred even if it is likely to involve more work than a less predictable alternative [23].

**Manual ballot inspection** We compare the number of ballots that must be handled manually for each audit. For BASICAUDIT and ballot comparison or ballot polling audits, this refers to the number of ballots that are hand-inspected; for 2SCANAUDIT it refers to the number of test ballots.

**Timings and labor costs** We estimate timings for Figure 2 based on the timings of key audit operations as documented in the Rhode Island pilot study and subsequent systematization [23,5]. We estimate labor costs at $20 per person-hour and calculate person-hours per task based on the RI data. Appendix F describes the key RI data and precisely how our estimates are computed.

**Worked example.** Consider a two-candidate election with $N = 10,000$ ballots cast, relative margin $m = 1\%$ (i.e., absolute margin $M = 100$), and risk limit $\alpha = 5\%$. A **ballot-polling audit** would escalate to a full hand recount in this setting. A **ballot-comparison audit** would require roughly 600 ballots to be hand-inspected, yielding an estimated workload just short of 15 hours. We estimate our 2SCANAUDIT would take less than 8 hours in total: **less than 51\% of the time of a ballot comparison audit.** These estimates follow the same methodology as above; Appendix G gives a step-by-step breakdown of the calculations.

---

The plots depict small margin ranges to illustrate our schemes’ performance in the regime where they are competitive. Ballot-polling and ballot-comparison audits perform better for larger margins (not our target regime).
7 Conclusion

We present and analyze a new approach to post-election audits inspired by multi-prover proofs in cryptography, continuing a long tradition of designing election systems based on cryptographic paradigms. We formalize our new paradigm of rescan audits and present new protocols with security proofs, which rely on untrusted scanners and a very small amount of hand examination of ballots. Our protocols handle contests with multiple candidates, ballots that are batched, and error-prone scanners. Our methods are very efficient in the most critical cases where existing techniques have high cost: i.e., when margins are small.

The schemes we propose are not ready for near-term deployment. We recognize that there remain considerable challenges, both theoretical and practical, to our goal of enabling more automation to be used securely in election audits. However, we expect that further theoretical and practical refinements will lead to schemes with an increased domain of practicality. We offer additional discussion on open questions in Appendix H. We hope that the initial steps and new approach in this paper will guide future research towards making post-election audits both faster and cheaper, while keeping them secure.

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References


A Tail bounds

Lemma 1 (Hoeffding bound). Let $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ be independent $[0,1]$-valued random variables, and let $\overline{X} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i X_i$. Then for any $t \geq 0$, we have that
$$\Pr[|\overline{X} - E[\overline{X}]| \geq t] \leq e^{-2nt^2}.$$

Lemma 2 (Multiplicative Chernoff bound). Let $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ be independent $\{0,1\}$-valued random variables, let $\overline{X} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i X_i$ and $\mu = E[\overline{X}]$. Then for any $\delta \in (0,1)$, we have
$$\Pr[\overline{X} \geq (1 - \delta)\mu] \leq \left(\frac{e^\delta}{1 - \delta}\right)^\mu.$$

Lemma 3. (Hoeffding [26]) Let $X \sim \text{Hypergeom}(N, K, n)$ be distributed according to the hypergeometric distribution with $n$ samples on a population of size $N$ containing $K$ successes, and let $p = K/N$. Then for any $\zeta > 0$ we have
$$\Pr[X \leq (p - \zeta)n] \leq e^{-2\zeta^2 n} \text{ and } \Pr[X \geq (p + \zeta)n] \leq e^{-2\zeta^2 n}.$$
Proof. For \( j \in \{1, 2\} \), let \( E_j \) be the event that \( S_j \) assigns \( i \) type-a ballots to reported value \( \hat{x} \) and \( k - i \) ballots of type \( a \) to reported value \( 1 - \hat{x} \). Suppose (as in the lemma statement) that \( E_1 \) occurs. Then if \( E_2 \) does not occur, SSR will output a nonzero discrepancy with probability 1.

