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### adobe lightroom





weak concepts	strong concepts
hard to use	intuitive, predictable
a mess to maintain	decoupling & localization
unreliable & buggy	more dependable





### what we're already doing

thinking & sketching simulating features

normal design practice copying good ideas

evaluating products user feedback

discarding failed designs "refactoring"

To design something really well, you have to get it. You have to really grok what it's all about. It takes a passionate commitment to really thoroughly understand something, chew it up, not just quickly swallow it. Most people don't take the time to do that. --Steve Jobs


#### what we're not doing

# being explicit

focusing: what are the concepts? relating: how are they related to each other? analyzing: what properties do they have?



#### alloy: a notation




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
#### semantic concepts

#### atom indivisible immutable uninterpreted relation collection of atom tuples set collection of atoms


(ie, a unary relation)




# graphical syntax




 $A1 \cap A2 = \emptyset$ 






- R maps m A's to each B
- R maps each A to n B's



### the alloy analyzer: a model finder




# i'm my own grandpa

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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1						build date: 20		02:02 EDT)
* An Alloy model of the song "I Am My Own Grandpa" * by Dwight B. Latham and Moe Jaffe	Executing "Run ownGrandpa for 4 Person" Solver=minisatprover(jni) Bitwidth=4 MaxSeq=4 SkolemDepth=1 Symmetry=2 1257 vars. 76 primary vars. 1985 clauses. 130ms. Instance found. Predicate is consistent. 11ms.							
* The challenge is to produce a man who is his own grandfather * without resorting to incest or time travel. Executing the predicate * "ownGrandpa" will demonstrate how such a thing can occur.								
* The full song lyrics, which describe an isomorophic solution, * are included at the end of this file.	00	0	)	(gra	ndpa) Rı	in ownGrand	pa for 4 Pe	erson
* model author: Daniel Jackson */	Viz	_	∎ 🏰 ot XN		Theme	Magic Layout	Evaluator	Projection: none Next
abstract sig Person { father: lone Man, mother: lone Woman } sig Man extends Person { wife: lone Woman } sig Woman extends Person { husband: lone Man } fact Biology { no p: Person   p in p.^(mother+father) } fact Terminology { wife = ~husband } fact SocialConvention {     no wife & *(mother+father).mother     no husband & *(mother+father).father   }	•			oand: 2 her: 2 2		ife n husband	Man0 (m) nother wife mother h Womar	e usband
<pre>fun grandpas [p: Person] : set Person {     let parent = mother + father + father.wife + mother.husband       p.parent.parent &amp; Man   }</pre>	_			_			_	
run {mother.husband = father} for 4 Person								
<pre>pred ownGrandpa [m: Man] { m in grandpas[m] }</pre>								
run ownGrandpa for 4 Person								

# some generic concepts









There is no problem in computer science that cannot be solved by introducing another level of indirection. --David Wheeler

rough edges


- > Indesign: can't tell whether you assigned color or swatch
- > CSS: formatting rules aren't independent

## "pseudo style"










#### rough edges

- Lightroom: "collection sets"
- > IMAP vs Apple Mail: folder holding message *and* folder?
- > Google docs: collections a bit scary?

# "approval"




#### rough edges > your suggestions?



#### microsoft word

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
#### rough edges

- > special role of Normal style, etc
- > hidden memory of <u>inherit</u> vs <u>replace with same</u>

#### the origins of paragraph styles

Bravo-X at Xerox PARC: Tim Mott, Larry Tesler, Charles Simonyi; first commercialized in Word, now ubiquitous (Pages, Indesign, Quark,...)


# javascript objects



rough edgesadd slots to all objects? is 23 an object?

### origins & referrers


### referrers & origins



#### a strategy for XSS and CSRF browser tracks "origin" of each request with HTTP request, includes origin as "referrer" if referrer is not self, server rejects it

critical property
s=origin(r) iff s really is cause of r

# modeling origins



## define basic concepts

**abstract sig** HTTPEvent {from, to, origin: EndPoint} **abstract sig** EndPoint { causes: **set** HTTPEvent }

{ causes = {e: HTTPEvent - Embedded | e.from = this} + causes.embeds }

sig Client, Server extends EndPoint {}

sig Request extends HTTPEvent { response: Response }
{ from in Client and to in Server }

sig Response extends HTTPEvent { embeds: set Embedded }
{ from in Server and to in Client }

sig Embedded extends Request {}
fact {Embedded = Response.embeds}

sig Redirect extends Response { }

```
fact RequestResponse {
response in Request one -> one Response
all r: Request | r.from = r.response.to and r.to = r.response.from
```

# define origin tracking

```
fact Origin {
    // for a redirect, origin is same as request, else server
    all r: Request | r.response.origin =
        (r.response in Redirect implies r.origin else r.response.from)
    // embedded requests have the same origin as the response
    all r: Response, e: r.embeds | e.origin = r.origin
    // requests that are not embedded come from the client
    all r: Request - Embedded | r.origin = r.from
}
```


```
pred appliesSOP (s: Server) {
    // request is only accepted if origin is server itself or sender
    all r: Request | r.to = s implies r.origin = r.to or r.origin = r.from
}
```

