

# Recitation 20: DNSSEC

MIT - 6.033


Spring 2021

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# Plan

- The problem
- Recitation Qs
- Digital sigs & DNSSEC
- Demo & visualization
- Debate

## Logistics

- \* Design project due **today** at 11:57pm. 
- \* No recitation Thursday 5/13
- \* Last recitation Tuesday 5/18
- \* Course evaluations open
- \* Office hours /AMA 5/20?  
↳ Poll, send topics by mail

# The Problem

TCP/IP provides

- \* no confidentiality
- \* no integrity

Most Internet protocols don't either

HTTP, SMTP, POP, IMAP, DNS, ...

DNS is the system mapping

hostnames

www.csail.mit.edu.



IP addresses

23.185.0.3

⇒ Attacker in network can hijack traffic, cause all sorts of chaos

# Recitation Questions

1. What security benefit does DNSSEC provide?

- Authentication of DNS records

- ↳ Prevents attacker in the middle from tampering w/ DNS replies

2. How does it provide that?

- "Chain of trust"

- ↳ Digital signatures

3. Why is DNSSEC necessary? Why hasn't it been deployed?

→ To discuss...

# Digital Signature

$$\text{Gen}() \rightarrow (sk, pk)$$

$$\text{Sign}(sk, m) \rightarrow \sigma$$

$$\text{Verify}(pk, m, \sigma) \rightarrow \{\text{valid}, \text{invalid}\}$$

**Correct:**

Honest verifier accepts with  $pk$   
accepts msg signed with  $sk$ .

**Secure:**

Infeasible for an adversary  
to cook up valid signatures  
without  $sk$ .


# What is DNSSEC?

Simple idea:

Use digital signatures to  
authenticate all DNS answers

→ No encryption / confidentiality

Recall DNS



# Demo: Dnsviz

Look at a few sites

- \* cloudflare.com

- \* google.com

- \* nsa.gov

- \* www.mit.edu

Things to notice

- \* Key-signing key (recover from theft)

- \* Complexity, many choices

- \* Lack of support! Misconfiguration!

Question: How to sign "does not exist" record?

# A Debate

All website operators should  
deploy DNSSEC.



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# A Debate

All website operators should deploy DNSSEC.

In Favor (odd rooms)


- \* Lots of infrastructure relies on DNS
  - ↳ might as well try to secure it
- \* Not so expensive
- \* Backwards compatible

Against (even rooms)

- \* violates end-to-end principle
- \* complexity w/o security
  - ↳ no encryption anyhow
- \* duplicates work at other layers of stack
- \* Internet works pretty well without it
- \* False sense of security.

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The

End