Now suppose that \( E_1 \land E_2 \) occurs. Consider the set of permutations that agree with \( \pi \) on all ballots not of type \( a \), where \( \pi \) is the permutation sampled by the routine SSR. There are \( k! \) such permutations. The input to the second scanner \( S_2 \) is identical for each of these permutations. SSR will output a nonzero discrepancy unless \( S_2 \) correctly guesses which ballots of type \( a \) \( S_1 \) assigned to each reported value. Hence, the probability that \( S_2 \) agrees with \( S_1 \) on each of the ballots of type \( a \) is at most \( i! (k - i)! / k! = 1 / (i/k)^i \).

Lemma 4 immediately yields the following corollary, which implies that SSR will identify a discrepancy with very high probability except in two cases: when almost all ballots cast for the winner are reported correctly (in which case there may be no discrepancy) and when almost all ballots cast for the winner are reported incorrectly.

**Corollary 1.** Suppose scanner \( S_1 \) reports the wrong vote on at least an \( \epsilon \) fraction of the \( W \) ballots cast for the true winner, where \( \epsilon \in [0, 1] \). Then an incorrect report will be detected — by SSR outputting a nonzero discrepancy — with probability at least \( 1 - \hat{\epsilon} W \hat{\epsilon} \) where \( \hat{\epsilon} = \min\{\epsilon, 1 - \epsilon\} \).

**Lemma 5.** Suppose scanner \( S_1 \) reports the wrong vote on at least an \( \epsilon \) fraction of the ballots cast for the true winner, where \( \epsilon \in [0, 1] \). Then an incorrect report will be detected with probability at least \( 1 - (1 - \epsilon/2)^h \) from a hand inspection of \( h \) distinct random ballots.

Proof. The true winner received at least \( N/2 \) votes, so our assumption implies that \( S_1 \) reports the wrong vote on at least \( \epsilon N/2 \) ballots. Call these ballots “bad ballots,” and call all the others “good ballots.” Then the fraction of bad ballots among all ballots is at least \( \epsilon/2 \). Consider the sequential selection of \( h \) random ballots (with replacement). For each ballot selected, the probability that the selected ballot is good is \( 1 - \epsilon/2 \). It follows that the probability \( p_{\text{miss}} \) that all of the \( h \) ballots selected for hand inspection are good is \( (1 - \epsilon/2)^h \). Finally, the probability that at least one of the hand-inspected ballots is bad is \( 1 - p_{\text{miss}} \).

**Theorem 1 (Correctness of BasicAudit)** Let \( S_1, S_2 \) be scanner functions and let \( \Pi \) be a hiding known-shuffle procedure. Let \( \mathbf{x} \) be the ballots cast in a contest. Then BasicAudit\(^{S_1,S_2,\Pi}(\mathbf{x}, \alpha) \) outputs the correct winner with probability \( \geq 1 - \alpha \).

Proof. Suppose the reported winner is incorrect and the reported margin is \( M \). Then at least \( M/2 \) votes for the true winner must have been erroneously reported by scanner \( S_1 \) as votes for the true loser. For any \( \delta \in [0, 1/2] \), consider two cases as follows.

**Case I:** Less than a \( \delta \) fraction of the true winner’s votes were misallocated by \( S_1 \). As noted above, the fraction \( \epsilon < \delta \) of misreported votes
is at least $(M/2)/W$, where $W$ is the true number of votes for the true winner. By Corollary 1, SSR (within BasicAudit) outputs a zero discrepancy with probability at most $e^{W\epsilon} \leq e^{M/2} \leq \delta^{M/2}$ (since $\epsilon \geq (M/2)/W$ and $\epsilon < \delta$).

**CASE II:** At least a $\delta$ fraction of the true winner’s votes were misallocated by $S_1$. In this case, Lemma 5 implies that hand-inspecting $h$ random ballots will detect an error with probability at least $1 - (1 - \delta^2)^h$. It follows that BasicAudit outputs the correct winner with probability at least $1 - \min_{\eta \in [0, \frac{1}{2}]} \max \{\eta^{M/2}, (1 - \eta/2)^h\}$. Taking $\eta = \alpha^{2/M}$, since $h = \lceil \log(\alpha)/\log(1 - \alpha^{2/M}/2) \rceil$ in BasicAudit (Algorithm 2, line 3), the theorem follows.

