COVID-19, Data Privacy & App Design
An analysis of privacy design elements of COVID-19 related applications

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Stephanie T. Nguyen, Independent Researcher
Ilaria Liccardi, MIT CSAIL
covid19apps@mit.edu
# Table of contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Overview</th>
<th>pp.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section 1</td>
<td>Overview</td>
<td>3 - 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 2</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>7 - 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 3</td>
<td>Themes in data transparency</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1: Onboarding transparency</td>
<td>12 - 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2: Visible data settings</td>
<td>47 - 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.3: App governance process</td>
<td>62 - 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>App comparisons</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.1: App permissions</td>
<td>74 - 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2: App data deletion</td>
<td>95 - 105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.3: App downloads (Google Play)</td>
<td>106 - 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 5</td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>113 - 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section 6</td>
<td>Appendix of screenshots</td>
<td>115 - 329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 1:
Overview
Context & Background: Project motivations

1. **COVID-19.** A global pandemic sparked need for technical interventions to reduce viral spread by logging contacts between individuals. Apps were the first types of technologies used in order to trace interactions.

2. **Apps Implementations:** Different countries started to develop apps. We wanted to identify similarities and difference in design implementations and information material that were used.

3. **App Adoption:** We wanted to see the different aspects of app’s experience and whether they impact adoption.

4. **App Design:** we wanted to look specifically into app designs (user experience and user interface) to do more analysis and comparisons among these apps with regard to user data transparency.

5. **Comparing and Documenting App Implementations:** We wanted to create a place where we could compare different apps and document the screenshots as the pandemic progressed.
Section 3 Overview: App design transparency comparisons

Section 3.1 - Onboarding transparency: Slides: 12-46

- (17 of 18) apps with some level of onboarding include a “walkthrough” step-by-step method of onboarding; (15 of 18) of those apps have similar user interface components (feature image and summary text) with various themes: (8 of 18) created warm illustrations of people and families, (16 of 18) showed information in short sentences as opposed to dense paragraphs, (10 of 18) use simple iconography (no human illustrations) with longer blocks of text, and (4 of 31) asked for data permissions before any walkthrough or onboarding of information;

Section 3.2 - Visible data settings: Slides 47-61

- (15 of 31) apps accessed feature settings, app permissions and data collection features placed on one of the apps main tabs; (9 of 15) are labeled on the home tab; between (1-6 apps of 15) show “on and off” via checkmarks, cards, toggles, buttons, iconography, and color-coded backgrounds; of the 15 apps, between 1-3 apps each show different aspects that can be turned on/off including: bluetooth, notifications, location, link to go to settings to activate bluetooth, awareness Bluetooth is on, contact registration or proximity tracing is on, “delete data” button and a remove tracking of geolocation option.

Section 3.3 - App governance process: Slide 62-72

- We analyzed the presence privacy policy specific to app (23 of 31), whether app is open source (17 of 31), privacy impact assessments (7 of 31).
Section 4 Overview: App data comparisons

Section 4.1 - App permissions: Slides 74-94

- We analyzed 28 apps available and live for download on the Google Play Store as of August 1, 2020; (17 of 28) both mentioned use of approximate and precise location information, (17 of 28) access bluetooth settings, (28 of 28) request full network access, (26 of 28) view network connections, (10 of 28) can read the contents of your USB storage, (5 of 28) ask permission to take pictures and video.

Section 4.2 - App data deletion: Slides 95-105

- Of 31 apps that we could access, (23 of 31) apps we found reference to user app deletion and (8 of 31) apps we did not find reference to user app and data deletion.

Section 4.3 - App downloads (Google Play Store): Slides 106-112

- We analyzed 27 apps available and live for download on the Google Play Store as of August 01, 2020; (2 of 28) listed 1,000+ installs, (3 of 28) listed 10,000+ installs, (4 of 28) listed 50,000+ installs, (8 of 28) listed 100,000+ installs, (2 of 28) listed 500,000+ installs, (6 of 28) listed 1,000,000+ installs, (2 of 28) listed 5,000,000+ installs, (1 of 28) listed 100,000,000+ installs.
Section 2: Methodology
Methodology: How we collected, categorized and analyzed apps

1. **Identifying COVID-19-Related Apps**: We first used a set of apps highlighted in the MIT Tech Review Contact Tracing Tracker. We then looked for additional apps deployed during the time of this review (March - July 2020) -- Basis for (Q1, 2, 3)

2. **Analyzing Apps**: For each app, we installed the app (using an iOS mobile device) where possible. Some were not accessible due to geographic limitations or the app was no longer available etc. We documented whether we were able to download the app, and if so, how far we were able to get to explore features (Q8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14). For example, many required local phone numbers to be able to see the home page and core experience.

3. **Capturing App Experience (Screenshots of live usage)**: After installation, we took screenshots of every step of the process from onboarding, permission gathering to home screen or other tab exploration. All screenshots are available in Section 5 of this slide deck.

4. **Inferring App Experience from App store images**: If firsthand screenshots with the app download were not possible, we documented screenshots in both the Apple App Store and Google Play Store links.
   a. We used Google Play Store to document permissions and the rough ballpark of downloads. (Q5, 7, 12)
   b. We used the App Store to document the version history to understand when the first version was uploaded to the app store. (Q4, 6)

5. **Inferring App Experience from news, blogs and App websites**: If firsthand screenshots with the app download were not possible, we searched the affiliated app websites, documentation (PDFs, GitHub repositories, etc.), news articles and/or video walkthroughs for additional screenshots. (Q8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14)

Using a mix of steps #3-5 we were able to answer questions including: Does the app explain data collection and the COVID-19-related app technology within the first 5 screens of onboarding? Does the home or main tab have settings features (the ability to turn off bluetooth, etc.)? What are the permissions required from the user in order to use the app? What personal information is collected throughout the app experience?

NOTE: This is a work in progress and information on these topics are changing frequently. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.
Methodology: How we collected, categorized and analyzed apps

6. **Governance, data collection and deletion**: We looked at the affiliated website, privacy policies, and/or terms of use documentation in order to gather information on: App collaboration and governance, personal information collected, if the app deletes data and if yes, under what conditions.

7. **Translated materials**: We used Google translate (where necessary) to derive insights. Note: Beyond visual indicators, we were not able to gather some information for the app due to language barrier even with Google translate. For these, we note them in each of the subsections below.

8. **Data collection**: We took steps 2-7 to be able to fill in an Excel spreadsheet of items for each of the countries, adding links for sources where relevant.

9. **Derived themes**: We looked at COVID-19 related applications and matched 4 common themes across the apps (See: Section 3 & Section 4). The themes we gathered are:
   a. **Onboarding transparency**: How did the apps onboard and orient users? (Q8)
   b. **Visible data settings**: What was the design of the app settings? How might a user turn “off” data sharing? (Q9)
   c. **App governance process**: How was the app designed, built, strategized and conceived? Who did they collaborate with? (Q10)
   d. **Unique features**: What are standout app features?

10. **App comparison**: We also created a section that simply compared information documented across apps:
    a. **App permissions**: What permissions does the app ask users for? (Q12)
    b. **Personal information collected**: What personal information is collected in the app? (Q13)
    c. **App data deletion processes**: What is the process or UX to delete your account or information? (Q14)
    d. **App downloads**: How many app downloads did the app see in Google Play store? Or relevant media? (Q7)

NOTE: This is a work in progress and information on these topics are changing frequently. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.
Questions for app analysis

1. What is the name of the country / state / province affiliated with the app?
2. What is the name of the app?
3. Who is the deployer?
4. What is the iPhone App store link?
5. What is the Google Play store link?
6. What is the date of deploying the app in the app store? (As seen by version 1.0 in the App store link)
7. How many reported downloads? (As seen by Google Play store link, along with the date documented)
8. Does the app explain data collection / COVID-19 related app technology within the first 5 screens of onboarding? Before they ask you to enable permissions?
9. Does the home / main page have setting toggles (ability to turn on/off bluetooth, location, etc.)
10. How was the app created (through collaboration with community members or experts)? How is it governed (documentation, advisory boards, outside council, etc.)?
11. Were we able to download the app? If so, how far were we able to explore before being limited in some way?
12. What are the permissions required from the user in order to use the app?
13. Personal information collected
14. Does the app delete the data? If yes, after how many days?
Section 3: App design transparency comparisons

Section 3.1 - Onboarding transparency
(17 of 18) apps with some level of onboarding include a “walkthrough” step-by-step method of onboarding; (1 of 18) of those apps have similar user interface components (feature image and summary text) with various themes: (6 of 18) created warm illustrations of people and families, (16 of 18) showed information in short sentences as opposed to dense paragraphs, (10 of 18) use simple iconography with longer blocks of text, and (4 of 32) asked for data permissions before any walkthrough or onboarding of information;

Section 3.2 - Visible data settings
(16 of 32) apps accessed feature settings, app permissions and data collection features placed on one of the apps main tabs; (10 of 16) are labeled on the home tab; between (1-6 apps of 16) show “on and off” via checkmarks, cards, toggles, buttons, iconography, and color-coded backgrounds; of the 16 apps, between 1-3 apps each show different aspects that can be turned on/off including: bluetooth, notifications, location, link to go to settings to activate bluetooth, awareness Bluetooth is on, contact registration or proximity tracing is on, “delete data” button and a remove tracking of geolocation option.

Section 3.3 - App governance process
We analyzed the presence privacy policy specific to app (23 of 31), whether app is open source (17 of 31), privacy impact assessments (7 of 31).
3.1: Onboarding transparency

Key questions

- Does the app explain data collection / COVID-19-related technology within the first 5-7 screens of onboarding?
- Of those with the walkthrough method present, how many have icon/illustration + text layouts?
- How do the apps differentiate in terms of style of onboarding?
- Do they explain permissions before they ask you to enable permissions?

Sub-themes and findings:

- **Walkthrough method:** Of the analyzed applications, 18 apps had some level of onboarding before requiring data collection include a “walkthrough” method of screen-by-screen onboarding, highlighting elements including: the purpose of the app, how the technology works (both for the user and also the technical backend), various features (notifications, confidentiality), and possible public health mentions.
  - (17 of 18) Walkthrough present: Alberta Canada, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, India, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, Poland, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, UK
  - (1 of 18) No walkthrough: Iceland has 1 screen that explains the app, but no series of walkthrough screens
- **Walkthrough screen components:** With the 16 apps that showcased an app walkthrough, 14/15 walkthrough “screen” was broken out into similar core components that included the following: main illustration highlighting the concept, a short few sentences of text:
  - (15 of 18) apps with walkthroughs have icon/illustration + text layout: Alberta Canada, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Canada, Czech Republic, France, India, Italy, Malaysia, Poland, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, UK
  - (3 of 18) No consistent set of screens with features of prominent graphic + text: Cyprus, Iceland, Ireland
- **Style of onboarding:** In the onboarding process we noticed several themes:
  - Created warm illustrations of people and families
    - (8 of 18) Yes: Australia, Canada, France, India, Ireland, Italy, Singapore, Switzerland,
    - (10 of 18) No or unable to tell based on app access: Alberta Canada, Austria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Iceland, Malaysia, Poland, Turkey, UK
  - Showed information in short sentences as opposed to dense paragraphs
    - (16 of 18) Yes: Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, India, Iceland, Italy, Malaysia, Poland, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, UK
    - (2 of 18) Not characteristic of this description or unable to access enough information: Alberta Canada, Ireland
  - Created a more formal approach, creating simple iconography (no human illustrations) with longer blocks of text (as opposed to a few sentence summary):
    - (10 of 18) Yes: Alberta Canada, Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Iceland, Ireland, Malaysia, Poland, Turkey, UK
    - (8 of 18) No: Australia, Canada, Bahrain, France, India, Italy, Singapore, Switzerland,
- **Permissions placement:** Looking at all apps (not just ones with onboarding transparency)
  - (4 of 32) total apps that asked for data before any walkthrough or explanation (US - Utah, US - North Dakota, Qatar, Mexico)
Countries referenced

1. Alberta, Canada: Unable to download; gathered screenshots through news, media
2. Australia: Unable to download; gathered screenshots through news, media
3. Austria: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 2.0.2
4. Bahrain: Unable to download; gathered screenshots through Google Play Store
5. Canada: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.0.2
6. Cyprus: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 2.0.1
7. Czech Republic: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.1
8. France: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.1.1
9. India: Research team did not download; gathered screenshots through App Store, news, and media
10. Iceland: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 2.0.0
11. Ireland: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.0.1
12. Italy: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.2.0
13. Malaysia: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.0.30 and detailed sequential screenshot documentation available through affiliated website.
14. Poland: gathered screenshots through iOS v 4.2.0; screenshots showed text information before asking for permissions for logging and notifications; unable to translate screens to validate what information is articulated
15. Singapore: Unable to download; gathered screenshots through secondary media; found potential evidence of this
16. Switzerland: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.0.5
17. Turkey: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from App Store and Google Play store; unable to determine sequential onboarding screens, but there seems to be some evidence of information walkthrough before entering the home screen.
18. UK: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from secondary source news media; Screens show some evidence of informational onboarding; unable to see sequential walkthrough details.

Note: Screens gathered highlight whether there was some evidence of the theme for analysis and comparison; we are not making a judgment or opinion on whether the design choices are good or bad.

We are not claiming these references are all inclusive as there are many resources that can help give a better picture of these categories that may not be mentioned in this study. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.

- Definite evidence through personal app download
- Some evidence, the app was not fully tested; used secondary information to infer details

Countries referenced

Definite evidence through personal app download
Some evidence, the app was not fully tested; used secondary information to infer details

Note: Screens gathered highlight whether there was some evidence of the theme for analysis and comparison; we are not making a judgment or opinion on whether the design choices are good or bad.

We are not claiming these references are all inclusive as there are many resources that can help give a better picture of these categories that may not be mentioned in this study. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.
Countries not referenced

1. Bulgaria: Unable to download; unable to translate PNG screenshots from Google Play
2. China: Unable to access the app; unable to translate screenshots of the app from news media
3. Germany: Unable to access the app; unable to translate screenshots of the app from the app store & github screenshots presented are not necessarily all comprehensive so was unable to answer question for this section.
4. Ghana: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from secondary news sources, unable to see sequential screenshots for this category
5. Iran: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from android app store, twitter, news and media. Unable to translate screenshots available.
6. Israel: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from Google Play store, affiliated websites; screens are not sequential and so was unable to answer question for this section.
7. Mexico: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.0.1; screenshots did not include data collection or onboarding screens before asking for permissions on location, notifications and bluetooth access
8. Netherlands: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from clickable PrivateTracer online prototype and secondary media sources (videos); unable to infer whether these screenshots are sequential and therefore unable to answer question for this section.
9. North Macedonia: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from App Store and secondary media from affiliated website; unable to track whether onboarding screens are sequential so was unable to answer question for this section.
10. Norway: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from Google Play Store and unable to see sequential onboarding screenshots so was unable to answer question for this section.
11. Qatar: Able to download; app asks for permissions (and does not let you continue) unless user turns on bluetooth and location services are on; no evidence of onboarding screens or information about the technology before Terms and Conditions screen and registration page.
12. UAE: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from app store and secondary media (video) source; unable to see sequential onboarding screenshots so was unable to answer question for this section.
13. U.S. North Dakota: gathered screenshots through iOS v 3.5; screenshots did not include onboarding screens before asking for permissions for notifications; “Welcome” screen gives minimal information on the technology
14. U.S. Utah: Able to download iOS v 1.2.1; there is no onboarding or informational walkthrough before requiring user to input phone number

Note: Apps for countries not referenced due to inability to download the app, lack of secondary evidence through sources we found to show there is some level of informational onboarding, or no informational screens or text before requiring some level of data collection or permissions.

This is a work in progress. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.
We did not have access to the onboarding screens of the app. Based on researching news media, these screenshots highlight a thick block of explanatory text before asking users to accept app permissions.
Australia COVIDSafe

How COVIDSafe works

Bluetooth® signals are used to determine when you're near an-other COVIDSafe user.

Every instance of close contact between you and other COVIDSafe users is noted to create contact informa-tion on your mobile device for COVIDSafe.

If you test positive, you will be informed that you had a close contact with another COVIDSafe user.

Registration and privacy

It is important that you read the COVIDSafe Privacy Policy. If you register for COVIDSafe, you are consent-ing to the Australian Government storing your mobile device ID and details in a secure database.

If you share COVIDSafe, you consent to the Australian Government storing your mobile device ID and details in a secure database.

You can choose to share your mobile device ID with COVIDSafe. This will allow us to track your close contacts.

If you are under 16 years of age, your parent or guardian must consent on your behalf.

Enter your details

Full name

App was not downloaded, screens were taken from this source.

Austria focuses one page of the onboarding directly on defining and explaining the key concept of their app: “The Digital handshake.”
Thank you for using the app!

You're actively helping to protect your health and the health of others. You can now record encounters with other app users.

By installing the app you agree to the terms of use.

Declaration of consent

I agree that the Austrian Red Cross (ÖRK) may process my personal data (random figures [*random-IDs], my telephone number, and any suspicion and reporting of my COVID-19 condition [= health data]) for the purpose of rapid interruption of the corona infection chain.

