Matt Weinberg

S. Matthew Weinberg

Postdoctoral Researcher
Computer Science, Princeton University

Email:
smweinberg (at) csail (dot) mit (dot) edu

CV: My CV

I am postdoctoral researcher in the Computer Science department at Princeton University, where I am hosted by Mark Braverman. My main research interests are algorithms and algorithmic game theory, and mechanism design in particular.

I completed my Ph.D. in 2014 within the Theory of Computation Group, Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab at MIT, where my advisor was Costis Daskalakis.

I obtained my B.A. in Math from Cornell University in 2010.

Publications:

Algorithms for Strategic Agents
S. Matthew Weinberg
PhD Thesis. (June 2014).
George M. Sprowls Award (for best MIT doctoral theses in CS).

Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms
Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
In the 26th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2015).

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
In the 55th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2014).

Reaching Consensus via non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks
Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg
In the 17th International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (APPROX 2014).

Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information
Pablo D. Azar, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
In the 25th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2014).

Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
In Proceedings of the 54th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2013).

Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
In the 24th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2013).

Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions
Pablo Azar, Constantinos Daskalakis, Silvio Micali, S. Matthew Weinberg
In the 24th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2013).

Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
In Proceedings of the 53rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2012).
MIT News Article

On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
Newsletter of the ACM Special Interest Group on E-commerce, 10(2), 2011. Newsletter.

Symmetries and Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC 2012). Best Student Paper Award.

Matroid Prophet Inequalities
Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
In Proceedings of the 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2012).

An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms
Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg
In Proceedings of the 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2012).

Pricing Randomized Allocations
Patrick Briest, Shuchi Chawla, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg
In Proceedings of the 21st ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA 2010).