dependence dependability

IBM Research · June 1, 2009 Daniel Jackson & Eunsuk Kang, MIT CSAIL

kemper arena, kansas city, 2007



kemper arena, 1979



what happened?





4.7 Hanger Assembly: bent by Lateral Force

Levy & Salvadori, Why Buildings Fall Down

failure = flawed success story



Therac 25



AECL fault tree analysis (1983) did not include software P(computer selects wrong energy) = 10⁻¹¹ Leveson & Turner (1993) race conditions, lack of interlocks, etc



A Direct Path to Dependable Software, CACM, March 2009 wordle thanks to Jonathan Feinberg, IBM Research, Cambridge

goals

a notation for analyzing, justifying, explaining desiderata simple, intuitive, graphical support formal analysis

the uses relation

the uses relation

A uses B if there exist situations in which the correct functioning of A depends on the availability of a correct implementation of B

David Parnas

Designing Software for Ease of Extension and Contraction, 1979

using uses



modular reasoning
 correct function of
 Payment depends only
 on ShoppingCart

using uses



modular reasoning
 correct function of
 Payment depends only
 on ShoppingCart

the notation

There probably isn't a best way to build the system, or even any major part of it; much more important is to avoid choosing a terrible way, and to have a <u>clear division of</u> <u>responsibilities among the parts</u>.

> Butler Lampson Hints for computer system design (1983)

key idea



inspired by problem diagrams [Michael Jackson]

represent properties, components, their relationship



a specification is a property



a specification is a property

a component may satisfy >1 property





a specification is a property

a component may satisfy >1 property

components can be justified independently but achieve a common goal



property established by component and property of another component







equivalent diagram, less familiar layout

an example: tracking stocks

problem

track stocks with given set of ticker symbols and display message when move exceeds bound

AAPL: now 12295 prev hi: 12295, prev lo: 12289 IBM: now 10218 prev hi: 10218, prev lo: 10212 INTC: now 1550 prev hi: 1552, prev lo: 1550

```
public class QuoteApp {
   public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
    Timer timer =
                  new Timer();
       for (String ticker: args)
        timer.schedule ( new Tracker (ticker), 0, 10000);
   }
}
public class Tracker extends TimerTask {
 String
         ticker:
   int hi = 0; int lo = Integer.MAX_VALUE;
   int MOVE = 1;
   public Tracker (String t) {ticker = t;}
   public void run () {
       int q = Quoter.getQuote(ticker);
       hi = Math.max(hi, q);
       lo = Math.min(lo, q);
       if (hi - lo > MOVE) {
        System. out.println (ticker + ": now " + q + " prev hi: " + hi + ", prev lo: " + lo);
           hi = lo = q;
       }
   }
}
```

public class Quoter {
 public static int getQuote (String ticker) {
 URL url = new URL("http://finance.yahoo.com/d/quotes.csv?s=" + ticker + "&f=l1");
 String p = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(url.openStream())).readLine();
 return (int) (Float.valueOf (p) * 100);
 }

}

uses relation



dependency diagram



finding a property's support



finding a property's support



finding a component's impact



finding a component's impact



explaining a flaw



explaining a flaw



six failures, explained

apple file vault

 $\bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc \bigcirc$

securing filesmake secure volumetransfer files to it

You are now ready to turn on FileVault protection. WARNING: Your files will be encrypted using your login password. If you forget your login password and the master password is not available, your data will be lost forever. Once you turn on FileVault, you will be logged out and FileVault will encrypt your entire Home directory. Depending on how much data you have, this could take a while. You will not be able to log in or use this computer until the initial setup is completed.