I consent

I may revoke my consent at any time, whereby revocation does not affect the lawfulness of processing up until the time that consent is revoked.

Further information can be found in our privacy policy.

iOS app version 2.0.2. Last update 6/26/20. Last accessed 6/28/20
Together, let’s stop the spread of COVID-19

COVID Alert helps us break the cycle of infection. The app can let people know of possible exposures before any symptoms appear.

That way, we can take care of ourselves and protect our communities.

Your privacy is protected

COVID Alert does not use GPS or track your location.

It has no way of knowing:

- Your location.
- Your name or address.
- Your phone’s contacts.
- Your health information.
- The health information of anyone you’re near.

How it works

- The app uses Bluetooth to exchange random codes with nearby phones.
- Every day, it checks a list of random codes from people who tell the app they tested positive.
- If you’ve had close contact with one of those people in the past 14 days, you’ll get a notification.

How COVID Alert works

The app runs in the background and will not interrupt your activities.

Whenever you’re near someone else with COVID Alert, both phones exchange random codes every 5 minutes.

The random codes change often and cannot be used to identify you.

What’s an exposure?
The app estimates how near people are by the strength of Bluetooth signals.
If you’re closer than 2 metres for more than 15 minutes, the app will record an exposure.

Getting a positive test
If someone with the app is diagnosed with COVID-19, they can choose to upload the random codes their phone sent. The codes go into a central server.
The server only gets the codes. It does not get any information about the person.

Looking for exposures
Every day, whenever it has an Internet connection, your phone will get a list of the random codes from people who reported a diagnosis.
If it finds codes that match, the app notifies you that you’ve been exposed and explains what to do next.

One part of public health
- COVID Alert is just one part of the public health effort to stop the spread of COVID-19.
- Follow all public health guidelines in your area.
- COVID Alert does not replace medical advice. If you get sick, contact your doctor or other healthcare provider.

The app will now ask your permission

Allow the app to start logging random codes or “random IDs” when you’re near other phones. The app will access the date, duration and signal strength related to the random codes, but they never leave your phone.

You'll also need to let the app send you notifications.

Learn more about privacy

Canada COVID Alert

Cyprus highlights 1-2 pages of app context before launching the user onto the home screen of the app for logging information.

Cyprus CovTracer

Source: iOS app screenshots version 2.0.1. Accessed 7/16/20
Czech’s onboarding is similar to France’s: similar graphical layout and onboarding features (step by step) details before permissions.
France includes a comprehensive “3-step” summary up front, and goes through each category step by step. Before ending onboarding, they include a series of public health reminders.
India
Aarogya Setu

Iceland

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=is.landalækni.rakning
Enter your phone number.

You will then be sent a code, which you will enter in the next step.

+345

TELEPHONE

I agree to the app’s Privacy Policy and that location data will be stored on the phone.

Next

Your device stores your location data for the past 14 days. Older data are deleted automatically.

Help the Civil Protection Team to track potential COVID-19 infections in Iceland

Let’s help the Department of Civil Protection and Emergency Management’s Contact Tracing Team to trace potential COVID-19 contagion paths in Iceland.

How does the app work, and what information does it store?

The app saves your movements/locations data and stores them securely in your device. In certain instances, the Contact Tracing Team may send you a notification and request that you forward them the data. Then you can send the data to the Team with a single click. This will make it easier to trace the spread of COVID-19 while the epidemic is ongoing.

Your device stores your location data for the past 14 days. Older data are deleted automatically.

Iceland
iOS app version 2.0.0, accessed July 02, 2020
Contact Tracing
Help contact tracing, protecting your privacy.

COVID Check-In
Check your symptoms every day.

Updates
Keep up to date on the fight against COVID-19.

If you tap Get started, you are accepting the Terms & Conditions.

Get started

Your data

The COVID Tracker app protects your privacy and does not share personal information about you with other app users. Your identity will never be revealed to other app users.

Any personal data you provide will be processed in line with GDPR and data protection law. You can read more about this in the Data Protection Information Notice below. Your data will only be used in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic response as set out in the Data Protection Information Notice.

If you need to be alerted, the app will start this process with a secure in-app notification. Separate to using this app, the HSE contact tracing team may phone you if someone with COVID-19 identifies you as a close contact. If you have a COVID-19 test, the HSE will contact you by text or by phone with results.

Take care with any suspicious phone calls, emails or texts asking for personal information. The HSE will not ask for personal information by text or email.

You can read the Data Protection Information Notice here.

You can view this notice at any time in Settings. If you do not want to continue, close and delete the app. If you consent, tap Continue to proceed.

Ireland COVID Tracker
iOS app accessed July 20, 2020
Version 1.0.1
Data Protection Information Notice

Version 1.0.1 - Updated 13/7/2020 - Section 9.1 updated to reflect that two of the third party data processors listed do not have access to user data.

1. Introduction

The purpose of this privacy information notice is to explain how the COVID Tracker App (the ‘app’) works, what data is collected by the app, who has access to that data and the purposes for which the data is used. This notice also provides you with information about your data protection rights under data protection law, including under the EU General Data Protection Regulation (EU Regulation 679/2016) (the GDPR).

The app is available to download for free from the Apple App Store and the Google Play Store. Use of the app by you is completely voluntary – it is your choice to download it, your choice to keep it on your device, your choice to opt-in to and use the different services that are available on the app, and your choice to delete it. You will never be required to use the app or to access other services from the HSE or Department of Health. You will be given a separate opt-in (consent) for each service that processes your personal data in the app. You can withdraw your consent(s) at any time.

The app runs on iPhones that support iOS 13.5 and higher, and Android phones running Android 6.0 and higher. The app is not intended for use by persons under 16 years of age, as they are considered not to have reached the digital age of consent. You will be asked to confirm that you are 16 years old or older after you download the app.

2. The Data Controllers

Contact Tracing

Contact tracing helps prevent the spread of COVID-19.

This app supports the work of the HSE’s Contact Tracing teams, but those teams may also contact you as part of manual contact tracing.

The app will send you a Close Contact Alert if you have been in close contact with someone who has tested positive for the virus.

To enable Contact Tracing for this app you need to turn on:

- Exposure Notification Service

and to get an alert you need to turn on:

- Notifications

If you change your mind, you can change your permissions in Settings at any time.

iOS app accessed July 20, 2020
Version 1.0.1
Contact Tracing follow-up call

If someone you’ve been in close contact with tests positive for COVID-19, the app will send you a Close Contact Alert. The HSE will also phone you if you provide your number below.

The HSE may also phone if you are identified as a close contact by manual contact tracing. The HSE will give you advice and refer you for testing if appropriate.

The app will only share your phone number with the HSE if you get a Close Contact Alert. You can enter your number below, or add it later in Settings.

Your country code

Ireland (+353)

Your phone number (optional)

Your number

Yes, I want to opt-in

No thanks

iOS app accessed July 20, 2020
Version 1.0.1
This app shows a series of screens explaining how the app is valuable on a high level before going into more granular details and permission gathering.

Source: Screenshots from 6/28/20: iOS app version 1.2.0 (last update one week ago from 6/28/20.)
Italy Immuni

Source: Screenshots from 6/28/20: iOS app version 1.2.0 (last update one week ago from 6/28/20.)
Bagaimana MyTrace berfungsi?

Dengan menggunakan aplikasi ini, anda akan membantu KKM untuk mengesan kontak yang berada dekat dengan pesakit COVID19.

Data kontak disimpan di peranti anda dan KKM akan meminta persetujuan anda agar data anda boleh digunakan untuk tujuan pengesahan.

How MyTrace works?

By using the app, you will help the MOH to trace persons that are in close contact with a COVID19 patient.

Wszystko w Twoich rękach. Ta wersja aplikacji korzysta z narzędzi systemów iOS/Android do powiadomiania o możliwym kontakcie z koronawirusem.

Pozwól, by aplikacja anonimowo rejestrowała spotkania z innymi użytkownikami. Dzięki temu, gdy użytkownik, któregoś z nich zachoruje, otrzymasz odpowiednie powiadomienie. Zadbaj o swoje i swoich bliskich zdrowie.

Więcej informacji

Dalej

---

ProteGO Safe to aplikacja, która pomoże nam w wychodzeniu z pandemii. Wśród nas będzie z nami korzystać, tym szybciej i skuteczniej ograniczymy tempo i skalę rozprzestrzeniania się koronawirusa. To także profesjonalna pomoc zarówno dla zdrowych, jak i zakażonych osób.

Nasza aplikacja korzysta z API opracowanego przez Google i Apple.

Jak działa?

Aplikacja składa się z dwóch modułów. Pierwszy z nich to moduł umożliwiający samokontrolę stanu zdrowia. Twój telefon jest „otrzymywarką”, w której na bieżąco pozwalają weryfikować ciepło oraz inne dane o Twoim stanie zdrowia. To rozwiązanie oparte o wytyczne Światowej Organizacji Zdrowia (WHO).

Drugi moduł – to skanowanie Twego otoczenia i korzystanie z przyjaznego kontaktu z innymi.

Jeśli węży, w swoim telefonie Bluetooth, aplikacja będzie komunikować się z urządzeniami jakichś innych użytkowników. Spokojnie, nie będzie im przyprowadzać żadnych danych na Twoim imieniu. Niemniej możesz dostarczyć dostęp do zawartości Twojego telefonu.

Informacje o zaprezentowanych nie zawierają żadnych danych o ich właścicielach, są anonimowe i zakażone, a do tego przechowywane tylko w telefonie, przez dwa tygodnie. Później są usunięte.

Do czego przydatne są te informacje?

Wszystko w Twoich rękach.

W razie pytań zapraszamy do kontaktu protego@ms.gov.pl
Poland uses a series of simple iconography to highlight each step of the onboarding process.
1. Scan QR code or go to tracetogether.gov.sg to download the app.

The app is now available in more languages.

2. Launch the app.

The first few pages explain the benefits of using the app.

3. Register using your mobile number.

Enter your mobile number

MOH will use this number to contact you if you had possible exposure to COVID-19.

9123 4567

GET OTP

4. Select your profile and enter your details.

Enter the One-Time Pin sent to you via SMS.

Your unique ID helps MOH reach the right person when they need to contact you.

5. Enable Bluetooth and other app permissions.

6. Set up completed!

Keep your app running and Bluetooth on until the outbreak ends.

And hang in there! We can defeat COVID-19 together.

The app bundles a series of explainer text before asking the user to launch into data input (mobile phone number, personal details). This pattern is seen in other apps.

Singapore Trace Together

What is TraceTogether and how does it work?

TraceTogether is a contact-tracing smartphone app that enables the Ministry of Health (MOH) to quickly track people who have been exposed to confirmed coronavirus cases.

1. Users can download the app on the Apple App Store or the Google Play Store.

2. Users have to input their mobile phone number for MOH to be able to contact them quickly. The number is only collected by the Government through the app.

3. During the initial set-up, users have to give their consent to be able to use the app.

4. Users will then have to enable push notifications and location permissions, and keep the Bluetooth function on their phones turned on.

5. This is because the app uses short-distance Bluetooth signals that are exchanged between phones to detect other TraceTogether users in close proximity.

6. Official contact tracers who call users will provide a code that users can match with a corresponding verification code on their app.

Singapore
Trace Together
act-tracing&psig=AoVvaw2ICWc-O1PawlLebOKjwIP&ust=1591709524377000&source=images&cd=vfe&ved=0CAIQjRxqFwoTC
JiXs5mq8ukCFQAAAAAdAAAAABAQ
Singapore
Trace Together
Singapore
Trace Together
Switzerland
SwissCovid App

Screenshots taken iOS app version 1.0.5 on June 28, 2020
This app highlights the reason for permissions before asking for exposure logging and notification access. Some apps do not give context before requiring permissions.
This application protects you and your surroundings from Corona virus T.C. It was developed by the Ministry of Health.

Risk Areas
When you allow location services, the app will alert you when you approach risky areas, and you will be able to see areas on the map that you should not approach instantly.

Turkey
Hayat Eve Sığar

https://apps.apple.com/tr/app/hayat-eve-s%C4%B1%C4%9Far/id1505756398?l=tr
Turkey
Hayat Eve Sığar

UK
NHS COVID-19 App


Users will be asked to enter the first part of their postcode but not their name or other personal details
3.2: Visible data settings

Key questions

- Are the settings on one of the main navigation tabs of the app? If so, which?
- Does the home or main tab have setting toggles (ability to turn on/off bluetooth, location, etc.)? How is this displayed?
- Based on the on/off elements, what specifically can be turned on or off?

Sub-themes and findings:

- (16 of 32) apps that we had access to featured settings, app permissions, and data collection features are placed one of the main tabs:
  - 9 of 16 are on the home tab (Alberta Canada, Austria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Italy, Malaysia, Netherlands, Switzerland)
  - 3 of 16 are not on the home tab (France - Protect tab, Ireland - Contact Tracing, US North Dakota - Visits, Protect, About)
  - 4 of 16 unable to tell which tab (Australia, Germany, Singapore, North Macedonia)

- On vs. off design elements. One UI element that is in several apps are the "on versus off" design for permissions, location sharing, or other types of data sharing are shown in a variety of ways:
  - 2 of 16 show checkmarks (Alberta Canada, Czech Republic)
  - 6 of 16 show cards with "active" text (Australia, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Singapore)
  - 2 of 16 show toggle on/off (Austria, North Macedonia)
  - 4 of 16 feature button on/off (Canada, Cyprus, France, US - North Dakota)
  - 1 of 16 features ionography with on/off text (Malaysia)
  - 1 of 16 features color-coded background toggle (Netherland)

- Data controls. Based on the on vs. off elements, what specifically can be turned on or off?
  - 2 of 16 show bluetooth (Alberta Canada, Cyprus, North Macedonia)
  - 1 of 16 shows notifications (Alberta Canada)
  - 1 of 16 shows exposure notifications (Canada)
  - 1 of 16 shows location (US - North Dakota)
  - 3 of 16 mention or link to go to your settings to activate bluetooth & location (France, Italy)
  - 2 of 16 show no action on interface, just awareness Bluetooth is on (Australia, Singapore-based on available screen)
  - 2 of 16 show contact registration or proximity tracing is on (Netherlands, Switzerland)
  - 1 of 16 shows "delete data" button which prompts delete app (US North Dakota)
  - 1 of 16 shows remove tracking of home geolocation option (US - North Dakota)
  - 2 of 16 unable to tell which features are specifically (Germany, Italy)
Countries referenced

1. Alberta, Canada: Unable to download; gathered screenshots through news, media
2. Australia: Unable to download; gathered screenshots through news, media
3. Austria: Able to download iOS app v 2.0.2; gathered screenshots directly through app and app stores
4. Canada: Able to download iOS app v. 1.0.2; gathered screenshots directly through the app
5. Cyprus: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 2.0.1
6. Czech Republic: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.1 and Google Play store with Google translation
7. France: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.1.1
8. Germany: Unable to access the app; gathered screenshots through Google Play Store & Github; unable to translate screenshots in Play Store but github documentation for screen descriptions are written in English
9. Italy: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.2.0
10. Ireland: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.0.1
11. Malaysia: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.0.30 and detailed sequential screenshot documentation available through affiliated website.
12. Netherlands: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from clickable PrivateTracer online prototype and secondary media sources (videos); unable to find evidence for this category
13. U.S. North Dakota: gathered screenshots through iOS v 3.5;
14. North Macedonia: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from App Store and secondary media from affiliated website; found possible evidence for this category with the toggle, but unable to translate this screen to confirm meaning and feature functionality
15. Singapore: Unable to download; gathered screenshots through secondary media; found possible evidence for this category
16. Switzerland: Able to download iOS app v 1.0.5; gathered screenshots through app directly, and affiliated Fact Sheet

Note: Screens gathered highlight whether there was some evidence of the theme for analysis and comparison; we are not making a judgment or opinion on whether the design choices are good or bad. We are not claiming these references are all inclusive as there are many resources that can help give a better picture of these categories that may not be mentioned in this study. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.
Countries not referenced

1. Bahrain: Unable to download; gathered screenshots through Google Play Store; unable to find evidence for this category
2. Bulgaria: Unable to download; unable to translate PNG screenshots from Google Play
3. China: Unable to access the app; unable to translate screenshots of the app from news media
4. Ghana: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from secondary news sources, unable to find evidence for this category
5. Iceland: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v. 2.0.0, unable to find evidence for this category
6. India: Research team did not download; gathered screenshots through app store, news, and media, unable to find evidence for this category
7. Iran: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from android app store, twitter, news and media, unable to translate screenshots and see evidence for this category
8. Israel: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from Google Play store, affiliated websites; unable to find evidence for this category
9. Mexico: Able to download; gathered screenshots through iOS v 1.0.1; unable to find evidence for this category
10. Norway: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from Google Play Store and unable to see sequential onboarding screenshots so was unable to find evidence for this category
11. Poland: gathered screenshots through iOS v 4.2.0; screenshots showed text information before asking for permissions for logging and notifications; unable to translate screens to validate what information is articulated
12. Qatar: Able to download; unable to find evidence for this category
13. Turkey: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from App Store and Google Play store; unable to find evidence for this category
14. UAE: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from app store and secondary media (video) source; unable to find evidence for this category
15. UK: Unable to download; acquired screenshots from secondary source news media; unable to find evidence for this category
16. U.S. Utah: Able to download iOS v 1.2.1; unable to find evidence for this category
HELP STOP THE SPREAD OF COVID-19
by keeping your Bluetooth on and the app open,
especially when you are out,
on public transport, at work
or in public places.

