

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		ACTION	
1 TO (Name, office symbol or location) <i>Paul</i>	INITIALS	CIRCULATE	
	DATE	COORDINATION	
2	INITIALS	FILE	
	DATE	INFORMATION	
3	INITIALS	NOTE AND RETURN	
	DATE	PER CONVERSATION	
4	INITIALS	SEE ME	
	DATE	SIGNATURE	
REMARKS <i>These are our comments for Prof Saltyer. Please take drop her off when you go down to class tomorrow</i>			
Do NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disapprovals, clearances, and similar actions.			
FROM (Name, office symbol or location) <i>Tom Bailey</i>		DATE <i>11 Oct</i>	PHONE

OPTIONAL FORM 41
AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 100-11.206

* GPO : 1968 O-314-838

5041-101

COMMENTS ON MIT PROJECT MAC

"Proposal for Engineering of a Computer System for which Security can be Certified by Auditing"

1. In the discussion of a certification by auditing, there is no action of what the certification criteria are. Throughout the proposal, there is no statement or definition of the system's information protection mechanisms nor is any effort proposed to arrive at such a definition. The proposed technique seems, therefore, to be of the ad hoc variety.
2. The security kernel, appearing on page 6 for the first time, seems to be ill-defined.
3. In the discussions of the (security) protection (page 6 and letter) perimeter, the use of ad hoc techniques for function within the perimeter seems to be at odds within the desire to eliminate all unnecessary functions from the protection perimeter.
4. The proposal is too kind, in its evaluation of the System Penetration Exercises