

Honeywell

PROJECT GUARDIAN TECHNICAL COORDINATION LETTER

Att: Clark

RECEIVED

JUN 11 1976

J. H. SALTZER

Contracting Officer
HQ/ESD/PPGM
Hanscom AFB
Bedford, Mass. 01731

Date: 4 June 1976
TCL No. 22
Contract No.: F19628-74-C-0193

Attention: C. E. Fenton
Captain, USAF

Subject: Technical Coordination Meeting - CDRL Item A014

On May 20, 1976 a meeting was held at ESD to discuss CDRL Item A014, "Security and Integrity Procedures". Attendees were:

R. Price - ESD
J. Millen - MITRE
L. Verdery - FSO
J. Gilson - FSO

The discussion centered on the environment to be used for final certifiable kernel preparation. General agreements were reached in many areas. No specific detailed agreements were approached.

The areas of general agreement included:


1. The report is to deal with the essential characteristics of the environment of the secure site for final kernel preparation. The certification methodology will be left for its own report (CDRL Item A030). The report will cover only issues related to the protection of the kernels.
2. To be accepted for the critical purposes anticipated for the kernel, there must be high confidence in the integrity of the kernel protection. No other method was suggested other than use of a standard classification. TOP SECRET appears to be the minimum level that entails the required levels of protection. It is possible that one or more categories will also be required.
3. The issue of initial verification of the Multics computer system hardware was discussed in detail. It was agreed that the procedures used for a classified site, such as initial acceptance of a 6000 system at a WWMCCS TOP SECRET site, could be used.

C. E. Fenton, Captain, USAF
4 June 1976
Page 2

4. The initial verification of the Multics service system software was agreed to be handled in a manner similar to the hardware.
5. The principle area for concern in the report is to be on the differences in the intent of kernel protection and keeping secrets. The kernel is to be protected at the TOP SECRET level, but it is not to be classified itself. This means that the master version of the kernel is to be handled as TOP SECRET but copies are to be unclassified.
6. There was considerable discussion on possible mechanisms to use for marking the protected master copies. No conclusions were reached.

If there are any questions or clarifications of the above, please contact the undersigned or Mr. L. Verdery, Program Manager.

Very truly yours,


R. L. Carlson
Sr. Contract Administrator

cc: ESD/MCI (5)
MITRE/D73 (5)
RADC/ISM (3)
NSA/R14 (3)
AFDSC/XMS (2)
CCTC (5)