Last Updated: 3:58 PM

APP PERMISSIONS STATUS

Permissions Enabled: Yes
Bluetooth Enabled: No
Push Notifications: Yes

For more help, see our FAQ.

Share COVIDSafe
Invite others to join. Together,
we're stronger.

Get the Coronavirus app

Digital Handshake

AUTOMATISCHER HANDSHAKE:
aktiv

Via Bluetooth versenden und empfangen Sie
Signale anderer Apps. Signale über 15 Min.
werden als Handshake im Ihren Kontakt-Notizbuch
aufgezeichnet. Bitte kontrollieren Sie die
Aufzeichnung mittels manuellen Handshake, da
nicht alle Geräte unterstützt werden.

Teilen Sie die App!
Empfehlen Sie die App
und schützen Sie so

Australia
COVIDSafe
Source: Blog post

Austria
STOUPP Corona
Source: App Store
Erouska is active. The application works in the background and monitors the environment, please do not quit it. Leave Bluetooth turned on and work with your phone as usual. Pause Data Collection.

Czech Republic
Erouska
The COVIDsafe App has detected you are now +20km from your nominated home address. Please register your reason for travel by calling 1300 1MY GOV (+61 1300 169 468) within 15 minutes of receiving this SMS (10:12am AEST Monday 27 April 2020). Thank you.

Please take note
1. Keep your phone with you when you leave home.
2. Keep the app running.

Has a health official asked you to upload your data?

Upload my data

Version Number: 1.0.11

Check permissions

COVIDSafe needs permission to access these features.

App permission status
- Bluetooth: Off
- Location: On
- Battery optimization: Off
Home screen button highlights "Enable COVID Alert" button which means "Enable exposure notifications" which alerts the user as soon as it learns of a possible exposure.

The home page highlights if the COVID Alert app is off and if notifications are off with button prompts to turn them on.

Canada
COVID Alert
Source: iOS app version 1.0.2, accessed 8/01/20
Cyprus
CovTracer
Source: iOS app v.2.0.1

France
StopCovid
Source: iOS app v.1.1.1

Germany
Corona-Warn-App
Source: Github
Contact Tracing follow-up call

If someone you’ve been in close contact with tests positive for COVID-19, the app will send you a Close Contact Alert. The HSE will also phone you if you provide your number below.

The HSE may also phone if you are identified as a close contact by manual contact tracing. The HSE will give you advice and refer you for testing if appropriate.

The app will only share your phone number with the HSE if you get a Close Contact Alert. You can enter your number below, or add it later in Settings.

Your country code
Ireland (+353)

Your phone number (optional)

Yes, I want to opt-in

No thanks

Contact Tracing

Hi there 🎉

COVID Check-In allows everyone using the app to check symptoms and get advice. It also helps the HSE to map and track how COVID-19 is affecting Ireland.

The COVID Check-In does not reveal your identity. You can share your age, sex and locality to help make the information more useful for public health analysis.

The COVID Check-In also keeps a record on your phone of any symptoms you’ve had, so you can check back and review at any time.

Yes, I’d like to use COVID Check-In

You can read the Data Protection Information Notice here

Contact Tracing not active

You need to enable Exposure notification service in your settings

Go to settings

COVID Check-In tab also highlights an opportunity for the user to opt-in to check in with their symptoms.

The Updates tab showcases the “COVID Check-In” to nudge users to input their symptoms.
Italy’s app features a “disable the service” call to action on the home page. It also highlights whether the service is active or inactive. Users can learn more about the technology throughout the app and view more information on how to disable exposure notifications directly in the app.
The app appears to be default off. The app will not function until the user switches contact registration back on.

The app shows when it was last updated, what data is shared and whether contact registration is off or on.

If the user turns off contact registration, the app presents this warning that it can no longer detect when you may be in proximity with an infected person.

Netherlands
PrivateTracer
Source: Public prototype
App features a call-to-action “Erase Data” button

Upon clicking “Erase Data” user is prompted to delete app.

US: North Dakota
Care19
Source: iOS app v.3.5
Unclear whether this is the home screen but screen title “Your app is active” is the indicator for this category.
Stop Korona
https://apps.apple.com/mk/app/stopkorona/id1506641869

Unable to translate application but this screen shows evidence of a toggle off/on for bluetooth functionality
Scrolling down on homepage, user can change settings for messages, follow up on public health steps.

Homepage features “app active” box to remind user app is on.
3.3: Privacy governance process

Key questions

- How was the app created (through collaboration with community members or experts)? How is the app governed (documentation, advisory boards, outside council, etc.)? [This was noted in the slide notes, but was not in the comparison slides due to the variation in phrasing.]
- Does the app have a privacy policy specific to the app?
- Does the app have evidence of open source documentation?
- Does the app have evidence of privacy impact assessments?

Sub-themes and findings:

- **Privacy policy specific to app.** Does the app have a privacy policy specific to the app (meaning, not just a broad privacy policy for the affiliated organization)?
  - (23 of 31) Yes (Alberta Canada, Australia, Austria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Iceland, India, Ireland Israel, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Qatar, Singapore, Switzerland, UAE, UK, U.S - Utah)
  - (8 of 31) No or unable to find evidence of this: (Bahrain, Bulgaria, France, Ghana, Iran, Malaysia, U.S - North Dakota, Turkey)

- **Open source.** Evidence of open source documentation (e.g. Github)
  - (17 of 31) Yes: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, Switzerland, UK
  - (14 of 31) No or unable to find evidence of this: Alberta Canada, Bahrain, Ghana, India, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico, U.S. North Dakota, North Macedonia, Norway, Qatar, Turkey, UAE, U.S. Utah

- *Privacy or Data Protection Impact Assessments.* Evidence of privacy or Data Protection Impact Assessments.
  - (7 of 31) Yes: Austria, Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Poland, UK
  - (24 of 31) No or unable to find evidence of this: Alberta Canada, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Ghana, Iceland, India, Iran, Israel, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, U.S. - North Dakota, North Macedonia, Norway, Qatar, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, UAE, U.S. - Utah

Definitions:
A Privacy Impact Assessment, or PIA, is an analysis of how personally identifiable information is collected, used, shared, and maintained. (Source: US FTC)
A Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) is a process to help you identify and minimise the data protection risks of a project. (Source: ICO)
Countries referenced

1. Alberta, Canada
2. Australia
3. Austria
4. Bahrain
5. Bulgaria
6. Canada
7. Cyprus
8. Czech Republic
9. France
10. Germany
11. Ghana
12. Iceland
13. India
14. Iran
15. Ireland
16. Israel
17. Italy
18. Malaysia
19. Mexico
20. Netherlands
21. U.S. North Dakota
22. North Macedonia
23. Norway
24. Poland
25. Qatar
26. Singapore
27. Switzerland
28. Turkey
29. UAE
30. UK
31. U.S. Utah

Note: Text gathered highlight whether there was some evidence of the theme for analysis and comparison; we are not making a judgment or opinion on whether the design choices are good or bad.

We are not claiming these references are all inclusive as there are many resources that can help give a better picture of these categories that may not be mentioned in this study. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.

- Has privacy policy or privacy statement specific to the app
- Has some reference to open source documentation
- Has evidence or reference to privacy or data protection impact assessment
- Could not find evidence but does not mean this does not exist; please let us know if you have information to help update.
1. China: Unable to find public information or evidence on any of these categories.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Advisory board</th>
<th>PP specific to app</th>
<th>OS</th>
<th>Date collected</th>
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<tr>
<td>Alberta, Canada</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this.</td>
<td><a href="https://www.alberta.ca/ab-trace-together-privacy.aspx">https://www.alberta.ca/ab-trace-together-privacy.aspx</a> (7/2/20)</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this.</td>
<td>July 17, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>No app specific advisory board, but evidence of advisory committees</td>
<td><a href="https://www.health.gov.au/committees-and-groups">https://www.health.gov.au/committees-and-groups</a></td>
<td>unable to find evidence of this</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>No app specific advisory board, but evidence the code was submitted to the privacy organisations noyb.eu, epicenter.works and the security experts at sba-research.org for a first review</td>
<td><a href="https://www.roteskreuz.at/datenschutz/">https://www.roteskreuz.at/datenschutz/</a></td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/austrianredcross/stopp-corona-ios">https://github.com/austrianredcross/stopp-corona-ios</a></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this but evidence of collaboration: “the Information &amp; eGovernment Authority (iGA), in cooperation with the National Taskforce for Combatting the Coronavirus (COVID-19) , worked endlessly to introduce the BeAware Bahrain app” (Source)</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this</td>
<td>July 17, 2020</td>
</tr>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/scalefocus/virusafe-android">https://github.com/scalefocus/virusafe-android</a> (7/2/20)</td>
<td>July 17, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Compliant with the European Commission recommendation on COVID-19 apps for contact tracing (Source: website)</td>
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</tbody>
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* PP: Privacy Policy
* OS: Open Source
* Date collected: July 17, 2020
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<td>Unable to find evidence of this; Audit and code: <a href="https://erouska.cz/audit-kod">https://erouska.cz/audit-kod</a>; Evidence of collaboration: <a href="https://erouska.cz/audit-kod">Team on website is listed here. Listed on website footer</a>; RISE is the Research Centre of Excellence on Information and Communication Technologies in Cyprus, focusing on Interactive media, Smart systems and Emerging technologies, aiming to empower knowledge and technology transfer in the region. It is a joint venture between the three public universities of Cyprus - University of Cyprus, Cyprus University of Technology, and, Open University of Cyprus-, the Municipality of Nicosia, and two renowned international partners, the Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Germany, and, the University College London, United Kingdom.</td>
<td><a href="https://covid-19.rise.org.cy/RISE_CovTracer_Privacy_Policy_EN.pdf">https://covid-19.rise.org.cy/RISE_CovTracer_Privacy_Policy_EN.pdf</a></td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/covid19cz/erouska-android">https://github.com/covid19cz/erouska-android</a> (7/2/20)</td>
<td><a href="https://covid-19.rise.org.cy/en/manual/">https://covid-19.rise.org.cy/en/manual/</a></td>
<td>July 17, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this; Expert's opinion and outreach: <a href="https://www.economie.gouv.fr/stopcovid">https://www.economie.gouv.fr/stopcovid</a>; Inria, ANSSI, Capgemini, Dassault Systèmes, Inserm, Lunabee Studio, Orange, Santé Publique France and Withings create the StopCovid project team in order to structure and strengthen their contribution to the government project to set up a mobile contact tracing application (StopCovid). In France, since the beginning of April, the Ministry of Solidarity and Health, the State Secretariat responsible for Digital, in connection with the Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Innovation are mobilized. Since April 8, Inria has been the operational pilot of the project and has been working closely with its European counterparts to develop a protocol that respects civil liberties. Other public and private players are also involved, including ANSSI, Santé Publique France, Inserm, Capgemini, Orange, Dassault Systèmes, Lunabee Studio and Withings. An ecosystem of contributors is also mobilized. Source: <a href="https://www.inria.fr/sites/default/files/2020-04/Communiqu%C3%A9%20de%20presse%20STPCovid%2026avril%20EN.pdf">https://www.inria.fr/sites/default/files/2020-04/Communiqu%C3%A9%20de%20presse%20STPCovid%2026avril%20EN.pdf</a>; <a href="https://www.inria.fr/fr/stopcovid-code-source">https://www.inria.fr/fr/stopcovid-code-source</a></td>
<td><a href="https://www.economie.gouv.fr/politique-confidentialite">https://www.economie.gouv.fr/politique-confidentialite</a></td>
<td><a href="https://www.inria.fr/fr/stopcovid19">https://www.inria.fr/fr/stopcovid19</a>; <a href="https://www.inria.fr/fr/stopcovid-code-source">https://www.inria.fr/fr/stopcovid-code-source</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Advisory board</td>
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<td>OS</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this; <a href="https://www.coronawarn.app/en/">on website</a> says “powered by Ministry of Communications in partnership with iQuent Technologies and Ascend Digital Solutions”</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this;</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this;</td>
<td></td>
<td>July 17, 2020</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this; The office of the Director of Public Health and the Civil Protection Department is behind covid.is. <a href="https://www.covid.is/app/en">Source:</a> (6/28/20)</td>
<td><a href="https://www.covid.is/app/privacystatement">https://www.covid.is/app/privacystatement</a></td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/aranja/rakning-c19-app">https://github.com/aranja/rakning-c19-app</a></td>
<td></td>
<td>July 17, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this;</td>
<td><a href="https://static.mygov.in/rest/s3fs-public/mygov_159051645651307401.pdf">https://static.mygov.in/rest/s3fs-public/mygov_159051645651307401.pdf</a></td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this;</td>
<td>Bug bounty programme: <a href="https://static.mygov.in/rest/s3fs-public/mygov_159057669351307401.pdf">https://static.mygov.in/rest/s3fs-public/mygov_159057669351307401.pdf</a>; data access knowledge protocol <a href="https://static.mygov.in/rest/s3fs-public/mygov_159051652451307401.pdf">https://static.mygov.in/rest/s3fs-public/mygov_159051652451307401.pdf</a>; technical faqs <a href="https://static.mygov.in/rest/s3fs-public/mygov_159056968451307401.pdf">https://static.mygov.in/rest/s3fs-public/mygov_159056968451307401.pdf</a></td>
<td>July 17, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Advisory board</td>
<td>PP specific to app</td>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Date collected</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
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<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this; A team of professors, alumni and students of Sharif, Shahid Beheshti and Amirkabir Universities of Technology and holders of the World Olympiad in Mathematics and Computer Olympiads have created a mask in collaboration with some of the best specialists in medical sciences and virology. The production of the mask was voluntary and without commercial incentives. The World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines and the experience of other countries have been used to control the prevalence of corona and reduce the number of victims in mask making. Source: <a href="https://mask.ir/about_us.html">https://mask.ir/about_us.html</a> (6/28/20)</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/MohGovIL">https://github.com/MohGovIL</a></td>
<td>Site is in another language, unable to fully translate</td>
<td>July 17, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of advisory board specific to the app; able to find HSE board members: <a href="https://www.hse.ie/eng/about/who/board-members/">https://www.hse.ie/eng/about/who/board-members/</a></td>
<td><a href="https://covidtracker.gov.ie/privacy-and-data/">https://covidtracker.gov.ie/privacy-and-data/</a></td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/HSEIreland/covid-tracker-app">https://github.com/HSEIreland/covid-tracker-app</a></td>
<td>Data Protection Impact Assessment. A DPIA is an important document that clearly and transparently defines what data the app uses and how it protects that data in full compliance with GDPR. The DPIA for the Covid Tracker app has been finalised on the basis of feedback from the Attorney General's Office and from the Office of the Data Protection Commissioner. <a href="https://github.com/HSEIreland/covidtracker-documentation/blob/master/documentation/privacy/DPINV1.1.mdown">Download the DPIA</a></td>
<td>July 17, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this; HaMagen was developed in a joint effort by developers from the Ministry of Health, commercial companies, and volunteers from various organizations and the developer community in Israel. What security checks did this application pass? The application was tested by several cyber and information security agencies, including staff from Israel National Cyber Directorate, specialists from the commercial sector, and leading information security and cyber experts from the civil cyber and information security community in Israel. Security checks included architectural checks, code reviews, and PT (breach checks). Adjustments were made according to the recommendations received, and we are currently convinced that the application is sufficiently secure for use, adequately protected from attacks and malfunction, and capable of providing user services in accordance with its purposes. Source: <a href="https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hamagen-app/download-en/">https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hamagen-app/download-en/</a> (6/28/20)</td>
<td><a href="https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hamagen-app/magen-privacy-en/">https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hamagen-app/magen-privacy-en/</a></td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/MohGovIL">https://github.com/MohGovIL</a></td>
<td>July 17, 2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Advisory board</td>
<td>PP specific to app</td>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Date collected</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this;</td>
<td><a href="https://www.immuni.italia.it/pn.html">https://www.immuni.italia.it/pn.html</a></td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/immuni-app/immuni-documentation">https://github.com/immuni-app/immuni-documentation</a>; Italy has released its official COVID-19 contact-tracing app, which is built on the framework developed by Apple and Google to track infections. (Source: Engadget)</td>
<td>List of what data &quot;Immuni does not gather&quot; <a href="https://www.immuni.italia.it/">https://www.immuni.italia.it/</a></td>
<td>July 17, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this; MyTrace is developed through a strategic cooperation between Government agencies of Malaysia: Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI), National Security Council (NSC), Ministry of Health (MOH), Malaysian Administrative Modernisation and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU), Malaysian Institute of Microelectronic Systems(MIMOS) and Malaysian Global Innovation and Creativity Centre (MaGIC); with the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) and Google. Source: <a href="https://www.mosti.gov.my/web/en/mytrace/#1588521061765-2930e986-9778">https://www.mosti.gov.my/web/en/mytrace/#1588521061765-2930e986-9778</a> (7/2/20)</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this;</td>
<td>Detailed usage manual and video: <a href="https://www.mosti.gov.my/web/en/mytrace/#1588521061765-2930e986-9778">https://www.mosti.gov.my/web/en/mytrace/#1588521061765-2930e986-9778</a></td>
<td>July 18, 2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this;</td>
<td><a href="http://covidradar.mx/aviso-de-privacidad/">http://covidradar.mx/aviso-de-privacidad/</a></td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this;</td>
<td></td>
<td>July 18, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this; <strong>List of collaborators:</strong> <strong>Source:</strong> <a href="https://www.privatetracer.org/nieuws">https://www.privatetracer.org/nieuws; PrivateTracer Foundation</a>; PrivateTracer Foundation: At the moment, all parties participate on a non-formal, idealistic, voluntary basis and that is the strength of this open source initiative. The PrivateTracer foundation and the partners in the partnership are open to further elaboration of the governance and the partnership, based on the wishes of VWS; PrivateTracer is a public-private association of parties based on free, ideally funded measures and informally responsible for non-profit Stichting PrivateTracer; The public private affiliate has been in the Hague, UMC, LUMC, Microsoft, NEN, YES! Delft, Milvum, Odyssey.org, Loyens &amp; Loeff, Flitsmeister, Edelman, Software Improvement Group, Zerocopter, DP-3T, Circularize, Poort8, Cybermundus, ConnectoRR, Dedico en ERAC.</td>
<td>Privacy by design tab on website.</td>
<td><a href="https://gitlab.com/PrivateTracer">https://gitlab.com/PrivateTracer</a></td>
<td>July 18, 2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Advisory board: Unable to find evidence of this;</td>
<td>PP specific to app: Available in documents here:</td>
<td>OS:</td>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>StopKorona! is a mobile app developed by Nextsense as donation for the needs of the Ministry of Health. The app was developed in cooperation with and support by the Ministry of Information Society and Administration. Source: FAQs <a href="https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/en">https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/en</a></td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/ProteGO-Safe">https://github.com/ProteGO-Safe</a></td>
<td><a href="https://www.gov.pl/attachment/748bd66d-2345-4644-927b-299227ae74a3">https://www.gov.pl/attachment/748bd66d-2345-4644-927b-299227ae74a3</a></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>The Norwegian Institute of Public Health and Simula have worked together to develop the Smittestopp app. Both information security for the data and privacy for users have been a high priority during development. Source: <a href="https://helsenorge.no/coronavirus/smittestopp">https://helsenorge.no/coronavirus/smittestopp</a> (7/2/20)</td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/ProteGO-Safe">https://github.com/ProteGO-Safe</a></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>We have started working on an application that will allow you to control and stop the spread of coronavirus. It is prepared by a group of Polish programmers. We want to know the views of others before implementing it. That is why we are making the source code available today.</td>
<td><a href="https://www.gov.pl/web/protegosafe/dokumenty">https://www.gov.pl/web/protegosafe/dokumenty</a></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Advisory board</td>
<td>PP specific to app</td>
<td>OS</td>
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<td>Date collected</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this; The application is owned and managed by State of Qatar and the relevant government entities, and it is related to the laws and regulations governing the e-government policies in force in Qatar, particularly Cabinet Resolution No. 18 of 2010 regarding the implementation of e-government policies and Law No. 13 regarding privacy and protection of personal data. Source: <a href="https://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/media-center/news/news-details/todeterminecoronavirustransmissionchainsehterazappisnowavailablefordownload">https://portal.www.gov.qa/wps/portal/media-center/news/news-details/todeterminecoronavirustransmissionchainsehterazappisnowavailablefordownload</a> (6/28/20)</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this; There is mention of the app privacy policy here: <a href="https://www.qatar-tribune.com/Latest-News/ArtMID/423/ArticleID/29605/ehteraz-app-doesn-t-violate-user-privacy-moph">https://www.qatar-tribune.com/Latest-News/ArtMID/423/ArticleID/29605/ehteraz-app-doesn-t-violate-user-privacy-moph</a></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>July 18, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this; Hayat Eve Sığar Mobile Application, T.C. It is a mobile application developed by the Ministry of Health to inform our citizens about the New Coronary Virus (Covid-19) and to minimize the risks associated with the epidemic disease that may occur and prevent its spread; Source: <a href="https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/director-of-communications-altun-shares-a-post-on-pandemic-isolation-tracking-project">https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/director-of-communications-altun-shares-a-post-on-pandemic-isolation-tracking-project</a> (6/28/20)</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>July 18, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Advisory board</td>
<td>PP specific to app</td>
<td>OS</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Date collected</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this; This privacy policy governs your use of the TraceCovid mobile app (“App”) created by the Department of Health (DOH), UAE. Source: <a href="https://tracecovid.ae/privacy.html">https://tracecovid.ae/privacy.html</a></td>
<td><a href="https://tracecovid.ae/privacy.html">https://tracecovid.ae/privacy.html</a></td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this;</td>
<td>July 18, 2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Yes: Ethics Advisory Board: “The use of technology will also give rise to questions relating to ethics, privacy and security, and it is important that these are properly explored and addressed. That is why we have established an independent Ethics Advisory Board. The Chair and existing members, who are not remunerated, are working on recruiting new members to ensure appropriate diversity and expertise. We have published the current membership of the Board together with the terms of reference; We have been consulting with: the Information Commissioner, Members of the National Data Guardian’s Panel, the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, representatives from Understanding Patient Data, volunteers who provided a patient and public perspective; We have also established an ethics advisory board for the app, chaired by Professor Sir Jonathan Montgomery from University College London who previously headed the Nuffield Council on Bioethics. Their advice and expertise will be crucial to everything we do.” <a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/nhs-covid-19-app-explainer">https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/nhs-covid-19-app-explainer</a></td>
<td><a href="https://covid19.nhs.uk/our-policies.html">https://covid19.nhs.uk/our-policies.html</a></td>
<td><a href="https://github.com/nhsx/COVID-19-app-Documentation-BETA">https://github.com/nhsx/COVID-19-app-Documentation-BETA</a></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sources: <a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/nhs-covid-19-app-explainer">https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/nhs-covid-19-app-explainer</a>, <a href="https://covid19.nhs.uk/isle-of-wight.html">https://covid19.nhs.uk/isle-of-wight.html</a> (this site has been archived since the app was taken off the app market on June 18 2020), <a href="https://faq.covid19.nhs.uk/category/?id=CAT-01006">https://faq.covid19.nhs.uk/category/?id=CAT-01006</a> (May 2020, 7/12/20); privacy impact assessment <a href="https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2617676/ico-contact-tracing-recommendations.pdf">https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2617676/ico-contact-tracing-recommendations.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Utah</td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this; The Governor’s Office and the Utah Department of Health worked closely with a developer, Twenty, to develop the Healthy Together app. Twenty repurposed its iOS and Android mobile application technology with existing user registration, location data sharing, basic map visualization, user-to-user sharing, and alerts to deliver a solution in two parts through a mobile application and an official portal to be used by public health. Twenty consulted with other technology experts and the state of Utah’s team during the development process. The app was coded and created by the core Twenty team and approved by State of Utah leaders and health officials. Source: <a href="https://coronavirus.utah.gov/healthy-together-app/">https://coronavirus.utah.gov/healthy-together-app/</a> (6/28/20)</td>
<td><a href="https://coronavirus-download.utah.gov/Health/HealthyTogether_PrivacyPolicy.pdf">https://coronavirus-download.utah.gov/Health/HealthyTogether_PrivacyPolicy.pdf</a></td>
<td>Unable to find evidence of this;</td>
<td>July 18, 2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 4: App data comparisons