### C Parameter tradeoff tables for BasicAudit and 2ScanAudit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
<th>Reported margin $M$</th>
<th>$B = 1$</th>
<th>$B = 20$</th>
<th>$B = 200$</th>
<th>$B = 2000$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0.09$</td>
<td>$7$</td>
<td>$4$</td>
<td>$4$</td>
<td>$4$</td>
<td>$4$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.05$</td>
<td>$10$</td>
<td>$5$</td>
<td>$5$</td>
<td>$5$</td>
<td>$5$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.01$</td>
<td>$21$</td>
<td>$8$</td>
<td>$7$</td>
<td>$7$</td>
<td>$7$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^{-21}$</td>
<td>$\ast$</td>
<td>$230$</td>
<td>$80$</td>
<td>$71$</td>
<td>$70$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: (a) BasicAudit number of ballots $h = \lceil \log(\alpha)/\log(1 - \alpha^{2/M}/2) \rceil$ to be hand-counted for risk limit $\alpha$ and reported margin $M$. Starred entries are larger than 1000 and are not recommended for use. (b) 2ScanAudit recount threshold $\tau_M = \lceil 27 \log(2/\alpha) \rceil$ on the margin and number $t = \lceil (25/8) \log(2BC/\alpha) \rceil$ of test ballots per candidate per batch with risk limit $\alpha$, $B$ batches, and $C$ candidates. A full hand recount will be invoked if $M \leq \tau_M$ or $M \leq 8d$.

### D Proofs for 2ScanAudit

**Theorem 2 (Correctness of 2ScanAudit)** Let $S_1, S_2$ be scanner functions, let $H$ be a hiding known-shuffle procedure, and let $x_1, \ldots, x_B$ be the ballots cast in batches $1, \ldots, B$ respectively. Then $2ScanAudit_{S_1, S_2, H}^C((x_1, \ldots, x_B), \alpha)$ will output the correct winner with probability at least $1 - \alpha$.

**Proof.** Follows from Lemmata 6 and 8.

**Lemma 6.** Take any batch $b \in [B]$ and any candidate $c \in [C]$. Let $k_{b,c}$ be the true number of votes cast for $c$ in batch $b$, and let $v_{b,c} \leq t + k_{b,c}$ be the number of the $t + k_{b,c}$ ballots for $c$ in batch $b$ (including test ballots) that the second scanner in batch $b$ incorrectly reports as being for a candidate other than $c$. Let $E$ be the event that for every batch $b$ where $\exists c \in [C]$ such that $v_{b,c} \geq (t + k_{b,c})/2$, are manually recounted in the algorithm. Then $\Pr[E] \geq 1 - B \cdot C \cdot \exp(-8t/25)$. 


Proof. Let $E_{b,c}$ be the event that $v_{b,c} < (t + k_{b,c})/2$, i.e., the event that less than half of all ballots (including test ballots) of type $c$ in batch $b$ are misreported by the second scanner. Let $E_b$ be the event that either $E_{b,c}$ occurs for all $c \in [C]$, or batch $b$ is manually recounted in the algorithm. Note that $E = E_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge E_B$.

Take any batch $b \in [B]$ and candidate $c \in [C]$ such that $v_{b,c} \geq (t + k_{b,c})/2$. Let $R_b$ be the event that batch $b$ is manually recounted in the algorithm. Let $Q_{b,c}$ be the event that the second scanner misreports. Then $Q_{b,c} \Rightarrow R_b$.

Conditioned on $\neg E_{b,c}$, we bound the probability of $Q_{b,c}$. Let $X$ be the number of test ballots of type $c$ that the second scanner misreports. Then $X \sim \text{Hypergeom}(t + k_{b,c}, v_{b,c}, t)$ and $\delta \geq X$. Using Lemma 3 with $p = v_{b,c}/(t + k_{b,c})$ and $\zeta = 2/5$:

$$
\Pr[Q_{b,c} | \neg E_{b,c}] = \Pr[\delta < t/10] \leq \Pr[X < t/10] = \Pr[X < (p - (p - 1/10)) t] \leq \Pr[X < (p - 2/5) t] \leq \Pr[X \leq (p - \zeta) t] \leq \exp(-2\zeta^2 t) \quad (\text{by Lemma 3})
$$

