@misc{RR14b,
  author =       { Michael O. Rabin and Ronald L. Rivest },
  title =        { Efficient End to End Verifiable Electronic Voting
                   Employing Split Value Representations },
  date =         { 2014-08-11 },
  OPTyear =      { 2014 },
  OPTmonth =     { August },
  note =         { Proc. EVOTE 2014 (Bregenz, Austria).  (Improvement of an <a href="http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs.html#RR14a">earlier version</a>) },                  
  urla =         { <a href="http://www.e-voting.cc/wp-content/plugins/download-monitor/download.php?id=247">conference-version</a> },
  urlb =         { <a href="http://www.e-voting.cc/en/service/conferences/evote2014/">conference</a> },                  
  abstract =     {
        We present a simple and fast method for conducting
        end to end voting and allowing public verification of correctness
        of the announced vote tallying results. In the present note
        voter privacy protection is achieved by use of a simple form of
        distributing the tallying of votes and creation of a verifiable proof
        of correctness amongst several servers, combined with random
        representations of integers as sums mod $M$ of two values. At the
        end of vote tallying process, random permutations of the cast
        votes are publicly posted in the clear, without identification of
        voters or ballot ids. Thus vote counting and assurance of correct
        form of cast votes are directly available. Also, a proof of the claim
        that the revealed votes are a permutation of the concealed cast
        votes is publicly posted and verifiable by any interested party. We
        present two versions of the method, one assuring voter privacy
        and proof of correctness in the presence of information leaking
        devices, the other achieving the same goals as well as prevention
        of denial of service by failing or sabotaged devices.
        Advantages of this method are: Easy understandability by noncryptographers,
        implementers, and ease of use by voters and
        election officials. Direct handling of complicated ballot forms.
        Independence from any specialized cryptographic primitives. In
        particular, we implement verifiable mix nets without using publickey
        or homomorphic cryptography. A novel result of significance
        beyond e-voting. Speed of vote-tallying and correctness proving:
        elections involving a million voters can be tallied and proof of
        correctness of results posted within a few minutes.  
                   },
}