Section 4.1 - App permissions
We analyzed 28 apps available and live for download on the Google Play Store as of July 17, 2020; (17 of 28) both mentioned use of approximate and precise location information, (17 of 28) access bluetooth settings, (28 of 28) request full network access, (26 of 28) view network connections, (10 of 28) can read the contents of your USB storage, (5 of 28) ask permission to take pictures and video.

Section 4.2 - App data deletion
Of 31 apps that we could access, (21 of 31) apps we found referenced to user app deletion, (2 of 31) apps we found secondary reference but no official documentation and (8 of 31) apps we did not find reference to user app and data deletion.

Section 4.3 - App downloads
(Google Play Store only)
We analyzed 27 apps available and live for download on the Google Play Store as of July 17, 2020; (2 of 27) listed 1,000+ installs, (3 of 27) listed 10,000+ installs, (4 of 27) listed 50,000+ installs, (7 of 27) listed 100,000+ installs, (2 of 27) listed 500,000+ installs, (6 of 27) listed 1,000,000+ installs, (2 of 27) listed 5,000,000+ installs, (1 of 27) listed 100,000,000+ installs.
4.1 App permissions

Key questions

● What are the permissions required from the user in order to use the app (based on comparison of the permissions in the Google Play Store)?

Sub-themes and findings:

● In this section, we looked at 28 apps that were available and live for download on the Google Play Store (as of July 17, 2020).
  ○ 1 app (UK) has been no longer available as of June 26, 2020.
  ○ 2 apps (Iran, Netherlands) we were unable to find on Google Play Store
  ○ Therefore, we will be analyzing 27 (instead of 31) apps in this section

● Location
  ○ (0 of 28) Approximate only
  ○ (5 of 28) Precise only
  ○ (17 of 28) Both mentioned Approximate and Precise
  ○ (6 of 28) Location was not referenced in the Google Play Store permissions

● Access bluetooth settings
  ○ (17 of 28) Yes
  ○ (11 of 28) Not referenced in Google Play Store

● Full network access
  ○ (28 of 28) Yes
  ○ (0 of 27) Not referenced in Google Play Store

● View network connections
  ○ (26 of 28) Yes
  ○ (2 of 28) Not referenced in Google Play Store

● Read the contents of your USB storage
  ○ (10 of 28) Yes
  ○ (18 of 28) Not referenced in Google Play Store

● Take pictures and video
  ○ (5 of 28) Yes
  ○ (23 of 28) Not referenced in Google Play Store
Note: Data gathered highlight whether there was some evidence of the theme for analysis and comparison; we are not making a judgment or opinion on whether the design choices are good or bad. We are not claiming these references are all inclusive as there are many resources that can help give a better picture of these categories that may not be mentioned in this study. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.
This is a work in progress. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.

Countries not referenced

1. China: Unable to find public information or evidence on any of these categories.
2. Iran: we were unable to find on Google Play Store
3. Netherlands: we were unable to find on Google Play Store
4. UK: has been no longer available as of June 26, 2020.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / State and Link to Google Play Store to view permissions (7/16/20)</th>
<th>Location (Approximate or precise)</th>
<th>Access bluetooth settings OR Pair with Bluetooth devices</th>
<th>Full Network Access</th>
<th>View Network Connections</th>
<th>Read the contents of your USB storage (e.g. photos, media, files)</th>
<th>Highlighting unique permissions on Google Play</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alberta Canada</td>
<td>Precise</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Pair with</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Add or modify calendar events and send email to guests without owners’ knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Precise</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Pair with</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Pair with</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>take pictures and videos</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: App information here were derived from Google Play App permissions ONLY. It is possible for every country, there are other permissions that are not included in this analysis. We did not include Apple permissions as this is not available on the App Store website. Location access with Android/Google may not reflect what is required on iOS as Android/Google requires that apps requesting access to Bluetooth also obtain location permission, as Bluetooth can be used to derive location information when combined with beacons in fixed locations. (See: Source)

We are not claiming these references are all inclusive as there are many resources that can help give a better picture of these categories that may not be mentioned in this study. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know. Blank boxes mean we did not find evidence of this in this analysis.
# Countries referenced

We are not claiming these references are all inclusive as there are many resources that can help give a better picture of these categories that may not be mentioned in this study. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know. Blank boxes mean we did not find evidence of this in this analysis.

Note: App information here were derived from Google Play App permissions ONLY. It is possible for every country, there are other permissions that are not included in this analysis. We did not include Apple permissions as this is not available on the App Store website. Location access with Android/Google may not reflect what is required on iOS as Android/Google requires that apps requesting access to Bluetooth also obtain location permission, as Bluetooth can be used to derive location information when combined with beacons in fixed locations. ([See: Source](#)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / State and Link to Google Play Store to view permissions (7/16/20)</th>
<th>Location (Approximate or precise?)</th>
<th>Access bluetooth settings OR Pair with Bluetooth devices</th>
<th>Full Network Access</th>
<th>View Network Connections</th>
<th>Read the contents of your USB storage (e.g. photos, media, files)</th>
<th>Highlighting unique permissions on Google Play Store</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Unable to find mask.ir on Google Play Store. <a href="https://mask.ir/">https://mask.ir/</a></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Pair with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Control vibration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Pair with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>take pictures and videos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Unable to find mask.ir on Google Play Store. <a href="https://gitlab.com/PrivateTracer">https://gitlab.com/PrivateTracer</a></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We are not claiming these references are all inclusive as there are many resources that can help give a better picture of these categories that may not be mentioned in this study. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know. Blank boxes mean we did not find evidence of this in this analysis.

Note: App information here were derived from Google Play App permissions ONLY. It is possible for every country, there are other permissions that are not included in this analysis. We did not include Apple permissions as this is not available on the App Store website. Location access with Android/Google may not reflect what is required on iOS as Android/Google requires that apps requesting access to Bluetooth also obtain location permission, as Bluetooth can be used to derive location information when combined with beacons in fixed locations. (See: Source)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / State and Link to Google Play Store to view permissions (7/16/20)</th>
<th>Location (Approximate or precise?)</th>
<th>Access bluetooth settings OR Pair with Bluetooth devices</th>
<th>Full Network Access</th>
<th>View Network Connections</th>
<th>Read the contents of your USB storage (e.g. photos, media, files)</th>
<th>Highlighting various unique permissions on Google Play Store</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. North Dakota</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prevent device from sleeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Precise</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prevent device from sleeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Pair with</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prevent device from sleeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>read phone status and identity disable your screen lock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>take pictures and videos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Pair with</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>prevent device from sleeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>prevent device from sleeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>prevent device from sleeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (No longer available as of June 26, 2020)</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>prevent device from sleeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. - Utah</td>
<td>Precise</td>
<td>Both</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Control vibration prevent device from sleeping</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Alberta, Canada                      | * Bluetooth enabled  
|                                    | * Location  
|                                    | * Push notifications  
|                                    | * Precise location (GPS and network-based)  
|                                    | * View wifi connections  
|                                    | * access Bluetooth settings  
|                                    | * pair with Bluetooth devices  
|                                    | * run at startup  
|                                    | * full network access  
| Australia                          | * use the contacts captured by the app to support their usual contact tracing  
|                                    | * call people to let them or their parent/guardian know they may have been exposed  
|                                    | * Source: App screenshots and online documentation (7/2/20)  
|                                    | precise location (GPS and network-based)  
|                                    | approximate location (network-based)  
|                                    | receive data from Internet  
|                                    | access Bluetooth settings  
|                                    | view network connections  
|                                    | pair with Bluetooth devices  
|                                    | run at startup  
|                                    | full network access  
|                                    | prevent device from sleeping  

### Austria

**Notifications**
- Logging and notifications: your iphone can securely collect and share random IDs with nearby devices. The app can use these IDs to notify you if you may have been exposed to COVID-19. The date, duration, and signal strength of an exposure will be shared with "StoppCorona"
- Source: Screenshots from iOS app download (7/2/20)

- Microphone. Because the participating smartphones emit a short, inaudible ultrasound tone during the manual handshake in order to determine the distance to other devices.
- Location: Because the automatic handshake works via Bluetooth, which is allowed for Android devices via location sharing. Of course, your location data will not be accessed. Devices in your environment are recognized during the automatic handshake via Bluetooth. For Android devices, you allow this Bluetooth function via location sharing. Of course, your location data will not be queried or processed.
- Contacts. to be able to notify people if you are covid positive
- Source: Online documentation (7/12/20) [https://noyb.eu/sites/default/files/2020-04/report_stopp_corona_app_english_v1.0_0.pdf](https://noyb.eu/sites/default/files/2020-04/report_stopp_corona_app_english_v1.0_0.pdf)

### Bahrain

**Location**
- Alerts: covid developments, push recommendations issued by kingdom's health authorities
- Source: Google Play screenshots and online documentation (6/28/20)

- retrieve running apps
- read calendar events plus confidential information
- add or modify calendar events and send email to guests without owners' knowledge
- approximate location (network-based)
- precise location (GPS and network-based)
- access extra location provider commands
- read the contents of your USB storage
- modify or delete the contents of your USB storage
- receive data from Internet
- view network connections
- pair with Bluetooth devices
- access Bluetooth settings
- full network access
- run at startup
- prevent device from sleeping
| Bulgaria | Access to the internet  
|          | Access to your location  
|          | Run at startup  
|          | Network access  
|          | Source: [https://github.com/scalefocus/virusafe-android/blob/develop/Permission-Scope.md](https://github.com/scalefocus/virusafe-android/blob/develop/Permission-Scope.md) (6/28/20)  

precise location (GPS and network-based)  
receive data from Internet  
view network connections  
full network access  
run at startup  
prevent device from sleeping  

| Cyprus | * GPS/location  
|        | * User location information in the form of Time-stamped data in five minute intervals is collected. The user may switch on and off the app’s logging by selecting the Start/Stop Logging option in the app. location may be determined by: GPS, Device Sensor data, IP address Wi-Fi access points, Bluetooth and cell towers.  