Now returning to analyze $E_b$, we have

$$
E_b = (E_{b,1} \wedge \cdots \wedge E_{b,C}) \vee R_b
= (E_{b,1} \vee R_b) \wedge \cdots \wedge (E_{b,C} \vee R_b)
\supset (E_{b,1} \vee \neg Q_{b,1}) \wedge \cdots \wedge (E_{b,C} \vee \neg Q_{b,C}) \quad (\because \neg Q_{b,c} \Rightarrow R_b)
$$

Using the final expression above to bound $\Pr[E_b]$, we have

$$
\Pr[E_b] \geq 1 - \sum_{c \in [C]} \Pr[\neg E_{b,c} \wedge Q_{b,c}] \quad (\text{union bound})
\geq 1 - \sum_{c \in [C]} \Pr[Q_{b,c} | \neg E_{b,c}]
\geq 1 - C \cdot \exp(-8t/25)
$$

Finally, we apply another union bound to get

$$
\Pr[E] = \Pr[E_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge E_B] = 1 - \Pr[\neg E_1 \vee \cdots \vee \neg E_B]
\geq 1 - B \cdot C \cdot \exp(-8t/25) .
$$

Lemma 7 (Concentration of sums of hypergeometrics). For $i \in [k]$, let $X_i \sim \text{Hypergeom}(N_i, K_i, n_i)$ be independently hypergeometrically distributed. Let $X = \sum_i X_i$, $n = \sum_i n_i$, and $\mu = \E[X]$. Then for any $\delta \in (0, 1)$

$$
\Pr[X < (1-\delta)\mu] \leq \left(\frac{e^{-\delta}}{(1-\delta)^{1-\delta}}\right)^\mu .
$$
The proof of Lemma 7 is in the full version.

**Lemma 8.** Suppose \( t \geq \frac{22}{N} \cdot \log \left( \frac{2BC}{\alpha} \right) \), and let \( \ell \) be the number of ballots misreported by \( S_1 \) across all candidates and batches. Then we have that with probability at least \( 1 - \alpha \), either \( \ell \leq 13 \cdot 04 \log(2/\alpha) \) or \( d > \ell/4 \).

**Proof.** For each batch \( b \in [B] \) and candidate \( c \in [C] \), let \( N_{b,c} \) be the number of ballots in batch \( b \) for candidate \( c \) (including the \( t \) test ballots), and let \( K_{b,c} \) and \( n_{b,c} \) be the number of these ballots that are misreported by scanners \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \), respectively, where we take the convention that \( K_{b,c} = n_{b,c} = 0 \) for all batches \( b \) that were recounted in the algorithm. Then the number of these ballots that are misreported by \( S_1 \) and not by \( S_2 \) is distributed according to

\[
X_{b,c} \sim \text{Hypergeom}(N_{b,c}, K_{b,c}, N_{b,c} - n_{b,c}).
\]

By Lemma 6, we have that with probability at least \( 1 - B \cdot C \cdot \exp (-8t/25) \geq 1 - \alpha/2 \) that each batch for which \( S_2 \) misreports at least half of the ballots for any candidate is manually recounted. Condition on the event that this holds. Then we have that \( n_{b,c} \leq N_{b,c}/2 \) and consequently \( \mu \geq \frac{1}{2} \sum_{b,c} K_{b,c} = \ell/2 \).

Then by Lemma 7 we can bound the total number of discrepancies by

\[
\Pr[d < \ell/4] \leq \Pr[\sum_{b,c} X_{b,c} < \mu/2] \leq (2/e)^{\mu/2}
\]

which is at most \( \alpha/2 \) as long as \( \mu \geq 2 \log(2/\alpha)/\log(e/2) \), i.e. whenever \( \mu \geq 6.52 \log(2/\alpha) \). For the case \( \mu < 6.52 \log(2/\alpha) \), observe that \( \ell \leq 2\mu < 13.04 \log(2/\alpha) \). Since we have conditioned on an event of probability \( 1 - \alpha/2 \), the conclusion follows by a union bound.