Security

what happens to old copies?> unlinked but not erased!

apple file vault



wrong property

from Simson Garfinkel, 2004
apple file vault



wrong property

from Simson Garfinkel, 2004

apple file vault



wrong property

from Simson Garfinkel, 2004

apple file vault



wrong property

from Simson Garfinkel, 2004



- a broken PIN scheme
- > hash of PIN stored on card
- > ATM just checks entered PIN against it

to access another account

> just change account number on card!



problem: bad analysis

from Ross Anderson, Why Cryptosystems Fail, 1994



problem: bad analysis

from Ross Anderson, Why Cryptosystems Fail, 1994



problem: bad analysis

from Ross Anderson, Why Cryptosystems Fail, 1994

Airbus A320 (1993)

landing in Warsaw
> overrun runway
> pilot & passenger died

explanation

- > aquaplaned, so no wheel rotation
- > reverse thrust was disabled for 9s



Airbus A320 (1993)



problem: incorrect environmental assumption

from Michael Jackson, Peter Ladkin

Airbus A320 (1993)



problem: incorrect environmental assumption

from Michael Jackson, Peter Ladkin

Panama City (2001)

radiation treatment planning software overexposes 20, killing at least 9

Panama City (2001)



dose = D

radiation treatment planning software overexposes 20, killing at least 9

Panama City (2001)



radiation treatment planning software overexposes 20, killing at least 9

Panama Radiotherapy, 2001



problem: component fails to meet spec

from IAEA Investigation, 2001

Panama Radiotherapy, 2001



problem: component fails to meet spec

from IAEA Investigation, 2001

Given [the input] that was given, our system calculated the correct amount, the correct dose. It was an unexpected result. And, if [the staff in Panama] had checked, they would have found an unexpected result.

Mick Conley, Multidata

Ariane 5 (1996)

first test flight
> self destructs
> \$400m loss

explanation

 > prelaunch routine throws numeric overflow exception



Ariane 5, 1996



problem: neglected coupling, incorrect assumptions

from report of inquiry board, J.L. Lions

Ariane 5, 1996



problem: neglected coupling, incorrect assumptions

from report of inquiry board, J.L. Lions

failure in 5ESS switch > for 9 hours > 148 calls made > about 50% dropped explanation

- > bug in recent upgrade
- > caused knock-on crashes





problem: feature interaction

from **RISKS** Forum



problem: feature interaction

from **RISKS** Forum



problem: feature interaction

from **RISKS** Forum

plus ça change...

Phone-company technicians traced the problem to a single 'failure of logic' in the computer programs that route calls through the AT&T network. AT&T Network Outage, 1990

We've now determined that message corruption was the cause of the server-to-server communication problems ... a handful of messages ... had a single bit corrupted Amazon S3 Outage, 2009 case study: proton therapy

proton therapy



hand pendant with stop button









towards automated analysis

observer



how to formalize?

like this?

```
contract SubjectView
      Subject supports [
             value : Value
             SetValue(val:Value) \mapsto \Delta value \{value = val\}; Notify()
             GetValue() : Value \mapsto return value
             Notify() \mapsto (|| \mathbf{v} : \mathbf{v} \in \text{Views} : \mathbf{v} \rightarrow \text{Update}() )
             AttachView(v:View) \mapsto \{v \in Views\}
             DetachView(v:View) \mapsto \{v \notin Views\}
       Views : Set(View) where each View supports [
              Update() \mapsto Draw()
              Draw() \mapsto Subject \rightarrow GetValue() \{View reflects Subject.value\}
              SetSubject(s:Subject) \mapsto \{Subject = s\}
       invariant
              Subject.SetValue(val) \mapsto \langle \forall v : v \in Views : v \text{ reflects } Subject.value \rangle
       instantiation
              (|| \mathbf{v} : \mathbf{v} \in \text{Views} : (\text{Subject} \rightarrow \text{AttachView}(\mathbf{v}) || \mathbf{v} \rightarrow \text{SetSubject}(\text{Subject})))
end contract
```

Helm, Holland & Gangopadhyay, 1990

alloy object model



class hierarchy
class hierarchy

sig Value {}
sig Time {}

class hierarchy

```
sig Value {}
sig Time {}
```

```
sig Subject extends Object {
    observers: Observer -> Time,
    value:Value one -> Time
  }
```