read the contents of your USB storage  
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage  
view Wi-Fi connections  
precise location (GPS and network-based)  
access extra location provider commands  
approximate location (network-based)  
receive data from Internet  
Google Play license check  
pair with Bluetooth devices  
run at startup  
prevent device from sleeping  
toggle sync on and off  
create accounts and set passwords  
read sync settings  
access Bluetooth settings  
view network connections  
full network access  

| Canada | view Wi-Fi connections  
|        | view network connections  
|        | pair with Bluetooth devices  
|        | full network access  
|        | run at startup  
|        | prevent device from sleeping  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Features and Permissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Czech Republic | * bluetooth  
* The eRouška application does not collect and store data from GPS, but the Android operating system also includes some Bluetooth LE (LE = low energy) services under positioning, which the eRouška needs for its operation. Therefore, the user's consent to the application's access to location data is required. In iOS, this consent is not required.  
| France | * Camera - to scan the QR code  
* Location: For phones running Android, it is not possible to activate bluetooth without activating positioning. However, the StopCovid application does not use this functionality at any time and only works with bluetooth. It is therefore impossible for StopCovid to geolocate users. All the data exchanged and stored in the StopCovid application are described in the application's confidentiality section.  
* Bluetooth  
* View network connections  
* Notifications  
* Source: Screenshots and online documentation from [https://www.economie.gouv.fr/stopcovid-faq#](https://www.economie.gouv.fr/stopcovid-faq#) (7/2/20) |
|           | approximate location (network-based)  
precise location (GPS and network-based)  
receive data from Internet  
view network connections  
pair with Bluetooth devices  
access Bluetooth settings  
full network access  
race at startup  
prevent device from sleeping  
|           | precise location (GPS and network-based)  
approximate location (network-based)  
take pictures and videos  
access Bluetooth settings  
view network connections  
pair with Bluetooth devices  
race at startup  
full network access  
prevent device from sleeping  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Permissions and Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>* Camera&lt;br&gt;* Bluetooth&lt;br&gt;* View network connections&lt;br&gt;* Prevent device from sleeping&lt;br&gt;* Full network access&lt;br&gt;* Run at startup&lt;br&gt;* Source: Google play permissions (7/4/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>take pictures and videos&lt;br&gt;view network connections&lt;br&gt;pair with Bluetooth devices&lt;br&gt;run at startup&lt;br&gt;full network access&lt;br&gt;prevent device from sleeping&lt;br&gt;<a href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.rki.coronawarnapp">https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=de.rki.coronawarnapp</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>* Location&lt;br&gt;* Bluetooth&lt;br&gt;* This App will need you to turn on and allow the App access to the Bluetooth and GPS location services on your device. This App shall not function properly and accurately if Bluetooth and GPS services are turned off or if the App’s access to Bluetooth and GPS services is revoked on the device on which this App is installed.&lt;br&gt;* Source: Downloading the app, screenshots (7/2/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>approximate location (network-based)&lt;br&gt;precise location (GPS and network-based)&lt;br&gt;view Wi-Fi connections&lt;br&gt;view network connections&lt;br&gt;full network access&lt;br&gt;<a href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.moc.gh&amp;hl=en">https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.moc.gh&amp;hl=en</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Iceland | approximate location (network-based)  
|         | access extra location provider commands  
|         | precise location (GPS and network-based)  
|         | read phone status and identity  
|         | read the contents of your USB storage  
|         | modify or delete the contents of your USB storage  
|         | receive data from Internet  
|         | view network connections  
|         | prevent device from sleeping  
|         | create accounts and set passwords  
|         | run at startup  
|         | toggle sync on and off  
|         | draw over other apps  
|         | read sync settings  
|         | full network access  
|         | read Google service configuration  
|         | https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=is.landlaeknir.rakning |

| India    | * bluetooth  
|          | * GPS  
|          | * location sharing to always: Aarogya Setu stores location data and requires constant access to the phone's Bluetooth which, experts say, makes it invasive from a security and privacy viewpoint.  
|          | * Source: Online documentation and app store screenshots (6/28/20)  
|          | approximate location (network-based)  
|          | precise location (GPS and network-based)  
|          | take pictures and videos  
|          | receive data from Internet  
|          | view network connections  
|          | pair with Bluetooth devices  
|          | access Bluetooth settings  
|          | full network access  
|          | run at startup  
|          | prevent device from sleeping  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Iran    | * location  
* Source: Twitter (6/28/20) [https://twitter.com/MaskApplication/status/1241286627252633601](https://twitter.com/MaskApplication/status/1241286627252633601)  
https://cafebazaar.ir/app/ir.covidapp.android |
| Ireland | view Wi-Fi connections  
view network connections  
pair with Bluetooth devices  
full network access  
| Israel  | * location. Location history of last two weeks only (dates, times, and places) according to the tracking services (and currently – not applicable to dates before you have installed the application).  
* History of wireless networks (WIFI) that you came across in the last two weeks only.  
* Cross-references of locations with diagnosed patients (if any) – in the last two weeks only.  
* Note: Everything is stored in the memory of your phone and is not forwarded.  
* Source: Screenshots and online documentation (6/28/20)  
retrieve running apps  
approximate location (network-based)  
precise location (GPS and network-based)  
access extra location provider commands  
view Wi-Fi connections  
receive data from Internet  
view network connections  
pair with Bluetooth devices  
access Bluetooth settings  
change network connectivity  
connect and disconnect from Wi-Fi  
full network access  
rut at startup  
control vibration  
prevent device from sleeping  
Google Play license check  
| Italy | * Enable COVID-19 Exposure Logging and Notifications  
* Enable Bluetooth  
* Enable notifications  
* Source: Screenshots (6/28/20)  
  
run at startup  
view network connections  
pair with Bluetooth devices  
full network access  
prevent device from sleeping  
|---|---|
| Malaysia | * bluetooth  
* location  
* battery optimization  
  
retrieve running apps  
approximate location (network-based)  
precise location (GPS and network-based)  
read the contents of your USB storage  
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage  
receive data from Internet  
view network connections  
pair with Bluetooth devices  
access Bluetooth settings  
full network access  
run at startup  
prevent device from sleeping  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mexico       | * Location  
* Notifications  
* Bluetooth  
* Source: Screenshots from app download (7/2/20)  
approximate location (network-based)  
precise location (GPS and network-based)  
retrieve running apps  
take pictures and videos  
view Wi-Fi connections  
access Bluetooth settings  
pair with Bluetooth devices  
view network connections  
full network access  
prevent device from sleeping  
runt at startup  
| Netherlands  | Unable to find app on Google Play Store  
The Dutch government has abandoned its initial attempt to commission a Covid-19 contact tracing app after the final seven designs were dismissed as inadequate on privacy grounds: [https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/netherlands-abandons-initial-plan-to-develop-covid-19-tracing-app-1.4236355](https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/netherlands-abandons-initial-plan-to-develop-covid-19-tracing-app-1.4236355) |  |
| U.S. - North Dakota | approximate location (network-based)  
precise location (GPS and network-based)  
receive data from Internet  
full network access  
preserve device from sleeping  
view network connections  
runt at startup  
**Extra notes:**  
* GPS. Does it show infected people? NO! The map does not show infected people. In fact, it doesn’t show people at all. The map displays a dot on each city where someone is using the Care19 app. The size of the dot is proportional to the number of users in that city. The purpose of the map is to help build community. It enables people to see how their friends and fellow citizens across the state are pitching in to help the fight against COVID-19  
* Source: [https://ndresponse.gov/node/5748](https://ndresponse.gov/node/5748)  
* The map represents cities where people are using the Care19 app. The size of the dot reflects how many people. The map does NOT display individual people, nor does it display anything about positive cases.  
* Source: [https://ndresponse.gov/node/5751](https://ndresponse.gov/node/5751) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Additional Permissions/Features</th>
<th>URLs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| North Macedonia | * Approximate location (network-based)  
* Precise location (GPS and network-based)  
* Receive data from internet  
* View network connections  
* Pair with Bluetooth devices  
* Access Bluetooth settings  
* Full network access  
* Prevent device from sleeping |
| Norway     | * bluetooth  
* The data about where you have been are recorded from Location Services and Bluetooth by the Smittestopp app: [https://helsenorge.no/coronavirus/smittestopp](https://helsenorge.no/coronavirus/smittestopp)  
* Precise location (GPS and network)  
pair with Bluetooth devices  
run at startup  
view network connections  
access Bluetooth settings  
full network access  
prevent device from sleeping |
| Poland     | * "exposure logging"  
* notifications  
* Source: Screenshots, app download |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qatar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| * bluetooth  
* notifications  
* location  
* Source: iOS app screenshots (6/28/20)  
  
  approximate location (network-based)  
  precise location (GPS and network-based)  
  directly call phone numbers  
  read phone status and identity  
  read the contents of your USB storage  
  modify or delete the contents of your USB storage  
  read phone status and identity  
  receive data from Internet  
  view network connections  
  pair with Bluetooth devices  
  access Bluetooth settings  
  disable your screen lock  
  full network access  
  run at startup  
  draw over other apps  
  prevent device from sleeping  
  
| **Singapore** | * bluetooth  
* notifications  
* * We only ask for location permission on Android devices, not on iOS devices. This is because Android/Google requires that apps requesting access to Bluetooth also obtain location permission, as Bluetooth can be used to derive location information when combined with beacons in fixed locations. For more information, please see: https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/bluetooth  
* * In short, we do ask for location permissions because we need Bluetooth permissions. But TraceTogether does not collect or use location data on Android  
* * Source: https://support.tracetogether.gov.sg/hc/en-sg/articles/360043224854-Why-does-TraceTogether-need-Location-Permission-on-Android-  
read the contents of your USB storage  
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage  
precise location (GPS and network-based)  
approximate location (network-based)  
take pictures and videos  
read the contents of your USB storage  
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage  
receive data from Internet  
pair with Bluetooth devices  
rund at startup  
prevent device from sleeping  
access Bluetooth settings  
view network connections  
control vibration  
full network access  
| **Switzerland** | * View network connections  
* Pair with bluetooth devices  
* Full network access  
* Run at startup  
* Prevent device from sleeping  
* Exposure logging and notifications  
* Source: Screenshots (6/28/20) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Permissions and Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>read your contacts&lt;br&gt;take pictures and videos&lt;br&gt;read the contents of your USB storage&lt;br&gt;modify or delete the contents of your USB storage&lt;br&gt;approximate location (network-based)&lt;br&gt;precise location (GPS and network-based)&lt;br&gt;view Wi-Fi connections&lt;br&gt;receive data from Internet&lt;br&gt;full network access&lt;br&gt;access Bluetooth settings&lt;br&gt;read Google service configuration&lt;br&gt;run at startup&lt;br&gt;view network connections&lt;br&gt;pair with Bluetooth devices&lt;br&gt;prevent device from sleeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>* Notifications&lt;br&gt;  * Bluetooth&lt;br&gt;  * Location for Android. Android devices require the location permission to be granted in order for the TraceCovid app to access Bluetooth features.&lt;br&gt;  * Source: Screenshots on Youtube and App stores (6/28/20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Approximate location (network-based)<br>  * Precise location (GPS and network-based)<br>  * Read the contents of your USB storage<br>  * receive data from Internet<br>  * view network connections<br>  * pair with Bluetooth devices<br>  * access Bluetooth settings<br>  * full network access<br>  * run at startup<br>  * prevent device from sleeping


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK</th>
<th>U.S. - Utah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* Notifications</td>
<td>* Location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Bluetooth</td>
<td>* Source: Screenshots from app download (6/28/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Source: screenshots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* receive data from Internet</td>
<td>precise location (GPS and network-based)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* full network access</td>
<td>view Wi-Fi connections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* prevent device from sleeping</td>
<td>receive data from Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* view network connections</td>
<td>pair with Bluetooth devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>run at startup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>view network connections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>access Bluetooth settings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>prevent device from sleeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>control vibration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>full network access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.2: App data deletion

- Does the app delete data?
- If, yes what are the rules? After how many days?
4.3 App data deletion

Key questions

- Does the app delete data?
  - If yes, what has been referenced?
  - How many days, if any, were referenced in accordance with data deletion rules?

Sub-themes and findings:

- In this section, we looked at 31 total apps
  - (23 of 31) apps we found reference to user app deletion
  - (8 of 31) apps we did not find a reference to user app and data deletion
Note: Data gathered highlight whether there was some evidence of the theme for analysis and comparison; we are not making a judgment or opinion on whether the design choices are good or bad.

We are not claiming these references are all inclusive as there are many resources that can help give a better picture of these categories that may not be mentioned in this study. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.

1. Alberta, Canada
2. Australia
3. Austria
4. Bahrain
5. Bulgaria
6. Canada
7. Cyprus
8. Czech Republic
9. France
10. Germany
11. Ghana
12. Iceland
13. India
14. Iran
15. Ireland
16. Israel
17. Italy
18. Malaysia
19. Mexico
20. Netherlands
21. U.S. North Dakota
22. North Macedonia
23. Norway
24. Poland
25. Qatar
26. Singapore
27. Switzerland
28. Turkey
29. UAE
30. UK
31. U.S. Utah
Countries not referenced

1. Bahrain: Unable to find public information or evidence on any of these categories.
2. Bulgaria: Unable to find public information or evidence on any of these categories.
3. China: Unable to find public information or evidence on any of these categories.
4. Ghana: Unable to find public information or evidence on any of these categories.
5. Malaysia: Unable to find public information or evidence on any of these categories.
6. Mexico: Unable to find public information or evidence on any of these categories.
7. Qatar: Unable to find public information or evidence on any of these categories.

This is a work in progress. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / State and Link to Google Play Store to view permissions (7/16/20)</th>
<th>Found evidence of data deletion</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Number of days referenced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alberta Canada</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>The ABTraceTogether Applications maintains user contact logs for 21 days on a user’s phone &amp; Alberta Health Services maintains contact logs used for contact tracing uploaded from contacted users for 21 days. <a href="#">Source</a></td>
<td>21 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Uninstalling COVIDSafe will not automatically delete any information already uploaded to the data store, or any of your contact data stored on another user’s device in the last 21 days, which could still be uploaded to the data store and used for contact tracing purposes. If you wish any of your contact data uploaded to the data store to be deleted you can expressly ask us to delete your information. <a href="#">Source</a></td>
<td>21 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Austria | X | * We delete or anonymize your personal data as soon as it is no longer required for the purposes for which we collected or used it. You can delete the data stored locally on your device (token) by uninstalling or deleting the Stop Corona app. Metadata saved by Uepaa AG (see point 5.3.3) are automatically deleted after 14 days. Data on the device for digital handshake with intensive contacts is deleted in the device after 7 days.  
* As soon as a sick report has been submitted, your data will be kept for 30 days after the report has been submitted. If it is necessary to clarify illegal or abusive use of the app or for legal prosecution and there are specific indications of illegal or abusive behavior, your data will be stored for a period of up to three years after the sick report has been submitted.  
* Otherwise we delete all personal data after the epidemic [Source](#) | Various |
| Bahrain | | Unable to find this detail. | |
| Bulgaria | | Unable to find this detail. May be located in terms of use but unable to translate. | |
| Canada | X | The app as a whole will be shut down within 30 days of a declaration by the Chief Public Health Officer of Canada that the pandemic is over. As well, individuals can delete the app at any time. Finally, the TEKs on the device delete after 14 days. In other words, all the information in this app's ecosystem is designed to be kept for the shortest time period necessary to achieve the specific need that information is for. | Various |
| China | | Unable to find this detail. | |
## App data deletion

A blank field means we were unable to find reference to this. We are not claiming these references are all inclusive as there are many resources that can help give a better picture of these categories that may not be mentioned in this study. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / State and Link to Google Play Store to view permissions (7/16/20)</th>
<th>Found evidence of data deletion</th>
<th>References</th>
<th>Number of days referenced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Cyprus** | X | * Request for erasure: this enables you to request the deletion of the personal data we hold about you.  
* We will endeavor to respond to any request as soon as possible and no longer than 30 days from the receipt of the request.  
In case where we will not be able to respond to your request within the aforementioned time period or in case your request is rejected, we will inform you accordingly explaining the reasons for any delay or for rejecting your request. All rights can be exercised free of charge. Source: [https://covid-19.rise.org.cy/RISE_CovTracer_Privacy_Policy_EN.pdf](https://covid-19.rise.org.cy/RISE_CovTracer_Privacy_Policy_EN.pdf) | 30 days |
| **Czech Republic** | X | * Each application stores your encounter history of the last 30 days, and the user may delete their history whenever.  
| **France** | | * Unable to find source to validate this.  
* "The French app would only use bluetooth and not geolocation, Cedric O said, and would not track a user’s movements. The data would be anonymous and deleted after a certain period."  
* After initial privacy concerns, the government has stressed that using the app is entirely voluntary; data can be deleted from the server by the user at any point; and it can also be de-activated by the user.  
| **Germany** | X | * At any point in time, you can deactivate the COVID-19 Exposure Notifications feature either in the app itself or in your device's settings, and of course you can always uninstall the app completely.  
* Source: [https://www.coronawarn.app/en/faq/#have_to_use](https://www.coronawarn.app/en/faq/#have_to_use)  
* The way de-installation is handled can change without further notice or any changes to the Corona-Warn-App itself. Hence, please use this means only as a last resort in error resolution.  
* [https://www.coronawarn.app/en/faq/#delete_random_ids](https://www.coronawarn.app/en/faq/#delete_random_ids) | |
| **Ghana** | | Unable to find this detail | |
## App data deletion

