

ThreeBallot, VAV, and Twin

Ronald L. Rivest - MIT CSAIL

Warren D. Smith - CRV

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
Outline

- ◆ End-to-end voting systems
- ◆ ThreeBallot
- ◆ VAV
- ◆ Twin


"End-to-end" voting systems

- ◆ Voter composes and casts ballot as usual, except cast ballot may be *encrypted*.
- ◆ Cast ballots posted on *public bulletin board (PBB)*.
- ◆ Voter gets "*receipt*" allowing her to confirm & correct posting of her ballot; receipt is typically copy of cast ballot as it should be posted.
- ◆ Tally is computed by election officials from ballots on PBB (proof of correctness also computed and posted).

End-to-end voting systems



End-to-end voting systems



Cast Ballot
"Cast as intended?"

Confirm Posting
"Posted as cast?"


Verify Tally
"Counted as posted?"

Crypto end-to-end voting systems

- ◆ Cast ballots are encrypted.
- ◆ With encrypted ballots, need to ensure they are "*cast as intended*" [challenging].
- ◆ With receipts, need to ensure that they don't reveal how voter voted [not so hard].
- ◆ With tally, need to ensure that election result is *publicly verifiable* [manageable].
- ◆ Examples: Punchscan, PretAVoter, Scratch&Vote, ...

Crypto-free end-to-end systems

- ◆ Is it possible to have an end-to-end voting system *without using cryptography??*




Crypto-free end-to-end systems

◆ Is it possible to have an end-to-end voting system *without using cryptography??*

◆ Yes. ThreeBallot.

◆ Yes. VAV.

◆ Yes. Twin.



ThreeBallot

Voting w/o crypto -- ThreeBallot

- ◆ Each voter casts three plaintext ballots
- ◆ All three cast ballots go on PBB.
- ◆ Voter takes home copy of arbitrarily-chosen *one* as receipt.
- ◆ Receipt does not indicate how she voted, but serves as integrity check on PBB.

ThreeBallot

Ballot	Ballot	Ballot
President	President	President
Alice <input type="radio"/>	Alice <input type="radio"/>	Alice <input type="radio"/>
Bob <input type="radio"/>	Bob <input type="radio"/>	Bob <input type="radio"/>
Charles <input type="radio"/>	Charles <input type="radio"/>	Charles <input type="radio"/>
Vice President	Vice President	Vice President
David <input type="radio"/>	David <input type="radio"/>	David <input type="radio"/>
Erica <input type="radio"/>	Erica <input type="radio"/>	Erica <input type="radio"/>
r9>k*@0e!4\$%	*t3]a&;nzs^_ =	u)/+8c\$@.?(

- ◆ Each row has 1 or 2 marks. Not 0, not 3.
- ◆ All three ballots cast and posted on PBB.
- ◆ Voter takes home copy of *one* as "receipt".

ThreeBallot

Ballot	Ballot	Ballot
President	President	President
Alice ○	Alice ●	Alice ○
Bob ●	Bob ●	Bob ○
Charles ○	Charles ○	Charles ●
Vice President	Vice President	Vice President
David ●	David ○	David ●
Erica ○	Erica ●	Erica ○
r9>k*@0e!4\$%	*t3]a&;nzs^_ =	u)/+8c\$@.?(

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Tallying in ThreeBallot


- ◆ Tally as usual: each candidate receives n extra votes (n = number of voters), but election outcome is unchanged.
- ◆ Works for (or can be adapted for) ordinary plurality voting, approval voting, and range voting, but not for IRV or other schemes where voter must rank-order choices.
- ◆ Also doesn't work for write-in votes.

Casting ballots

- ◆ Votes are cast in a physical ballot box; order of casting is lost, and it is should be impossible to figure out which three ballots originally formed a ballot triple.


Ensuring valid votes

- ◆ Need way to ensure that votes are *valid* -- voter doesn't vote zero or three times for anyone.
- ◆ Voter casts ballots through a *checker machine* that checks validity of ballot triple before allowing them to be cast.



Making receipts

- ◆ Voter may arbitrarily choose one ballot to be copied as her receipt.
- ◆ No record kept of which was copied.
- ◆ Can integrate copying with checker (Shamos checker).
- ◆ Receipts should be “unforgeable”.



Confirming Posting

- ◆ Ballots aren't posted on PBB until polls are closed.
- ◆ Each ballot should have a unique ID (matching ID on receipt copy), so that ID can be looked up on PBB.
- ◆ Voters should not see (and/or not be able to memorize) ID's for ballots that were *not* copied (to prevent vote-selling).