## does the policy work?

check {

no server: Server, attacker: Server - server {
 // no direct request to attacker
 no r: Request | r.to = attacker and r.origin in Client
 // trusted server obeys origin policy
 server.appliesSOP
 // and attacker still gets request through
 some r: attacker.causes | r.to = server
 }
} for 6 but 1 Client, 2 Server

#### counterexample!



#### Towards a Formal Foundation of Web Security [2010] Akhawe, Barth, Lam, Mitchell & Song

#### generic model of web security HTTP, certificates, cookies, script contexts about 2,000 lines of Alloy

Case	Lines of	No. of	CNF gen.	CNF solve
Study	new code	clauses	time (sec)	time (sec)
Origin Header	25	977,829	26.45	19.47
CORS	80	584,158	24.07	82.76
Referer Validation	35	974,924	30.75	9.06
HTML5 Forms	20	976,174	27.67	73.54
WebAuth	214	355,093	602.4	35.44

#### applied to 5 case studies in each, found vulnerabilities 2 known, 3 unknown

#### more examples: alloy.mit.edu

community

about

download documentation

entation book

applications people thanks

#### alloy: a language & tool for relational models

#### about alloy

Alloy is a language for describing structures and a tool for exploring them. It has been used in a wide range of applications from finding holes in security mechanisms to designing telephone switching networks.

An Alloy model is a collection of constraints that describes (implicitly) a set of structures, for example: all the possible security configurations of a web application, or all the possible topologies of a switching network. Alloy's tool, the Alloy Analyzer, is a solver that takes the constraints of a model and finds structures that satisfy them. It can be used both to explore the model by generating sample structures, and to check properties of the model by generating counterexamples. Structures are displayed graphically, and their appearance can be customized for the domain at hand.

At its core, the Alloy language is a simple but expressive logic based on the notion of relations, and was inspired by the Z specification language and Tarski's relational calculus. Alloy's syntax is designed to make it easy to build models incrementally, and was influenced by modeling languages (such as the object models of OMT and UML). Novel features of Alloy include a rich subtype facility for factoring out common features and a uniform and powerful syntax for navigation expressions.


The Alloy Analyzer works by reduction to SAT. Version 4 was a complete rewrite that included Kodkod, a new model finding engine that optimizes the reduction, and a new front end.

#### news

ASM, Alloy, B and Z Conference: papers now due January 22!

Research programmer position available on Alloy project!

Revised edition of book now out! Available from MIT Press.





#### non-uniformity

#### **members of set have different properties or behaviors** eg: in Photoshop, base layer is different

#### coupling

#### concepts are not independent

eg: in OS X, folder view vs. network access eg: in CSS, element position vs. wrap around

#### over-generalization

distinct concepts merged

eg: in mail clients, trashed messages have no deletion date

# unity of purpose?

Conceptual integrity is the most important consideration in system design. It is better to have a system **omit certain anomalous features** and improvements, but to reflect one set of design ideas, than to have one that contains many good but independent and uncoordinated ideas.

-- Fred Brooks, 1975


# thank you!


#### squander

```
public class Sudoku {
 private int [][] grid = new int [9][9];
@Ensures ({
     "all row in \{0..8\} | this.grid[row][int] = \{1..9\}",
     "all col in \{0..8\} | this.grid[int][col] = \{1..9\}",
     "all r, c in {0, 1, 2} l
       this.grid[{r*3..r*3+2}][{c*3..c*3+2] = {1..9}"
  })
@Modifies("this.grid[int].elems | _<2> = 0")
public void solve() { Squander.exe(this); }
public static void main(String[] args) {
  Sudoku s = new Sudoku();
  s.grid[0][3] = 1; ...; s.grid[8][8] = 5;
  s.solve();
  System.out.println(s);
```


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	2			4			9	
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8 5		4	6		7			9
	3						5	
7			8		3	1		2
		1	7			9		6
	8			3			2	
3		2	9		4			5











#### **Rubicon specs**

```
it "user included in list of users" do
  user = Factory(:user)
  get :index
  assigns[:users].should include user
end
```

**RSpec test** 

it "all users included in list of users" do
User.forall do |user|
get :index
assigns[:users].should include(user)
end
end

Rubicon spec

#### Fat Free CRM

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### prototype Apache analyzer

#### Apache Configuration Analyzer 🎭 🚽 🚞 🥑 🔍 Q 🔍 The Apache Configuration Analyzer started successfully. An Apache config file succesfully loaded. The document root successfully specified. Analyzing the input configuration... ApacheWebServer — Analysis Report — A potential security vulnerability detected in the input configuration! Security Failure: Request The web server exposes the contents of directory (Malicious) SDOCROOT. OD: GET Threat: A potentially malicious client from "102.169.118.40" issues arget source a request for the listing of directory \$DOCROOT. Vulnerability: /usr/lib/cgi-bin /usr/share/doc **\$DOCROOT** 102.169.118.40 /var/www The global configuration is missing a directive to control the listing of directory contents. Recommended Mitigation: \$DOCROOT/dir1 \$DOCROOT/calendar \$DOCROOT/financial \$DOCROOT/meetings \$DOCROOT/models Add an "Indexes" option to the global configuration file to disable the listing of directory contents. \$DOCROOT/dir1/myfiles1 nyreports Global configuration file: /etc/apache2/apache2.conf Document root path: /home/eskang/public html