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<tr>
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<th>Found evidence of data deletion</th>
<th>App deletion referenced</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Iceland** | X | After the app is installed, it works in the background and saves the location of the phone several times an hour. This data is only stored on the phone itself and not accessible to anyone. Only data that has been stored for the past 14 days and older data is deleted.  
* Removing the app from your phone will stop working and no locations will be saved to your phone.  
* Source: [https://www.covid.is/app/is](https://www.covid.is/app/is) | 14 days |
| **India** | X | * Contact, location and self assessment data of an individual that has been collected by NIC shall not be retained beyond the period necessary to satisfy the purpose for which it is obtained which, unless a specific recommendation to this effect is made in the review under Para 10 of this Protocol, shall not ordinarily extend beyond 180 days from the date on which it is collected, after which such data shall be permanently deleted  
* Source: [https://static.mygov.in/rest/s3fs-public/mygov_159051652451307401.pdf](https://static.mygov.in/rest/s3fs-public/mygov_159051652451307401.pdf) | 180 days |
| **Iran** |  | * The information stored in your mask is used only to combat corona in Iran, and the mask does not even allow you to use your unidentified information for scientific purposes. Mask will try to delete your information as soon as possible in order to use it in the fight against corona. It should be noted that only the data that you enter in the "Daily Health Information Input" section will be shared with the Ministry of Health so that the Ministry of Health can provide you with better services by attaching them to your electronic health record. Also, if a legal order is issued by the judicial authorities, the mask will be obliged to present your information to the court  
* Source: [https://mask.ir/privacy.html](https://mask.ir/privacy.html) |  |
| **Ireland** | X | * There are different treatments of data deletion.  
* (Sex, age, county, town), 1 day after  
* (COVID-19 symptoms), 28 days, or until the user removes it by selecting the Leave function; or uninstalling the app  
* (Mobile number), automatically removed as soon as the SMS is sent, the date and code are removed automatically as soon as the SMS is sent. | Various |
## App data deletion

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<th>Number of days referenced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>* The rest of the raw information that will be shared with the Ministry of Health and not used for epidemiological investigations will be deleted within 30 days from the date of sharing with the Ministry of Health, including from the logs and from any stations that this information passed through on its way to the Ministry of Health. During this period, the Ministry of Health may use this data for bettering the information and for improving technological capacities for identifying Coronavirus contamination points. <a href="https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hamagen-app/magen-privacy-en/">https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hamagen-app/magen-privacy-en/</a> * The Ministry of Health may change the Terms of Use and/or the Privacy Declaration, and any such change will be announced through a notification to the device on which the app is installed and a consent request. Users who do not agree with any such changes may uninstall the app. Upon removing the app, the information stored on the device will be deleted. <a href="https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hamagen-app/terms-and-conditions-of-use-en/">https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hamagen-app/terms-and-conditions-of-use-en/</a></td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>In addition, all recorded contact logs must be deleted once the health emergency is over or by Dec. 31 at the latest. Source: <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-italy-app/italy-launches-covid-19-contact-tracing-app-amid-privacy-concerns-idUSKBN2383EW">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-italy-app/italy-launches-covid-19-contact-tracing-app-amid-privacy-concerns-idUSKBN2383EW</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Malaysia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unable to find this detail.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mexico</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unable to find this detail.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Netherlands</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>* Only minimal data and metadata necessary for the application purpose may be stored. This requirement prohibits the central collection of any data that is not specific to a contact between people and its duration. * If additional data such as location information are recorded locally on the phones, users must not be forced or tempted to pass this data on to third parties or even publish it. Data that is no longer needed must be deleted. Sensitive data must also be securely encrypted locally on the phone. Source: <a href="https://www.privatetracer.org/privacy-by-design">https://www.privatetracer.org/privacy-by-design</a> (Resource was translated by Google translate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## App data deletion

We are not claiming these references are all inclusive as there are many resources that can help give a better picture of these categories that may not be mentioned in this study. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.

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<th>App deletion referenced</th>
<th>Number of days referenced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. North Dakota</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Q: If I change my mind, can I uninstall Care19 and delete all data that it collected? A: Yes, this application works like any other application and may be deleted at any time from your device. In addition, you have the ability through the “About Screen” in the application to delete all data that has been collected from your use of the application as well as see the data that has been collected. This application adheres to all rules outlined in the California Consumer Privacy Act. Source: <a href="https://covid.sd.gov/care19app.aspx">https://covid.sd.gov/care19app.aspx</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Macedonia</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>YOU HAVE COMPLETE CONTROL OVER YOUR DATA AND MAY WITHDRAW YOUR CONSENT AT ANY GIVEN TIME You may, at any given time, withdraw your consent for storing your mobile telephone number, by opening the drop-down menu in the upper right corner in the app and selecting the option Delete Data. After you have performed this activity, the app will display a notification with the following message: &quot;All sent registration data and information will be deleted. CANCEL / DELETE&quot;, whereby you will be given the opportunity to choose between CANCEL and DELETE. If you choose DELETE, your mobile telephone number will be permanently deleted from our server. Moreover, all data stored in your app, data you have already sent and anonymous codes for your app in other apps that have been nearby will be permanently deleted from our server. Source: <a href="https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/privacy-policy/en">https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/privacy-policy/en</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norway</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>* The data about where you have been are recorded from Location Services and Bluetooth by the Smittestopp app. These data are deleted after 30 days. While the Smittestopp app is in use, data from the last 30 days are constantly recorded and older data are deleted. You can delete your personal information at any time by using the delete functionality in the app, or you can delete the app. You can also choose whether to turn the logging features on or off. Source: <a href="https://helsenorge.no/coronavirus/smittestopp">https://helsenorge.no/coronavirus/smittestopp</a></td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Access to Information. We do not collect any personal information. We maintain appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to protect any non-personal information from accidental, unlawful, or unauthorised destruction, loss, alteration, access, disclosure, or use and other unlawful forms of processing. All non-personal information is deleted after 14 days. Although anonymous, you can request access, and delete your non-personal information (Random numerical identifiers). Please email <a href="mailto:info@protegoapp.org">info@protegoapp.org</a> for this. Source: <a href="https://www.protegoapp.org/privacy-policy">https://www.protegoapp.org/privacy-policy</a></td>
<td>14 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country / State and Link to Google Play Store to view permissions (7/16/20)</td>
<td>Found evidence of data deletion</td>
<td>App deletion referenced</td>
<td>Number of days referenced</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unable to find this detail.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Also, the Bluetooth information stored on the phones after 25 days is automatically deleted. The app will cease functionality at the end of the outbreak. * Source: <a href="https://support.tracetogether.gov.sg/hc/en-sg/articles/360043543473-How-does-TraceTogether-work-">https://support.tracetogether.gov.sg/hc/en-sg/articles/360043543473-How-does-TraceTogether-work-</a> * You may request for your identification data to be deleted on our servers You may request for your identification data to be deleted on our servers, unless your proximity data has already been uploaded as a confirmed case. * You can do so by emailing <a href="mailto:support@tracetogether.gov.sg">support@tracetogether.gov.sg</a> with the mobile number you registered in the app. * We will then delete your mobile number, identification details and User ID from our server. This renders meaningless all data that your phone has exchanged with other phones, because that data will no longer be associated with you. * <a href="https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg/common/privacystatement">https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg/common/privacystatement</a></td>
<td>25 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Data about other users recorded by your mobile phone is only saved locally on the device. Neither the mobile phone nor the SwissCovid app sends any personal or location data to a central storage location or server. This means that no one can work out who you have been in contact with or where that contact took place. Once the coronavirus crisis is over, or if the app proves to be ineffective, the system will be shut down. <a href="https://www.bag.admin.ch/bag/en/home/krankheiten/ausbrueche-epidemien-pandemien/aktuelle-ausbrueche-epidemien/novel-cov/swisscovid-app-und-contact-tracing.html#-1601404801">https://www.bag.admin.ch/bag/en/home/krankheiten/ausbrueche-epidemien-pandemien/aktuelle-ausbrueche-epidemien/novel-cov/swisscovid-app-und-contact-tracing.html#-1601404801</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td>Unable to find this detail.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>* What happens when I uninstall TraceCovid? Once TraceCovid is uninstalled, all records and Secure Tracing Identifier (STI) data will be deleted. * Source: <a href="https://tracecovid.ae/">https://tracecovid.ae/</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country / State and Link to Google Play Store to view permissions (7/16/20)</td>
<td>Found evidence of data deletion</td>
<td>App deletion referenced</td>
<td>Number of days referenced</td>
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</table>
| **UK** (No longer available as of June 26, 2020) | X | * The app on your phone will keep a log of anonymous contact data for a maximum of 28 days. After 28 days, this information will be deleted.  
  * You can delete the app and all of its data whenever you want. We'll always comply with the law around the use of your data.  
  * If you delete your NHS Covid-19 App or We end your right to use the NHS Covid-19 App:  
  * Any personal data we hold about you will be dealt with in accordance with our Privacy Notice, available via the link under clause 2.4 of these terms of use  
  * All rights granted to you under these terms of use shall automatically cease without further notice  
  * You will always be able to delete the NHS COVID-19 app and all associated data whenever you want. We will always comply with the law around the use of your data, including the Data Protection Act and will explain how we intend to use it. The data will only ever be used for NHS care, management, evaluation and research.  
  * Data you share with the NHS, either proactively or as part of requesting a test, may be retained and used in the future for research that is in the public interest. The NHS may also use this for planning and delivering services. We’ll always comply with the law around the use of data, including the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018.  
  * Some smartphone’s operating systems may retain some information after the app is deleted, in line with how they work for all apps.  
| **U.S - Utah** | X | All symptom data is automatically de-identified after 30-days.  
 All location data is automatically deleted after 30-days.  
 * You can fully delete your data at any time. Location data will automatically be deleted after 30 days. Symptom data will be automatically de-identified after 30 days.  
 * Source: [https://coronavirus.utah.gov/healthy-together-app/](https://coronavirus.utah.gov/healthy-together-app/) | 30 days |
4.3 App downloads (Google Play only)

Key questions

- How many Google Play Store app installs does each app have?
- What privacy policy does the app reference?
- Disclaimer: The numbers are likely higher given that we are only looking at Android devices through Google Play and not Apple iOS store.

Sub-themes and findings:

- In this section, we looked at 27 apps that were available and live for download on the Google Play Store (as of July 17, 2020).
  - 1 app (UK) has been no longer available as of June 26, 2020.
  - 2 apps (Iran, Netherlands) we were unable to find on Google Play Store
  - Therefore, we will be analyzing 27 (instead of 30) apps in this section
- App downloads listed at the following thresholds:
  - (2 of 28) 1,000+ (Cyprus, Ghana)
  - (3 of 28) 10,000+ (Bulgaria, Mexico, U.S. - Utah)
  - (4 of 28) 50,000+ (Alberta Canada, Iceland, U.S. - North Dakota, North Macedonia)
  - (8 of 28) 100,000+ (Austria, Bahrain, Czech Republic, Malaysia, Norway, Poland, UAE)
  - (2 of 28) 500,000+ (Ireland, Switzerland)
  - (6 of 28) 1,000,000+ (Australia, France, Israel, Italy, Qatar, Singapore)
  - (2 of 28) 5,000,000+ (Germany, Turkey)
  - (1 of 28) 100,000,000+ (India)
Countries referenced

1. Alberta, Canada
2. Australia
3. Austria
4. Bahrain
5. Bulgaria
6. Canada
7. Cyprus
8. Czech Republic
9. France
10. Germany
11. Ghana
12. Iceland
13. India
14. Ireland
15. Israel
16. Italy
17. Malaysia
18. Mexico
19. U.S. North Dakota
20. North Macedonia
21. Norway
22. Poland
23. Qatar
24. Singapore
25. Switzerland
26. Turkey
27. UAE
28. U.S. Utah

Note: Data gathered highlight whether there was some evidence of the theme for analysis and comparison; we are not making a judgment or opinion on whether the design choices are good or bad. We are not claiming these references are all inclusive as there are many resources that can help give a better picture of these categories that may not be mentioned in this study. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.
Countries not referenced

1. China: Unable to find public information or evidence on any of these categories.
2. Iran: we were unable to find on Google Play Store
3. Netherlands: we were unable to find on Google Play Store
4. UK: has been no longer available as of June 26, 2020.

This is a work in progress. If there is information you have that is not reflected here that can help add, edit, or correct information, please let us know.
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alberta Canada</td>
<td>50,000+</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>4.371 million</td>
<td>50%*</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>1.2.0</td>
<td>May 1, 2020</td>
<td>June 17, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://alberta.ca/ABTraceTogetherPrivacy">https://alberta.ca/ABTraceTogetherPrivacy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>24.99 million</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>1.0.33</td>
<td>April 26, 2020</td>
<td>July 24, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://www.health.gov.au/using-our-websites/privacy">https://www.health.gov.au/using-our-websites/privacy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>8.859 million</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.0.3.10 57-QA_245</td>
<td>March 27, 2020</td>
<td>June 28, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://www.roteskreuz.at/site/faq-app-stopp-corona/datenschutzinformation-zur-stopp-corona-app/">https://www.roteskreuz.at/site/faq-app-stopp-corona/datenschutzinformation-zur-stopp-corona-app/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain*</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>1.569 million</td>
<td>50%*</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>0.1.9</td>
<td>March 28, 2020</td>
<td>July 5, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://bahrain.bh/wps/portal/Conditions_en">https://bahrain.bh/wps/portal/Conditions_en</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>10,000+</td>
<td>10,000+</td>
<td>7 million</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.0.3</td>
<td>April 6, 2020</td>
<td>May 27, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://virusesafe.io/information/terms-of-use.html">https://virusesafe.io/information/terms-of-use.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>37.59 million</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.0.2</td>
<td>July 30, 2020</td>
<td>July 30, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://digital.canada.ca/exposure-notification-app-privacy-policy/">https://digital.canada.ca/exposure-notification-app-privacy-policy/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1,000+</td>
<td>1,000+</td>
<td>1.17 million</td>
<td>50%*</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2.0.2</td>
<td>May 15, 2020</td>
<td>June 11, 2020</td>
<td><a href="http://covid-19.rise.org.cy/en/privacy/">http://covid-19.rise.org.cy/en/privacy/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>10.69 million</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.0.437</td>
<td>May 3, 2020</td>
<td>May 22, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://erouska.cz/gdpr">https://erouska.cz/gdpr</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Sources referenced:

(Col C) Population (US): https://datacommons.org/place/geoId/25
(Col C) Population (Non-US): https://datacommons.org/place/geoId/25
(Col D) Android device % by country (Android): https://deviceatlas.com/

For the countries not available on that site, we assumed a 50% Android spread. We indicate those countries with * These are approximations, not exact figures.