### E 3ScanAudit

The protocols above rely on a known-shuffle procedure (implemented by a labeler and an unknown-shuffle procedure, as in Section 4). Next, we outline a candidate
scheme 3SCANAUDIT that we conjecture is secure even in a stronger (and thus preferable) threat model in which all software components are untrusted: i.e., the only trusted components are simple, non-programmable hardware devices.

**Threat Model 2** 3SCANAUDIT is designed for the following stronger, and thus preferable, threat model (also expressed graphically in Figure 3 in Section E):
- The scanners and comparison logic are untrusted (pink).
- The shuffler is purely mechanical; its reliable mechanical operation is trusted but it requires no trusted software (indicated in blue).\(^2^0\) Again, the shuffler need not implement a particular known shuffle.
- The printer, a new component not present in the other protocols, is untrusted (pink). Unlike the labeler of the previous threat model, it does not need to produce random or pseudorandom labels, and could simply print the values 1 through \(N\) in order.

Specifically, 3SCANAUDIT would remove the need to trust the labeler, by ensuring that labels are unrelated to the order of ballots in the first scan. Moreover, in contrast to our previous protocols, 3SCANAUDIT’s shuffler may be entirely mechanical with no software component, as 3SCANAUDIT requires only an unknown shuffle procedure that does not output the permutation implemented. Compared to our earlier protocols, 3SCANAUDIT involves one additional shuffle and one additional scan.

Provable security for 3SCANAUDIT appears substantially more complex, and to require qualitatively new techniques, compared to the analyses of our other schemes. Providing a complete security proof for 3SCANAUDIT is an open question that we would be keen to see addressed in future work. In the full version, we provide a preliminary analysis with high-level proof intuitions, and briefly discuss its overhead and some potential drawbacks. Here, due to space constraints, we simply state the scheme and security conjecture.

**Candidate scheme** 3SCANAUDIT is illustrated in Figure 3: it involves two (unknown) shuffles and three scan procedures. 3SCANAUDIT’s innovation is to remove trust in the ballot labeling process and remove the need for a known shuffle, by: (1) shuffling the ballots immediately after labeling \((\Pi_1)\), before any

\(^{20}\) Limiting the trusted hardware to simple, purely mechanical, non-programmable components is desirable because it allows the same hardware to be used without modification for each election, reducing the attack surface.
scans take place; then (2) using scanners to read vote values and labels both before and after the second shuffle (Π₂). 3SCANAUDIT uses test ballots in the same way as 2SCANAUDIT. Intuitively, the first shuffle Π₁ serves to remove any adversarial ordering of labels. The first two scan procedures S′, S₁ occur before Π₂: they respectively scan the labels and vote values and are assumed to have physical read access only to the portion of the ballot containing the label or voter markings, respectively. Then, as before, the final scan S₂ occurs after Π₂ and reads both labels and vote values. This results in four scan outputs: ℓ′ from S′; y from S₁; and (z, ℓ) from S₂. Then, these scan results y, z, ℓ′, ℓ are checked for consistency by comparison-logic software. Based on ℓ′ and ℓ, the comparison logic can compute the permutation π of the ballots between the first and second scan (if the scanners behave honestly), and thus check whether each ballot value in y is equal to the corresponding value in z. If the scanners behave dishonestly, the inferred permutation π will be incorrect, and this is very likely to cause discrepancies in the comparison logic, as further argued below.

Crucially, this design means that each ballot scan is independent of the ballot permutation π and the ballot labels are independent of the associated vote values. From an entropy perspective, the design is equivalent to the simple “bipartite graph scheme” illustrated in Figure 4 — in which there are no labels, there is one single trusted unknown shuffle, and: S₁, given true ballot values x, outputs scanned values y; S₂, given true shuffled ballot values π*(x), outputs scanned values z; and S′, given true permutation π*, outputs an alleged permutation π. The comparison logic then takes the three outputs y, z, π and checks whether y ≈ π(z), like in 3SCANAUDIT (Figure 3).

Conjecture 1. There exist a number of test ballots t and thresholds on the number of misreported test ballots and on the size of the reported margin (independent of the total number of ballots N) such that 3SCANAUDIT outputs the correct winner with probability at least 1 − α.