Short Ballot Assumption (SBA)

- ◆ Since ballots are published in *plaintext*, voters must not be able to identify their ballots by the selection of choices made.
- ◆ *Short Ballot Assumption*: ballot is short enough so that each possible arrangement of choices likely to have been made by several voters.
- ◆ Can separate ballot into several short ones to ensure SBA.
- ◆ SBA also prevents *reconstruction attacks*.

Integrity of PBB

- ◆ Since no one knows *which* ballots posted on PBB have been copied for receipts, any significant tampering with PBB is likely to be detectable.

Coercion-freeness

- ◆ Voter can bring home an arbitrary-looking receipt, independent of her choices. Thus, voter can't sell vote using her receipt.
- ◆ Adversary (or voter) can't determine which three ballots were in original triple from PBB and receipt.


Usability

- ◆ Not so good! Voting three ballots would be confusing to many!
- ◆ Note: Can mix "OneBallot" (ordinary ballots) with ThreeBallot:
 - OneBallot voters don't get receipts.
 - But their ballots posted on PBB are protected along with ThreeBallots.

ThreeBallot is end-to-end

- ◆ ThreeBallot provides end-to-end security:
 - Voter is confident her ballot is cast as intended.
 - Voter can check that her ballot is included in collection of ballots being tallied.
 - Voters can check that tampering with collection has not occurred.
 - Anyone can add up ballots on PBB to obtain correct election result.

VAV



(Vote // Anti-Vote // Vote)

VAV = ThreeBallot Variation

- ◆ Like ThreeBallot: each voter casts three ballots and takes home copy of one as a receipt.
- ◆ But VAV works for *any* vote-tallying system (e.g. IRV), not just plurality, approval, and range-voting.
- ◆ Key idea: one ballot may *cancel* another ballot. Of three ballots cast, two of them *must* cancel each other.

VAV Example Ballots (Blank)

Ballot	V
President	
Alice	—
Bob	—
Charles	—
Vice President	
David	—
Erica	—
4765239014119052	

Ballot	A
President	
Alice	—
Bob	—
Charles	—
Vice President	
David	—
Erica	—
155236349001341	

Ballot	V
President	
Alice	—
Bob	—
Charles	—
Vice President	
David	—
Erica	—
144578232133782	


VAV Example Ballots

Ballot	V	Ballot	A	Ballot	V
President		President		President	
Alice	1	Alice	1	Alice	3
Bob	3	Bob	3	Bob	1
Charles	2	Charles	2	Charles	2
Vice President		Vice President		Vice President	
David	2	David	2	David	1
Erica	1	Erica	1	Erica	2
4765239014119052		155236349001341		144578232133782	

- ◆ Second (Anti-) ballot *cancel*s first ballot, since they are identical except for A/V notations.
- ◆ As in ThreeBallot, voter can take home copy of any *one* ballot as her receipt.

Tallying VAV ballots

- ◆ Tallier finds pairs of V/A ballots that cancel, and removes such pairs from further consideration. (The ballots in a pair don't need to have originated with the same voter.)
- ◆ Remaining ballots are tallied to determine election results.
- ◆ VAV handles *any* voting system.
- ◆ VAV also provides end-to-end security.



Twin

Key Idea for Twin

- ◆ With ThreeBallot, voter could not use take-home receipt to sell her vote, because it copied only a *part* of her ballot.
- ◆ With Twin, voter can not use take-home receipt to sell her vote, because it is copy of *some other voter's* ballot.
- ◆ Single original may be copied more than once, or not at all.
- ◆ Simple!

"Mixing up" voter receipts


- ◆ Voter places her receipt into the bin, and receives a *copy* of some previous voter's receipt from the bin.
- ◆ First 10 voters don't get take-home receipt.
- ◆ Voter checks PBB with her take-home receipt.
- ◆ At end of day, bin has all original receipts; enables additional check on PBB.

Receipt




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
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
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Take-home
Receipt



Properties of Twin

- ◆ **[Exchange]** Voter gets a copy of *some other voter's* receipt as her take-home receipt.
- ◆ **[Anonymity]** Voter does not know which other voter she received copy from.
- ◆ **[Collusion-Resistance]** Adversary has no good way of collecting *all* copies of some receipt.
- ◆ **[Coverage]** Constant fraction of all receipts are copied as take-home receipts, with high probability.
- ◆ **[End-to-end security]** Twin provides end-to-end security.
- ◆ Twin is similar to "Farnel" protocol, except we are applying it to receipts, not ballots, and we distribute *copies* rather than originals.

Conclusions

- ◆ End-to-end voting systems provide improved assurance of correctness of election outcome.
- ◆ It is possible to implement end-to-end voting systems *without using cryptography*.

(The End)