(Col F + G) Apple App Store website
(Col B + H) Google Play store website
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>66.99 million</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>1.1.0</td>
<td>June 2, 2020</td>
<td>June 26, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://bonjour.stopcovid.gouv.fr/privacy.html">https://bonjour.stopcovid.gouv.fr/privacy.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5,000,000+</td>
<td>10,000,000+</td>
<td>83.02 million</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>1.0.5</td>
<td>June 15, 2020</td>
<td>July 7, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://www.coronawarn.app/assets/documents/cwa-privacy-notice-de.pdf">https://www.coronawarn.app/assets/documents/cwa-privacy-notice-de.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1,000+</td>
<td>5,000+</td>
<td>29.77 million</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.0.3</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>May 8, 2020</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dataprotection.org.gh/privacy-policy">http://www.dataprotection.org.gh/privacy-policy</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>50,000+</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>364,134</td>
<td>50%*</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>2.1.1</td>
<td>April 2, 2020</td>
<td>July 14, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://www.covid.is/app/privacystatement">https://www.covid.is/app/privacystatement</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India*</td>
<td>100,000,000+</td>
<td>100,000,000+</td>
<td>1.353 billion</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>1.4.1</td>
<td>April 2, 2020</td>
<td>July 8, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://web.swaraksha.gov.in/ncv19/privacy/">https://web.swaraksha.gov.in/ncv19/privacy/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Unable to find app on Google Play Store</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>500,000+</td>
<td>500,000+</td>
<td>4.904 million</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>1.0.1.44</td>
<td>July 6, 2020</td>
<td>July 17, 2020</td>
<td><a href="http://covidtracker.ie/privacy-and-data">http://covidtracker.ie/privacy-and-data</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>8.884 million</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>1.4.7</td>
<td>March 22, 2020</td>
<td>June 16, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hragen-app/Privacy-policy-EN">https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hragen-app/Privacy-policy-EN</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>5,000,000+</td>
<td>60.36 million</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.3.0</td>
<td>June 1, 2020</td>
<td>July 10, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hagen-app/Privacy-policy-EN">https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/hagen-app/Privacy-policy-EN</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>31.53 million</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>Unknown (No App Store version with date)</td>
<td>April 26, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://www.mosti.gov.my/web/dasar-privasi/">https://www.mosti.gov.my/web/dasar-privasi/</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>10,000+</td>
<td>50,000+</td>
<td>126.2 million</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>April 19, 2020</td>
<td>May 2, 2020</td>
<td><a href="http://covidradar.mx/avisoprivacidad.html">http://covidradar.mx/avisoprivacidad.html</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Unable to find app on Google Play Store</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. North Dakota</td>
<td>50,000+</td>
<td>50,000+</td>
<td>762,062</td>
<td>33% (USA)</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>April 7, 2020</td>
<td>June 26, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://care19.app/privacy">https://care19.app/privacy</a></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>50,000+</td>
<td>50,000+</td>
<td>2.077 million</td>
<td>50%*</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>April 12, 2020</td>
<td>May 7, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/privacy/en">https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/privacy/en</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>5.433 million</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>Unable to access App store first version date</td>
<td>June 8, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://www.fhi.no/om/fhi/nedlasting-og-bruk-av-smittestopp/">https://www.fhi.no/om/fhi/nedlasting-og-bruk-av-smittestopp/</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>37.97 million</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>April 30, 2020</td>
<td>July 14, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://www.gov.pl/web/protegosafe/dokumenty">https://www.gov.pl/web/protegosafe/dokumenty</a></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Qatar*</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>2.782 million</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td>April 25, 2020</td>
<td>July 2, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://moi.gov.qa/">https://moi.gov.qa/</a></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>1,000,000+</td>
<td>5.639 million</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
<td>2.1.4</td>
<td>March 18, 2020</td>
<td>July 7, 2020</td>
<td><a href="http://www.tracetogether.gov.sg/common/privacystatement">http://www.tracetogether.gov.sg/common/privacystatement</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>500,000+</td>
<td>500,000+</td>
<td>8.57 million</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>1.0.5</td>
<td>Unable to access App store first version date</td>
<td>June 20, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://www.bag.admin.ch/swisscovid-datenenschutzverordnung-und-nutzungsbedingungen">https://www.bag.admin.ch/swisscovid-datenenschutzverordnung-und-nutzungsbedingungen</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey*</td>
<td>5,000,000+</td>
<td>10,000,000+</td>
<td>82 million</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>2.0.9</td>
<td>April 14, 2020</td>
<td>June 24, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://hesapp.saglik.gov.tr/hayat_eve_sigar_aydinlatma.pdf">https://hesapp.saglik.gov.tr/hayat_eve_sigar_aydinlatma.pdf</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE*</td>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>No longer on app store</td>
<td>9.361 million</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.1.6</td>
<td>April 3, 2020</td>
<td>April 13, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://tracecovid.ae/privacy.html">https://tracecovid.ae/privacy.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (No longer available as of June 26, 2020)</td>
<td>50,000+</td>
<td>No longer on app store</td>
<td>66.65 million</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>May 5, 2020</td>
<td>June 26, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://covid19.nhs.uk/our-policies.html">https://covid19.nhs.uk/our-policies.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S - Utah</td>
<td>10,000+</td>
<td>10,000+</td>
<td>3.206 million</td>
<td>33% (USA)</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.2.48</td>
<td>April 22, 2020</td>
<td>July 15, 2020</td>
<td><a href="https://healthytogether.io/legal/privacy">https://healthytogether.io/legal/privacy</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 6
Conclusions
Conclusions

1. **Onboarding transparency:** 16 of 18 apps created walkthroughs in onboarding to more transparently communicate a number of key benefits and safeguards such as data privacy and how the app works and uses your data. This was implemented to gain user trust by explaining how COVID-19-related apps work through onboarding methods, illustrations, and design layout (pp.12-46).

2. **Privacy settings:** Authorities and app developers build privacy settings features often separate from the core app user experience (pp.47-61). 16 of 31 apps feature settings, app permissions and data collection features placed more prominently on one of the apps main tabs; This is done through mechanisms such as toggles, on/off buttons, iconography, checkmarks, “active or inactive” cards, and color-coded background toggles. This feature can position the app data collection process to be more transparent to the user every time they log into the system.

3. **Privacy governance processes:** In various apps, there is evidence of articulating the data governance and app creation through app specific privacy policies, data deletions and/or privacy or data protection impact assessments (pp.62-72). 23 of 31 apps feature a privacy policy specific to the app, 17 of 31 apps we were able to find some evidence of open source documentation which signals attempts at transparency and the option to engage the research and developer community to continually improve the application. 7 of 30 apps showed evidence of privacy or data protection impact assessments, which signals that there are processes in place to identify and manage potential risks.
Section 5: Appendix of screenshots
Alberta, Canada
AB Trace Together
Alberta, Canada
ABTraceTogether
https://www.alberta.ca/ab-trace-together.aspx
Australia
COVIDSafe
Join the fight to stop the spread of COVID-19

Get notified quickly if you come into contact with COVID-19

Your identity is safeguarded

You’re in control of your information

Let’s stop the spread. Stay home, save lives

Together we can stop the spread of COVID-19

COVIDSafe has been developed by the Australian Government to help keep the community safe from the spread of coronavirus.

COVIDSafe will securely note contact that you have with other users of the app. This will allow state or territory health officials to contact you, if you have been in close contact with someone who has tested positive to the virus.

How COVIDSafe works

Bluetooth® signals are used to determine when you’re near another COVIDSafe user.

Every instance of close contact between you and other COVIDSafe users is noted to create close contact information. This information is encrypted and only stored in your phone.

If you test positive to COVID-19 as a COVIDSafe user, a state or territory health official will contact you. They will assist with voluntary upload of your contact information.

1. I want to help

2. Next

3. How a health official contacted you?
Request data deletion

This form will start the process to remove your data from the COVIDSafe secure information storage system. You will be asked to validate your identity through a phone call from the COVIDSafe Administrator.

Please refer to the COVIDSafe privacy policy when providing information in this form.

Full name used to register for the COVIDSafe app

Mobile number used to register for the COVIDSafe app
You will be contacted on this phone number by a COVIDSafe Administrator to complete the process.

I'm not a robot

I have read the COVIDSafe collection notice and consent to the information provided being used and disclosed by the Australian Government to enable the Commonwealth, state and territory governments to respond to COVID-19. I have only included information about myself, or about another person who has either given me their consent to provide their information or where I am that other person’s parent or legal guardian.

App deletion
Australian Government
How COVIDSafe works

Bluetooth® signals are used to determine when you’re near another COVIDSafe user.

Every instance of close contact between you and other COVIDSafe users is noted to create contact
inform on your phone. COVIDSafe will help to keep you and others safe.

If you test positive for COVID-19, secure record from other. This will allow
health officials to instruct you to self-isolate.

Help stop the COVID-19 pandemic.

App permissions

COVIDSafe needs Bluetooth® and notifications enabled to work.

Select “Proceed” to enable:
1. Bluetooth®
2. Notifications

“COVIDSafe” would like to make data available to nearby Bluetooth devices even when
you’re not using the app.

COVIDSafe exchanges Bluetooth® signals with nearby phones running the same app. These signals contain an
encrypted ID which is encrypted and changes continually to ensure your privacy.

Forward

Registration and privacy

It is important that you read the COVIDSafe Privacy Policy before you register for COVIDSafe.

If you are under 16 years old, your parent/guardian must read the Privacy Policy.

Registration consent

I consent to the Australian Privacy Principles.

Enter your details

Full name:

More screenshots

COVIDSafe is active
There is nothing else you need to do except to leave the app running and keep Bluetooth® on.

For more help, see our FAQ.

Share COVIDSafe
Invite others to join. Together, we're stronger.

Get the Coronavirus app
Download the Government app for the latest numbers, news and advice.

Latest news and updates
Head to aus.gov.au for the latest Coronavirus news.

The COVIDsafe App has detected you are now +20km from your nominated home address. Please register your reason for travel by calling 1300 1MY GOV (+61 1300 169 468) within 15 minutes of receiving this SMS (10:12am AEST Monday 27 April 2020). Thank you.

Please take note
1. Keep your phone with you when you leave home.
2. Keep the app running.

Has a health official asked you to upload your data?
Upload my data

Check permissions
COVIDSafe needs permission to access these features.

App permission status
- Bluetooth: Off
- Location: On
- Battery optimization: Off
Protect yourself and others: download the COVIDSafe app

Case numbers

Latest government advice

News & Media

Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) statement on early childhood and learning centres
25 May 2020 | News

Additional $20 million for research into mental health and suicide prevention
25 May 2020 | News

Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) statement on restoration of elective surgery and hospital activity
22 May 2020 | News

See the latest COVID-19 news in your language

Coronavirus (COVID-19)

Essential information
4:30PM AEST on Thursday, 9 April 2020

- Symptom checker
- Advice
- Register isolation
- News & Media
- Current Status
- States and territories


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coronavirus_Australia
Austria
STOPP Corona
Austrian Red Cross
Stopp Corona

Suspected case. You have completed the questionnaire and there is suspicion of a corona infection. Quarantine days.

Give the all clear
Report medical confirmation

Reported sick. Please stay in Quarantine. You have officially reported sick as suffering from the coronavirus.

Question. How are you today?
I feel good.
I have symptoms of illness.

Do you have any of the following symptoms:
Cough
Sore throat
Shortness of breath
Respiratory infection
Sudden loss of taste or smell
Digital Handshake
(Austria Red Cross)

It will definitely be a while before we’ll actually shake each others hands again. In the meantime: use “Stopp Corona”s digital handshake.

If you and the person you encounter have installed the app, you can simply select each other. The app will anonymously save your meeting. Should one of you fall sick with the corona virus the other will receive an instant notification.
Welcome!

By installing the Stop Corona App, you help to combat the spread of the corona virus and keep the number of new infections low.

Digital handshake

With the digital handshake you save your encounters anonymous and automatically. You will be notified anonymously in the app if one of your contacts falls ill.

For medical reasons: The app works on further distance, please avoid to get closer than 1 meter.

Check symptoms

Use our clinically tested questionnaire. Get a daily assessment of your health status.

Notification in the event of illness

Help to help others! If you should contract the corona virus yourself, your contacts will be notified anonymously so that they can take measures.

iOS app version 2.0.2. Last update 6/26/20. Last accessed 6/28/20
Thank you for using the app!

You’re actively helping to protect your health and the health of others. You can now record encounters with other app users.

By installing the app you agree to the terms of use.

Declaration of consent

I agree that the Austrian Red Cross (ÖRK) may process my personal data (random figures [“random-IDs”), my telephone number, and any suspicion and reporting of my COVID-19 condition [= health data]) for the purpose of rapid interruption of the corona infection chain.

☐ I consent

I may revoke my consent at any time, whereby revocation does not affect the lawfulness of processing up until the time that consent is revoked.

Further information can be found in our privacy policy.

Continue

Finished

Digital Handshake

Automatic handshake:
inactive

None of the app's features are active.

How does the app work?

And the app can notify you if you have been exposed to COVID-19.

Enable COVID-19 Exposure Logging and Notifications

Your iPhone can securely collect and share random IDs with nearby devices. The app can use these IDs to notify you if someone has been exposed to COVID-19.

Don’t Enable

Enable

“Stopp Corona” Would Like to Send You Notifications

Notifications may include alerts, sounds, and icon badges. These can be configured in Settings.

Don’t Allow

Allow

Share the app!

Share the app and protect yourself and your environment.

Share App
Bahrain
BeAware
New service added to BeAware Bahrain App

Self-Isolation exit test appointment

- Allows self-isolation individuals to book their exit test appointment.
- Exit test appointment will be conducted via a drive-through testing facilities at the Bahrain International Exhibition & Convention Center without the need to get out of the vehicle.
- The appointment can be booked 3 days before the end of the self-isolation/quarantine period completion.

https://www.bahrain.bh/wps/portal/!ut/p/a1/jZDLDoJADEW_xQVbWgdBdCs8REJPhBxNgbMOGqQMYYqg54u6wnd3bc5JbwsMAMbJm09EmO1kEsa3nhmrvotGnZhkiJ6POHFs29P9mYW6XgLLcqBpXaSu0Rw3_RYxTPzPR-JY9UGjBBwHkZqd6cizLcSe9qf_oeijP_TOewALYE_Z6xR34FvMBfM4xBCZiGd1_uqRjpkCWm03POWpek7L8TbLige2ggoWRaEKUXM1bU8KPhO2cTBkGVhONhpq8ug70e5yNKa7Uriziwiw!!/dl5/d5/L2dB1SEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/
Bulgaria
Virusafe
Регистрация

Въведете код за верификация на получението на снимка

Мобилен номер (0800000000)

Потвърди

Потвърди

Не получих код

ЕГН

Лична информация

Години

Пол

Мъж

Жена

Хронични заболявания

Не получих код

Постовна болка или напрежение в гърдите

Да

Не

Помагайте на съседите си

ТВОЯТ ЛИЧЕН ПРИНОС

Включи се в помощ, като отчиташ своето здравословно състояние всеки ден

Как се чувстваш днес?

ТАЙТСТИЦА

ТАВИТЕ ЛИЧНИ ДАНИ

ПОВЕЧЕ ЗА КОРОНА ВИРУС

КАК РАБОТИ VIRUSAFE

Условия за ползване

Republic of Bulgaria Ministry of Health
ViruSafe (6/28/20)
Canada
COVID Alert
Together, let’s stop the spread of COVID-19

COVID Alert helps us break the cycle of infection. The app can let people know of possible exposures before any symptoms appear.

That way, we can take care of ourselves and protect our communities.

Your privacy is protected

COVID Alert does not use GPS or track your location.

It has no way of knowing:

- Your location.
- Your name or address.
- Your phone’s contacts.
- Your health information.
- The health information of anyone you’re near.

How it works

- The app uses Bluetooth to exchange random codes with nearby phones.
- Every day, it checks a list of random codes from people who tell the app they tested positive.
- If you’ve had close contact with one of those people in the past 14 days, you’ll get a notification.

Learn more about how it works

COVID Alert

https://apps.apple.com/ca/app/id1520284227, iOS app v. 1.0.2, accessed 8/1/20
How COVID Alert works

The app runs in the background and will not interrupt your activities.

Whenever you’re near someone else with COVID Alert, both phones exchange random codes every 5 minutes.

The random codes change often and cannot be used to identify you.

What’s an exposure?

The app estimates how near people are by the strength of Bluetooth signals.

If you’re closer than 2 metres for more than 15 minutes, the app will record an exposure.

Getting a positive test

If someone with the app is diagnosed with COVID-19, they can choose to upload the random codes their phone sent. The codes go into a central server.

The server only gets the codes. It does not get any information about the person.

Looking for exposures

Every day, whenever it has an Internet connection, your phone will get a list of the random codes from people who reported a diagnosis.

If it finds codes that match, the app notifies you that you’ve been exposed and explains what to do next.

COVID Alert

https://apps.apple.com/ca/app/id1520284227, iOS app v. 1.0.2, accessed 8/1/20
One part of public health
- COVID Alert is just one part of the public health effort to stop the spread of COVID-19.
- Follow all public health guidelines in your area.
- COVID Alert does not replace medical advice. If you get sick, contact your doctor or other healthcare provider.

The app will now ask your permission
Allow the app to start logging random codes or “random IDs” when you’re near other phones. The app will access the date, duration and signal strength related to the random codes, but they never leave your phone.

You’ll also need to let the app send you notifications.

Learn more about privacy

Privacy policy
Your privacy is protected
COVID Alert is built with strong privacy protection.

It’s extremely unlikely that you could be identified while using this app. The COVID Alert app takes extensive steps, described below, to ensure your privacy and data are protected.

Use of the app is voluntary.

What the app collects and stores on your phone
- Random codes from your phone, for 14 days.
- Random codes from other phones near you, for 14 days.

The random codes are only stored and used for the purpose of notifying you, or others, of possible COVID-19 exposure.

How the data is protected
- The app cannot connect your identity with the random codes.
- Your phone encrypts the random codes. You must give your permission before your phone will share the random codes with COVID Alert.

COVID Alert has no way of knowing
- Your location.
- Your name or address.

COVID Alert
https://apps.apple.com/ca/app/id1520284227, iOS app v. 1.0.2, accessed 8/1/20
Step 6 of 6

Where do you live? (optional)

Choose your region to check if you can report a diagnosis through this app.

Your region will never be shared with anyone.

Alberta
British Columbia
Manitoba
New Brunswick
Newfoundland and Labrador
Northwest Territories
Nova Scotia
Nunavut

Back ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ Done

COVID Alert

https://apps.apple.com/ca/app/id1520284227, iOS app v. 1.0.2, accessed 8/1/20
China
Chinese health code system
A contract-tracing app is being used in Wuhan, China, that can tell you whether you can or cannot enter a shop.

Before entering a shop, residents have to scan a QR code and then wait for their temperature to be taken.

A person also scans a QR code when they leave the store to signify they are done there.

If the app displays a green thumbprint, it means their temperature is OK and they can enter the store.

