@misc{RR14a,
author = { Michael O. Rabin and Ronald L. Rivest },
title = { Practical Provably Correct Voter Privacy Protecting End to End Voting
Employing Multiparty Computations and Split Value Representations of Votes },
date = { 2014-05-12 },
OPTyear = { 2014 },
OPTmonth = { May 12, },
urla = { VTP-WP-124 },
urlb = { code },
note = { CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project Working Paper 124. },
abstract = { Continuing the work of Rabin and Rivest [1] we
present another simple and fast method for
conducting end to end voting and allowing public
verification of correctness of the announced vote
tallying results. This method was referred to in [1]
as the SV/VCP method. In the present note voter
privacy protection is achieved by use of a simple
form of Multi Party Computations (MPC). At the end
of vote tallying process, random permutations of the
cast votes are publicly posted in the clear, without
identification of voters or ballot ids. Thus vote
counting and assurance of correct form of cast votes
are directly available. Also, a proof of the claim
that the revealed votes are a permutation of the
concealed cast votes is publicly posted and
verifiable by any interested party. Advantages of
this method are: Easy understandability by
non-cryptographers, implementers and ease of use by
voters and election officials. Direct handling of
complicated ballot forms. Independence from any
specialized primitives. Speed of vote-tallying and
correctness proving: elections involving a million
voters can be tallied and proof of correctness of
results posted within a few minutes.
},
}