

On Estimating the Size and Confidence of a Statistical Audit

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
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$$u = \left\lceil \left(n - \frac{b-1}{2} \right) \cdot \left(1 - (1-c)^{1/b} \right) \right\rceil$$



Outline

- Motivation
- Background
 - How Do We Audit?
 - The Problem
- Analysis
 - Model
 - Sample Size
 - Bounds
- Conclusions



Motivation

- There have been cases of electoral fraud (Gumbel's *Steal This Vote*, Nation Books, 2005)
- Would like to ensure confidence in elections
- Auditing = comparing statistical sample of paper ballots to electronic tally
- Provides confidence in a software independent manner



How Do We Audit?


- Proposed Legislation: *Holt Bill (2007)*
 - Voter-verified paper ballots
 - Manual auditing
- Granularity: Machine, **Precinct**, County
- Procedure
 - Determine u , # precincts to audit, from margin of victory
 - Sample u precincts randomly
 - Compare hand count of paper ballots to electronic tally in sampled precincts
 - If all are sufficiently close, declare electronic result final
 - If any are significantly different, investigate!



How Do We Audit?


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 - Compare hand count of paper ballots to electronic tally in sampled precincts
- ➔ Our formulas are **independent** of the auditing procedure

The Problem




- How **many** precincts should one audit to ensure high confidence in an election result?

Previous Work



- *Saltman (1975)*: The first to study auditing by sampling without replacement
- *Dopp and Stenger (2006)*: Choosing appropriate audit sizes
- *Alvarez et al. (2005)*: Study of real case auditing of punch-card machines


Hypothesis Testing



- Null hypothesis: The reported election outcome is **incorrect** (electronic tally indicates different winner than paper ballots)
- Want to reject the null hypothesis
 - Need to sample enough precincts to ensure that, if no fraud is detected, the election outcome is correct with high confidence



Model




- c = desired confidence
- Want: If there are $\geq b$ corrupted precincts, then sample contains at least one with probability $\geq c$
- **Equivalently:** If the sample contains no corrupted precincts, then the election outcome is correct with probability $\geq c$
- Typical values: $n = 400$, $b = 50$, $c = 95\%$




What is b ?

- Minimum # of precincts adversary must corrupt to change election outcome
- Derived from margin of victory



- Our formulas are **independent** of b 's calculation



Rule of Three

- If we draw a sample of size $\geq 3n/b$ *with replacement*, then:
 - Expect to see at least **three corrupted** precincts
 - Will see at least **one corrupted** precinct with $c \geq 95\%$
- In practice, we sample *without replacement* (no repeated precincts)




Sample Size

- Probability that no corrupted precinct is detected:


$$Pr = \binom{n-b}{u} / \binom{n}{u}$$

- Optimal Sample Size: Minimum u such that $Pr \leq 1 - c$

⇒ **Problem:** Need a computer




- Goal: Derive a simple and accurate upper bound that an election official can compute on a hand-held calculator



Our Bounds

- Intuition: How many **different** precincts are sampled by the Rule of Three?
- Our *without replacement* upper bounds:


A
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C
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R
A
C
Y



$$u = \lceil n \cdot (1 - (1 - c)^{1/b}) \rceil$$

$$u = \left\lceil \left(n - \frac{b-1}{2} \right) \cdot (1 - (1 - c)^{1/b}) \right\rceil$$

$$u = \left\lceil \frac{b}{H_n - H_{n-b}} \cdot (1 - (1 - c)^{1/b}) \right\rceil$$



Our Bounds


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$$u = \lceil n \cdot (1 - (1 - c)^{1/b}) \rceil$$

$$u = \left\lceil \left(n - \frac{b-1}{2} \right) \cdot (1 - (1 - c)^{1/b}) \right\rceil$$

- Example: $n = 400$, $b = 50$ (margin=5%), $c = 95\%$

$$u = \left\lceil \left(400 - \frac{50-1}{2} \right) \cdot (1 - (1 - 0.95)^{1/50}) \right\rceil = \lceil 21.84 \rceil = 22$$




Our Bound

$$u = \left\lceil \left(n - \frac{b-1}{2} \right) \cdot \left(1 - (1-c)^{1/b} \right) \right\rceil$$


$$(1-c)^{1/b} = e^{\ln(1-c)/b}$$

- Conservative: provably an upper bound
- Accurate:
 - For $n \leq 10,000$, $b \leq n/2$, $c \leq 0.99$ (steps of 0.01):
 - 99% is exact, 1% overestimates by 1 precinct
 - Analytically, it overestimates by at most $-\ln(1-c)/2$, e.g. three precincts for $c < 0.9975$
- Can be computed on a hand-held calculator



Observations

Precincts to Audit




- Fixed level of auditing is not appropriate



Observations (cont'd)

Precincts to Audit




- *Holt Bill (2007):* Tiered auditing



Related Problems

- Inverse questions
 - Estimate confidence level c from u , b , and n
 - Estimate detectable fraud level b from u , c , and n
- Auditing with constraints
 - *Holt Bill (2007)*: Audit at least one precinct in each county
- Future work
 - Handling precincts of variable sizes (*Stanislevic, 2006*)



Conclusions


- We develop a formula for the sample size:

$$u = \left\lceil \left(n - \frac{b-1}{2} \right) \cdot \left(1 - (1-c)^{1/b} \right) \right\rceil$$

that is:

- Conservative (an upper bound)
- Accurate
- Simple, easy to compute on a pocket calculator
- Applicable to different other settings

Thank you!



- Questions?