Preliminary analysis We now give some intuition behind the conjectured soundness of 3SCANAUDIT. For ease of exposition, the analysis below considers the simpler “bipartite graph scheme” (Figure 4). Let us consider the scans S′, S₁, S₂ in turn.

If S′ behaves honestly (and the labels are distinct), the inferred permutation π will be correct, so the ballot shuffle amounts to a known-shuffle procedure, and the analysis of 2SCANAUDIT holds. Consequently, any successful attack must have S′ output an incorrect label scan.

Now, if S₁ and S₂ behave honestly but S′ behaves dishonestly, S′ has no information about the outputs of S₁ and S₂. Then, the chance that any incorrect edge that S′ produces will pass the comparison logic’s consistency check is close to the probability that two randomly sampled ballots have the same value. In close elections, this probability will be close to 1/2, so the probability that S′ can output n incorrect edges and still pass the comparison logic’s checks shrinks with 1/2^n.

21 See Section H and “Scanner masking assumption” under Section 3.1 for more discussion on scanner masking.
The most subtle case to analyze is when $S'$ is dishonest and $S_1, S_2$ are also dishonest. Then, in the locations where $S_1, S_2$ output incorrect ballot values that are independent of the true ballot values, $S'$ may be able to compute the outputs of $S_1, S_2$. However, if any such location is inspected by the hand audit, the hand audit will immediately detect a discrepancy. If the fraction of such locations is $\phi$, the probability of evading detection by the hand audit shrinks with $(1 - \phi)^h$. Hence, a successful attack must have a relatively small $\phi \ll 1/2$, i.e., not many locations where $S_1, S_2$ output incorrect values that are independent of the true values.

Finally, if $\phi \ll 1/2$, the ballots on which $S_1$ output incorrect ballot values that are independent of the true ballot values are very unlikely to be the same physical ballots on which $S_2$ outputs such incorrect values. That is, there will be many physical ballots for which $S_1$ outputted an incorrect value but $S_2$ did not, and vice versa. If $S'$ outputs the correct edge at any one of these locations, then the comparison logic will detect a discrepancy. But if $S'$ outputs an incorrect edge at every such location, then a significant fraction (around $1 - \phi^2$) of these incorrect edges must connect to output values on which $S_1$ or $S_2$ were honest. Since $S'$ has no information about the output values at these locations, the likelihood that each such edge passes the consistency checks is low (close to $1/2$ in a close election). Therefore, such an attack should be very likely to be detected by the comparison logic whenever $S'$ outputs a significant number of incorrect edges.

**Additional considerations for a full analysis** It may seem intuitive that the adversary cannot obtain an advantage by outputting an incorrect mapping, since matching up many ballots cast for different candidates makes it likely for discrepancies to be detected. However, this turns out not to be the case: there are nontrivial attacks that involve misreporting in the label scan $S'$, as described in the next paragraph. These attacks are not fatal, but they complicate the rigorous analysis of 3SCANAUDIT and rule out a range of intuitive proof approaches. In particular, bounds on error probabilities for 3SCANAUDIT must be slightly worse than error probabilities for our schemes based on a trusted shuffle, though we expect them still to be exponentially small.

As an illustration, consider a very close election and an adversary wishing to change the outcome by flipping a single vote. If $S'$ is honest, then the probability of both scanners flipping the same vote from the winner to the loser is roughly $1/(n/2) = 2/n$. But if $S'$ observes a sequence of labels beginning with label “k” and misreports by swapping the positions of labels “1” and “k”, then $S_1$ can misreport its first ballot and $S_2$ can misreport the ballot with label “1”. Due to the misreport of $S'$, these ballots are associated in the comparison logic. As long as the ballots labeled “1” and “k” have the same cast vote, no discrepancy will be detected, so this adversary successfully flips a single vote from the winner to the loser in a close election with probability roughly $1/4$.

Although this attack improves the adversary’s chance of flipping a single vote undetected, the probability of flipping $t$ votes undetected decreases exponentially in $t$. Hence, it fails to provide a meaningful break to the security of the scheme: even in elections with small reported margins, the probability of this attack flipping the outcome undetected is well below any standard risk limit. Yet the
existence of such attacks appears to add substantial complexity to the security analysis.