class hierarchy

```
sig Value {}
sig Time {}
```

```
sig Subject extends Object {
    observers: Observer -> Time,
    value:Value one -> Time
  }
```

```
sig Observer extends Object {
    display:Value one -> Time
    }
```

```
abstract sig Event {
    before, after:Time,
    invokes: set Event
  }
```

```
abstract sig Event {
    before, after:Time,
    invokes: set Event
  }
```

```
abstract sig Method extends Event {
    receiver: Object
    }
```

```
abstract sig Event {
    before, after: Time,
   invokes: set Event
abstract sig Method extends Event {
   receiver: Object
abstract sig SubjectEvent extends Method {} {
    receiver in Subject
    }
```

```
abstract sig Event {
    before, after: Time,
   invokes: set Event
abstract sig Method extends Event {
    receiver: Object
abstract sig SubjectEvent extends Method {} {
    receiver in Subject
sig Add extends SubjectEvent {
   observer: Observer } {
     receiver.observers.after =
         receiver.observers.before + observer
```

```
pred control (invokes: Event -> Event) {
    all u: Update |
        all o: u.receiver.observers.(u.before) |
            some n: u.invokes & Notify |
                n.subject = u.receiver && n.receiver = o
    all n: Notify |
        some d: n.invokes & Display |
            d.receiver = n.receiver && d.subject = n.subject
    }
}
```

```
pred control (invokes: Event -> Event) {
    all u: Update |
        all o: u.receiver.observers.(u.before) |
           some n: u.invokes & Notify |
               n.subject = u.receiver && n.receiver = o
    all n: Notify |
        some d: n.invokes & Display |
               d.receiver = n.receiver && d.subject = n.subject
    }
```

fact MinimalInvocation {

```
control [invokes]
no e, e': Event | e->e' in invokes and control [invokes - e->e']
}
```

```
pred control (invokes: Event -> Event) {
    all u: Update |
        all o: u.receiver.observers.(u.before) |
           some n: u.invokes & Notify |
               n.subject = u.receiver && n.receiver = o
    all n: Notify |
        some d: n.invokes & Display |
               d.receiver = n.receiver && d.subject = n.subject
    }
```

fact MinimalInvocation {

```
control [invokes]
no e, e': Event | e->e' in invokes and control [invokes - e->e']
}
```

```
pred control (invokes: Event -> Event) {
    all u: Update |
        all o: u.receiver.observers.(u.before) |
           some n: u.invokes & Notify |
               n.subject = u.receiver && n.receiver = o
    all n: Notify |
        some d: n.invokes & Display |
               d.receiver = n.receiver && d.subject = n.subject
    }
```

fact MinimalInvocation {

```
control [invokes]
no e, e': Event | e->e' in invokes and control [invokes - e->e']
}
```

a sample execution

a sample execution



a sample execution



code analysis challenges

where are the properties written? eg, update results in display not a property of Subject!

how are properties extracted? eg, update results in calls to notify not a change of state not a data-independent state machine

related work

axiomatic design Suh, 2001

> spec/design parameters

design structure matrix Steward; Eppinger; Baldwin/Clark; Lattix > topological sort of uses

evolvability analysis Sullivan et al
derive DSM from constraints on parameters

behavioral compositions Helm et al; Barnett, Schulte et al
operational specs, runtime checks only?

extra slides

uses puzzles

who's using whom?



Scheduler calls Task

but who serves whom?

using but not knowing?



HashMap calls Key's equals and hashCode methods

But Key didn't even exist when HashMap was written and tested!

coupling on format?



ReadLog relies on WriteLog for correct formatting.

So does it use it?

cyclic uses?



Subject calls Observer to refresh display, and Observer calls back to Subject to get state.

preconditions?



If Motor's precondition is violated, it burns out

So does Motor use Controller too?

uses puzzles, revisited

who's using whom?



uses doesn't capture coupling by cooperation

who's using whom?



uses doesn't capture coupling by cooperation

using but not knowing?



uses is whole spec, not property by property

using but not knowing?



uses is whole spec, not property by property

coupling on format?



uses seems to favor the component executing later

coupling on format?



uses seems to favor the component executing later

cyclic uses?



uses works better for classic ADTs than OOPs

cyclic uses?



uses works better for classic ADTs than OOPs

preconditions?



in uses, component breakage matters only for user

design secrets

design secrets

challenge
> local definition
> global reasoning

idea

> in reasoning, treat as uninterpreted

radio-controlled clock

signal from NIST station handling time zones > NIST transmits UTC > switch on clock for zone handling daylight savings > transmitted with signal > ... but ignored by my clock :-(



radio-controlled clock



dst function is local to Clock property