@article{RS17,
  author =       { Ronald L. Rivest and Philip B. Stark },
  title =        { When is an election verifiable? },
  journal =      { {IEEE Security and Privacy} },
  publisher =    { IEEE },
  date =         { 2017-06-09 },
  OPTyear =      { 2017 },
  OPTmonth =     { June 9, },
  pages =        { 48--50 },
  doi =          { 10.1109/MSP.2017.78 },
  abstract =     { For years, election integrity advocates have called
                  for voter-verified paper ballots: paper is tangible,
                  tamper-evident, and readable and countable by humans
                  without relying on software. But if laws and
                  partisan wrangling make it impossible to use ballots
                  to check the accuracy of electronically tabulated
                  results, what good is the paper?  Despite the
                  proliferation of voting systems that use
                  voter-verifiable paper as the ballot of record, the
                  2016 US presidential election and its
                  aftermath-which included public demands to audit the
                  results and legal battles over recounting the
                  results in three states-make it clear that having an
                  auditable paper record of voter intent falls far
                  short of having verifiable elections.  }
}