F Workload evaluation

Manual ballot inspection We compare the number of ballots that must be handled manually for each audit. For BasicAudit and ballot comparison or ballot polling audits, this refers to the number of ballots that are hand-inspected; for 2ScanAudit it refers to the number of test ballots. The number of ballots hand examined by a ballot-polling audit (e.g., BRAVO [31]) is an estimated $2 \ln(1/\alpha)/m^2$ ballots for a relative margin of $m = M/N$. The number of ballots hand examined by a ballot-comparison audit (e.g., Shangrila [42]) is approximately $1/m$ times fewer, or $2 \ln(1/\alpha)/m$ ballots [30].

Timings We estimate timings for Figure 2 based on the timings of key audit operations as documented in the Rhode Island pilot study [23] (summarized in Table 2) and research systematizing the Rhode Island pilot data [5], 22

The Rhode Island study used two ES&S DS850 scanners, whose specifications indicate a processing speed of 300 ballots per minute; however, the pilot study found that “the DS850 tends to jam frequently” and “most of the scanner operator’s time was not spent actually scanning the ballots, but handling them before and after the scan,” resulting in a 4–5 times slower throughput [23].

The scanning and hand inspection steps in our protocols have direct equivalents in the Rhode Island ballot-comparison pilot, from which timings can be drawn. We estimate test ballot preparation time to be 25s, conservatively bounding it by the time to examine a retrieved ballot: if test ballots are machine-produced, then a human will need to examine them; if they are hand-produced, 25s should suffice to fill in a prescribed bubble; and no retrieval is required. We estimate labeling and shuffling time by a single pass of all the ballots through a modern ballot scanner such as the DS850. As discussed in Section H, we envision a “reverse riffle shuffle” followed by cuts, using just a single pass to avoid the prohibitive cost of a fully random shuffle.

Labor costs We estimate labor costs for Figure 2 using a rough estimate of $20 per person-hour and supposing, consistently with the Rhode Island pilot data, that: a scanner operator can operate two scanners at once, teams of two retrieve ballots for inspection, and teams of five examine retrieved ballots. 23

These labor costs do not account for training and equipment. The Rhode Island figures suggest that initial equipment setup may cost roughly $4,235 per audit location; however, personnel costs are expected to dominate future audit costs, after equipment setup [23].

$N$, $h$, $t$, $C$, and $B$ are as defined in BasicAudit and 2ScanAudit and $R_s$, $R_{bp}$, $T_{r bp}$, $R_{bc}$, $T_{rc}$, $T_{ex}$, and $T_{opn}$ are as defined in Table 2. BP stands for ballot-polling and BC stands for ballot-comparison.

22 Where applicable, we interpret the RI data favorably for the ballot-polling and ballot-comparison audits (e.g., using 35s, not 230s, for ballot-polling retrieval time)—conservatively evaluating our own protocols in comparison.

23 We omit the labor cost of the randomness generation step as it is unclear how many paid personnel would be required and the cost is both relatively small and the same for all schemes we consider.
Table 2: Operation timings based on Rhode Island data [23]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Timing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Random seed/key generation</td>
<td>14m (one-off)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scan or label ballots**</td>
<td>4,000 ballots/h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescan &amp; prepare ballots (for ballot-comparison audit)</td>
<td>3,240 ballots/h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rescan &amp; prepare ballots (for ballot-polling audit)</td>
<td>4,770 ballots/h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrieve a specified ballot (for ballot-comparison audit)</td>
<td>45s average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retrieve a specified ballot (for ballot-polling audit)</td>
<td>25s fastest method, 230s slowest method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examine a retrieved ballot</td>
<td>25s for one contest**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open a box of ballots^26</td>
<td>15s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here are the formulae we use for Figure 2 timing estimates:

- **BP:** \( T_t + \frac{N}{R_{bp}} + (T_{rbp} + T_{ex}) \cdot 2 \ln(1/\alpha)/m^2 \).
- **BC:** \( T_t + \frac{N}{R_{bc}} + (T_{rbc} + T_{ex}) \cdot 2 \ln(1/\alpha)/m \).
- **BASIC AUDIT:** \( T_t + 2 \cdot \frac{N}{R_s} + \frac{N}{R_{bc}} + T_{opn} + h \cdot T_{ex} \).
- **2SCAN AUDIT:** \( T_t + 3 \cdot \frac{N}{R_s} + C \cdot B \cdot t \cdot T_{ex} \).

