

Protection

(We will not attempt to test every technique known to man - we will concentrate on studying along one complete path.)

2 Aspects

a. Specification of who may get at a piece of information

b. Enforcement of the specification.

a. (Page 2 of 653 s. 101a)

Segment (by def) is smallest unit of information separately protected by system.

b. Enforcement (P. 4-8 of lecture)

n.b.: Area of weakness: don't easily protect small information items. (Mechanism is molecularly ponderous)

E.G., a dossier with a 10 character protected entry.)

# Certification

Best development of  
problem in the negative  
of certification aspect

Profound problem of all:

1. Spec says "this event is not to  
then "this must" be permitted" rather  
2. It will be nearly in other  
components

Do all of my mechanism work the way they are supposed to?

Negative Specs

Out of spec. Dilemma: lots of complicated programs.

infinite bugs; potential hardware failures  
no methodical scheme for proof.

Techniques: Make the program few + simple (Partition them)

Audit them - read them over

Consistency checks

Put in attempts to break down the boxes  
at random intervals.

Leave audit trails to help determine  
maximum extent of a failure.

Higher level language (but certify the computer too)

Certification is easier if

a. User executes interpretively only

b. User can only type commands.

(Exhaustive testing may then be adequate)

~~c. Hardware does not have pipelines, etc.~~

Hardware features to help verification

0. No pipeline
1. Simple, standard addressing scheme
2. Asynchronous organization
3. Program readable configuration
4. Program readable clock