



Audit Thoughts

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Viewpoint on high-tech

- *We should think of a computer (or other forms of “high tech”) as a very fast and well-trained four-year old child.*
- The child may be very helpful (she is fast, and well-trained!) but may not always do the right thing (she’s only four!).
- For something as important as an election, a “grown-up” should always check her work.



Audit Method Types


- Post-Election Manual Tally (PEMT)
 - Audit tallying by “batches”
- Single-ballot methods (e.g. CHF’07)
 - Convert all ballots to electronic form first
 - Audit the conversion; then tally is easy (even IRV)
- End-to-End Voting Systems
 - Scantegrity II, Pret A Voter, ...
 - Takoma Park election (Nov 2009)

Assume “chain of custody” is OK ??




Voting Steps

- *recorded as intended*
- *cast (and collected) as recorded*
- *counted as cast*



End-to-End Voting Steps

- **verifiably** recorded as intended (by voter)
- **verifiably** cast (and collected) as recorded (“ ”)
- **verifiably** counted as cast (by anyone)



PEMT considerations

- PEMT is also about tradeoffs between
 - Cost
 - Level of assurance provided
 - Simplicity / Understandability
- If you're already spending \$6 / voter, spending another \$0.10 on integrity/audit is "low order" (e.g. auditing 20% at \$0.50/ballot)

PEMT considerations

- Precincts have variable sizes!
- A small amount of “interpretation error” is expected (e.g. people see voter intent differently than a scanner does)
- Late batches vs. fast start
- Staged audits vs. tight timescale
- Multiple, overlapping, contests

Detection vs. Correction

- Much initial work (e.g. APR) strove for high-probability *detection* of error sufficient to have changed outcome.
- Models tended to ignore interpretation error.
- APR and similar works also treated “what to do” (correction) lightly. E.g. assuming that full recount would be done if error was detected (which would then make them two-stage risk-limiting audits). See Stark for more discussion of turning detection → correction.

Margin-based audits

- Let M = reported margin of victory
- Want smaller audit when M is large
- Assume n batches
- Let u_i be upper bound on error in i -th batch
 $U = \sum_i u_i$ is their total
- Let e_i be actual error in i -th batch towards changing outcome (determinable by audit)
- Want to know if $\sum_i e_i \geq M$
- Many approaches (Saltman; SAFE; ...)

PPEBWR [APR'07]

- Probability proportional to error bound, with replacement
- Pick batch i with probability proportional to u_i / U ; do this t times (with replacement).
- Chance that precincts with error of total magnitude M is never picked is
$$\leq (1 - M/U)^t$$
- To get this chance $< \alpha$ (e.g. $\alpha = 0.05$):
$$t > \ln(\alpha) / \ln(1 - M/U)$$

NEGEXP [APR'07]

- Batch i is picked *independently* with probability

$$p_i = 1 - \alpha^{(u_i / M)}$$

- When total error is at least M , the chance of not detecting any errors in sampled batches is less than α .

PPEBWR and NEGEXP


- Require that you know margins to get started
- Both require more sophisticated sampling than simple random (uniform) sampling.
- Are not risk-limiting unless you do full recount when error detected (or embed them otherwise in an appropriate escalation procedure).

Escalation of Sample Size

- PPEBWR fairly straightforward: you are effectively just increasing t and continuing the drawing process.
- For NEGEXP: Easier to think of this as decreasing α ; so p_i 's are increasing. (Imagine having a random x_i for batch i ; where x_i is in $[0,1]$. Batch i is audited iff
$$x_i \leq p_i$$
Increasing p_i 's will cause more to be audited, in a nice telescoping way.)

Combining multiple races

- Assume that there are “economies” – hard part is fetching ballots, easy to audit multiple races once you have ballots... (Is this true??)
- With NEGEXP, each race gives probability of audit for a batch: p'_i , p''_i , p'''_i , ...
- We can then audit batch with probability
$$p_i = \max(p'_i, p''_i, p'''_i, \dots)$$
and satisfy auditing conditions for all races simultaneously...



* Keep Your Batches Small!

The End