Let \( R_L \) be the cost of labor per person-hour. Here are the formulae we use for Figure 2 cost estimates:

- **BP:** \( R_L \left( 2T_t + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{N}{R_{bp}} + (2T_{rbp} + 5T_{ex}) \cdot 2 \ln(1/\alpha)/m^2 \right) \).
- **BC:** \( R_L \left( 2T_t + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{N}{R_{bc}} + (2T_{rbc} + 5T_{ex}) \cdot 2 \ln(1/\alpha)/m \right) \).
- **BASIC AUDIT:** \( R_L \left( 2T_t + \frac{1}{2} \left( 2 \cdot \frac{N}{R_s} + \frac{N}{R_{bc}} \right) + T_{opn} + h \cdot 5T_{ex} \right) \).
- **2SCAN AUDIT:** \( R_L \left( 2T_t + \frac{3}{2} \cdot \frac{N}{R_s} + C \cdot B \cdot t \cdot 5T_{ex} \right) \).

G Detailed worked example

Recall that we consider a two-candidate election with \( N = 10,000 \) ballots cast, relative margin \( m = 1\% \) (i.e., absolute margin \( M = 100 \)), and risk limit \( \alpha = 5\% \).

- **A ballot-polling audit** (e.g., BRAVO [31]) requires hand examining around \( 2 \ln(1/\alpha)/m^2 = 60,000 \) ballots. That is, a ballot-polling audit would require a full hand recount in this setting.

- **A ballot-comparison audit** (e.g., Shangrila [42]) requires approximately \( 1/m \) times fewer hand comparisons, leading to a rough estimate of 600 ballots being inspected [30]. We estimate the workload of a ballot-comparison audit to be just short of 15 hours using the formulae in Appendix F. The seed generation takes roughly 14 minutes, the scan and preparation for manual inspection takes about 3.1 hours, and retrieving and manually inspecting the 600 ballots would take about 12.5 hours, for a total of 15.8 hours.

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24 Estimate from [23, footnote 59].
25 This timing scales sublinearly for multiple-contest ballots: the average time to examine a ten-contest ballot was 62s. The table omits this figure since our protocols and thus our evaluation focus on the single-contest setting.
26 As estimated in [5, equation 5.2].
We estimate the workload of 2ScanAudit to be less than 8 hours in total time, using the formulae in Appendix F. The number of test ballots \( t \) for each candidate is 14. The seed generation takes roughly 14 minutes, generating the 28 test ballots takes roughly 12 minutes, and the first scan, the label-shuffle step and the second scan each require about 2.5 hours, for a total of less than 8 hours. Consequently, in this setting our audit requires less than 51\% of the time of a ballot comparison audit.

### Discussion

This paper highlights a new approach to post-election audits with provable security, and provides initial cost and efficiency estimates based on historical data. Significant work remains to fully assess the practicality and limitations of our novel approach, including a detailed examination of practical shuffling and labeling mechanisms. A full analysis of such physical and hardware considerations is beyond the scope of this work. We offer a number of open questions.

- Modern ballot scanners have very high resolution, to the point that individual paper fibers can be imaged [28,14]. This contradicts our ballot indistinguishability assumption. Older scanners using analog mark detection circuitry were far more likely to meet our assumptions. Can ballot indistinguishability be integrated into the specifications for a new generation of ballot scanners?
- Our proofs assume a perfect random shuffle. This is hard to implement. How much disorder is sufficient in practice? For example, would one or two cut-and-shuffle steps suffice?
- Efficient mechanical shuffling machines are currently available (e.g., [36]), primarily for playing cards (for which casinos create robust demand, and stringent unpredictability requirements). Also, various types of efficient sorting machines are routinely relied upon by postal services to sort mail [7], and efficient automatic labeling and stamping machines are widely used in industrial applications (e.g., [25]). Ballots are much larger than playing cards, and need to be handled at larger scale. Can we leverage these existing technologies to build efficient machines to shuffle ballots?

Further discussion of shuffling and labeling technologies is in the full version.