Anyone with a yellow thumbprint needs to self-quarantine at home while anyone with a red thumbprint must stay under supervised quarantine.

Cyprus
CovTracer
Government of the Republic of Cyprus
CovTracer
Help Cypriots

By logging your location trail, you help the authorities to track COVID19 with higher accuracy.

Learn More:

Start Logging

NOTE: After clicking this button you may be prompted to grant CovTracer access to your location.

Learn More:

Export

You can share your location trail with anyone using the Share button below. Once you press the button it will ask you with whom and how you want to share it.

Location is shared as a simple list of times and coordinates, no other identifying information.

Total time the log covers: 1 day 19 hours 4 minutes

Number of points logged: 2

Time since last updated: 1 day 19 hours 4 minutes

Stop Logging

Visualize movements

The app logs your location privately every five minutes. Location information does NOT leave your phone.

Import

Export

News

Learn More:
1.0.0
Phase 1:
The user starts recording his/her location via GPS. All information remains on the device, respecting his/her privacy.

Phase 2:
Let’s say for example that the user is diagnosed positive to COVID-19. If he/she wants, voluntarily, shares the geolocation data of the movements of his/her last two weeks with his/her epidemiologist:

Phase 3:
The epidemiologist checks this information and takes action, e.g. to evacuate areas, perform cleaning or to inform people who were in close touch with the patient. If the patient wishes, the geo-locations of his/her movements become anonymous and public on the database of CovTracer. Information about the patient’s home and any possible identification traces are removed:
iOS app screenshots version 2.0.1. Accessed 7/16/20
**Import locations**

Adding location data from Google will give you a head start on building your recent locations.

Before you can import, you must first “Take out” your location data from Google.

Visit Google Takeout and export your Location History using the following settings:

1. Delivery method: “Add to Drive”
2. Frequency: “Export once”
3. File type & size: “.zip” and “1GB”
4. Google sends an email when the export is ready
5. Return here to import locations from Google Drive

Visit Google Takeout
And then
Import locations

**Export**

You can share your location trail with anyone using the Share button below. Once you press the button it will ask you with whom and how you want to share it.

Location is shared as a simple list of times and coordinates, no other identifying information.

Total time the log covers: No data
Number of points logged: 0
Time since last updated: No data

NOTE: After clicking this button you may be prompted to grant CovTracer access to your location.
Czech
eRouska
I'm protecting **myself**, I'm protecting you!

Thanks to Bluetooth, the eRouška application remembers other eRouška you have met. This will make it easier for the hygienic station to locate risky contacts.

Contribute to increasing the number of coronavirus infections.

https://erouska.cz/
Visualizations of how the app works
Erouska is active. The application works in the background and monitors the environment, please do not quit it. Leave Bluetooth turned on and work with your phone as usual. Pause Data Collection.

Díky eRoušce ochráněte sebe i ostatní ve svém okolí.

Aplikace bude nepřetržitě monitorovat vaše okolí a zaznamenávat všechny ostatní telefony s aplikací eRouška, ke kterým se přiblížíte.

Pokud se u majitele kteréhokoliv z nich potvrdí nákaza koronavirem, telefonický vás kontaktuje pracovník hygienické stanice.

Když se potvrdí nákaza u vás, hygienická stanice bude kontaktovat všechny ostatní uživatele aplikace, s kterými jste se potkal.

Více o nezbytných auditách

Pokračovat k aktivaci

Jak to funguje
Povolení Bluetooth

Potřebuji ověřit, že nejste robot

Ověření

Potřebuji ověřit, že nejste robot

Telefonní číslo

Souhlasím s podmínkami

Soulhač, abyste klepl na tlačítko „Pokračovat”, eRouška se spoji se serverem a zašle vašemu telefonu oznámení pro automatické ověření, které je nutné povolit. Tak vás jednoduše ověříme.
France
StopCovid
Bienvenue
Protégeons nos proches, protégeons-nous et protégeons les autres
Avec StopCovid, participez à la lutte contre l'épidémie en limitant les risques de transmission.

Actif
StopCovid contribue à votre protection et à celle des autres
Je désactive StopCovid
Merci d'avoir activé StopCovid. Vous pouvez continuer à utiliser votre téléphone normalement, mais ne désactivez pas le Bluetooth !
Confidentialité
Gérer mes données

Me déclarer
Vous avez effectué un test COVID-19 et il est positif ?
Votre médecin ou laboratoire vous a remis un code : merci de le scanner ou le saisir pour que les personnes que vous avez rencontrées soient alertées.
Prenez soin de vous !
Scanner le QR code
Saisir le code

Partager
Plus nous sommes nombreux à utiliser StopCovid et mieux nous sommes protégés
Nous avons besoin de vous : l'impact de cette application dans la lutte contre le COVID-19 dépend de vous ! Merci de la partager avec vos proches.
Je partage l'application

https://apps.apple.com/app/id1511279125
Welcome
Let's protect our loved ones, ourselves and everybody else
Use StopCovid to help fight the pandemic by reducing transmission risks.

It’s simple!
1. Activate the app
StopCovid uses your phone’s Bluetooth connection to detect other users’ phones that are close to yours.
2. Send me alerts
You will be alerted if you have been in close contact with a user who has tested positive for COVID-19.
3. Protect my loved ones and everybody else
If you test positive for COVID-19, the test results will come with a code to be scanned or entered manually to send anonymous alerts to the users you have met.

Confidentiality
Your privacy is protected
StopCovid complies with the General Data Protection Regulation.
More information about the GDPR

How the data sharing works
StopCovid uses your phone’s Bluetooth connection only. It does not record or share your location information. The Bluetooth connection is used to estimate the distance between two phones based on a statistical model.

What data are shared and why
The data shared between two phones over their Bluetooth connections are temporary pseudo-identifiers.
Pseudo-identifiers are renewed automatically every 15 minutes. They can be a string of numbers, letters and symbols that cannot be used on their own to identify a person.
The application shares these data with the server managed by the Ministry for Solidarity and Health, but only if you test positive and only if you give your consent. If you do, then other users’ apps can

Detection
Allow "Bluetooth contacts"
StopCovid needs to use your phone’s Bluetooth connection in order to work.
No location data are shared or recorded.

App iOS version 1.1.1., accessed July 02, 2020
“StopCovid” Would Like to Use Bluetooth
StopCovid needs Bluetooth to get an estimate, based on a statistical model, of the proximity between two phones.

Don’t Allow  OK

Detection

Receive push notification if you are at risk
If you have been in close contact with a user who is reported positive (exposure at less than one metre lasting 15 minutes or more), you will be alerted.
StopCovid will then give you the recommendations from the Ministry for Solidarity and Health.

Allow push notifications

Notifications

Don’t forget!
Barrier gestures are critical

Wash your hands frequently

Cough or sneeze into your elbow or into a tissue

Use single-use tissues and throw them in the bin

Avoid touching your face

Keep a distance of at least one metre from others

Got it
Attention
You have not activated StopCovid yet

Report me
Has your COVID-19 test come back positive?
You have received a code with your test results; please scan or enter the code so that the users you have met can be alerted. Take good care of yourself!

Share
The more of us use StopCovid, the better we are protected
We need you. The impact that this app has on fighting COVID-19 depends on you! Please share it with your friends and family.

To run StopCovid, you need to activate Bluetooth and push notifications in settings by tapping here...
Confidentiality

Your privacy is protected
StopCovid complies with the General Data Protection Regulation.

More information about the GDPR

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The application shares these data with the server managed by the Ministry for Solidarity and Health, but only if you test positive, you receive alerts. Attention, this will delete all of the alerts.

Delete my alerts
Quit StopCovid
You can stop using StopCovid and delete all of your personal information at any time.

Cancel registration

About StopCovid
This app was developed by the StopCovid team under the supervision of the Ministry for Solidarity and Health and the Ministry of State for Digital Affairs. StopCovid team: Inria, ANRIS, Cappellini, Dossodat SYSTELAB, ISTEM, Lunebee Studio, Ministry for Solidarity and Health, Orange, Sainte Publique France and Wellings.

More about StopCovid
Questions - Answers
Give your opinion

“StopCovid” Would Like to Access the Camera
StopCovid needs to access your camera in order to flash a QR code.

Don’t Allow OK

Enter the code

Your code
Please enter the code you have received with your test results.

This code is random and does not contain any personal information. It is valid for 60 minutes.
Germany
Corona Warn App
Let's fight coronavirus together

More protection for you and for us all. By using the Corona-Warn-App we can break infection chains much quicker.

Turn your device into a coronavirus warning system. Get an overview of your risk.

Protect yourself and protect us all

Check whether you had encounters with infected persons

Learn how to act correctly in every situation

The app records your encounters – but no personal data

Users register their coronavirus tests anonymously and warn others
Easily request your test result via the app

How this works:
- Test added successfully
- Your test has been registered in the Coronavirus app
- Your Test Result
  The laboratory result indicates no verification that you have recovered from SARS-CoV-2.
  Please take the test from the

Share the app with family and friends
Figure 1: UI Screens for Google Android (high-resolution images)

Figure 2: UI Screens for Apple iOS (high-resolution images)

Screen Descriptions

1. This is the first screen (Android, iOS) that a user sees when launching the app for the first time. It describes the purpose of the app and is only displayed once after the very first app start.

2. The home screen (Android, iOS) is the entry point to the app for further starts. It provides the user with the current risk status. In case of a positive test, it offers the opportunity to submit the diagnosis keys to the server with a QR code or a TeleTAN. Further, it allows the sharing of the app with others, offers additional information, as well as the app setting button.

3. The detailed view (Android, iOS) of the risk level repeats the information displayed on the home screen. It provides the user with behavioral recommendations in line with his current infection risk. Moreover, it explains how the infection risk was determined.

4. The settings of the risk calculation screen (Android, iOS) can be accessed via the home screen as well as via the application settings. It explains the risk calculation and allows users to control it. In case of a significant malfunction of the risk calculation (e.g., the deactivation of Bluetooth) the user will be informed and provided with a solution.

https://github.com/corona-warn-app/cwa-documentation/blob/master/ui_screens.md
Ghana
GH COVID-19 Tracker
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EiJIO45Vya0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EiJIO45Vya0
This app does not give health advice but it allows you to assess your symptoms and help control the spread of COVID-19. Please visit the Ghana Health Service website if you need health advice.

Powered By Ministry of Communications
Iceland

Rakning C-19
Iceland - Authentication, Location, Notifications
Rakning - COVID-19
Hjálpum rakningateymi Almannavarnu að reka hugsanleg COVID-19 smit á Íslandi

Tracing – COVID-19
Help the Civil Protection Team to track potential COVID-19 infections in Iceland

Tracing – COVID-19
Let’s help the Department of Civil Protection and Emergency Management’s Contact Tracing Team to trace potential COVID-19 contagion paths in Iceland.

How does the app work, and what information does it store?
The app saves your movements/locations data and stores them securely in your device. In certain instances, the Contact Tracing Team may send you a notification and request that you forward them the data. Then you can send the data to the Team with a single click. This will make it easier to trace the spread of COVID-19 while the epidemic is ongoing.

Your device stores your location data for the past 14 days. Older data are deleted.

Enter your phone number.
You will then be sent a code, which you will enter in the next step.

+354
TELEPHONE

I agree to the app’s Privacy Policy and that location data will be stored on the phone.

Next
India

Aarogya Setu
Aarogya Setu tracks, through a Bluetooth & GPS generated social graph, your interaction with someone who could have tested COVID-19 positive.

You will be alerted if someone you have come in close proximity of, even unknowingly, tests COVID-19 positive.

With Aarogya Setu, you can protect yourself, your family and friends, and help our country in the effort to fight COVID-19

If we are safe, India is safe.

Screenshots in english
Now, choose the desired language and tap Next
The app supports 11 languages—English, Hindi, Gujarati, Marathi, Punjabi, etc.

Now, tap on the Register Now button at the last slide of the information page

4. Allow all the necessary permissions.
   As already mentioned, the app uses Bluetooth and location data to work, need to provide access to these services.

5. At the next screen, enter your phone number, tap Submit.

Govt Launches ‘Aarogya Setu App’

The app will alert users if they come in proximity to an infected person.

The app has a unique architecture and is available in 11 languages.

Aarogya Setu App

Neha meets a few people during her visit to the market, who may not know them or their health conditions.

Aarogya Setu, through Bluetooth and GPS, creates an anonymous and encrypted social graph of her interactions.

If one of these people is diagnosed with COVID-19, Aarogya Setu traces all contacts in last 14 days and assesses risk of infection.

Government sends curated advisory to all those who may be at risk, and proactively reaches out to those with necessary medical interventions.

Privacy-first by design; user data deleted after 30 days; available in 11 languages.

Live since 2nd April 2020.

Used by 30 million Indians already (and growing).

Built by inclusively, in public-private partnership, for India.
Govt Launches ‘Aarogya Setu App’
a Bluetooth-based COVID-19 Tracker

- The app will alert users if they come in proximity to an infected person.
- Inform users about best practices & relevant medical advisories.
- The App is privacy-first by design & available in Android & iOS.
- The App has highly scalable architecture & is available in 11 languages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases Over Time</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>India</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confirmed</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recovered</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>70756 (+3604, 5.37%)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tue May 12 2020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Iran
Mask.ir
احتمال ابتلا شما به کرونا کم است. لطفاً تا بهره‌کامل در منزل باشید.

ورود اطلاعات سلامت روزانه
25 اسفند 1398 - 13:55

بگذارید نام و شماره تماس شما در جستجوی افراد نزدیک شما مورد استفاده قرار گیرد.

از جمجمه‌های اینترنتی بهبودی جستجو‌های فردی ثبت نماید.

زمان بروزرسانی و وضعیت شما: 25 اسفند 1398 - 13:55
آنتجه یاید درباره ویروس کرونا بدانید

از ووهان تا تهران

در چند وقت اخیر اسم کرونا در تمامی رسانه‌ها جز عناوین مهم خبری و برخی این امر نیز چنین را به تعویضی کشاویده بود. هیچ کس کنن کرد یا خبری از کرونا در مدت کوتاهی هزاران فقر در سطح جهان از زاین، گرچه جنوبی تایلند، سنگاپور، ایالات متحده آمریکا و اخیرا ایران را از دست داده. در 20 ماه گذشته یا همراه با مقامات دولتی وجود ویروس کرونا در ایران (قم) را تایید کرده، با وجود مطالعات و آزمایش‌هایی که توسط محققین بر روی کرونای صورت گرفته، کمک‌های این ویروس با شکسته‌نگاره‌ای مانده ایست. روش‌های جدیدی برای بیشتری، به خصوص هنگام مسافرت به نقاط محروم شده، در ادامه به بررسی ویروس کرونا می‌پردازد.

https://twitter.com/MaskApplication/status/1251726935736098816/photo/1
https://peivast.com/p/73198
Ireland
HSE Covid-19 App
iOS app accessed July 20, 2020
Version 1.0.1
Data Protection Information Notice

Version 1.0.1 - Updated 13/7/2020 - Section 9.1
updated to reflect that two of the third party data
processors listed do not have access to user data.

1. Introduction

The purpose of this privacy information notice is to
explain how the COVID Tracker App (the 'app') works,
what data is collected by the app, who has access to
that data and the purposes for which the data is used.
This notice also provides you with information about
your data protection rights under data protection law,
including under the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (EU Regulation 679/2016) (the GDPR).

The app is available to download for free from the
Apple App Store and the Google Play Store. Use of
the app by you is completely voluntary - it is your
decision to download it, your choice to keep it on your
device, your choice to opt-in to and use the different
services that are available on the app, and your choice
to delete it. You will never be required to use the app
in order to access other services from the HSE or
Department of Health. You will be given a separate
opt-in (consent) for each service that processes your
personal data in the app. You can withdraw your
consent(s) at any time.

The app runs on iPhones that support iOS 13.5 and
higher, and Android phones running Android 6.0 and
higher. The app is not intended for use by persons
under 16 years of age, as they are considered not to
have reached the digital age of consent. You will be
asked to confirm that you are 16 years or older after
you download the app.

2. The Data Controllers

iOS app accessed July 20, 2020
Version 1.0.1
iOS app accessed July 20, 2020
Version 1.0.1
Data Protection Information Notice

Version 1.0.1 - Updated 13/7/2020 - Section 9.1
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1. Introduction

The purpose of this privacy information notice is to explain how the COVID Tracker App (the ‘App’) works, what data is collected by the App, who has access to that data and the purposes for which the data is used. This notice also provides you with information about your data protection rights under data protection law, including under the EU General Data Protection Regulation (EU Regulation 679/2016) (‘the GDPR’).
The app is available to download for free from the Apple App Store and the Google Play Store. Use of the app by you is completely voluntary – it is your choice to download it, your choice to keep it on your device, your choice to opt-in to and use the different services that are available on the app, and your choice to delete it. You will never be required to use the app in order to access other services from the HSE or Department of Health. You will be given a separate opt-in (consent) for each service that processes your personal data in the app. You can withdraw your consent(s) at any time.

The app runs on iPhones that support iOS 13.5 and higher, and Android phones running Android 6.0 and higher. The app is not intended for use by persons under 16 years of age, as they are considered not to have reached the digital age of consent. You will be asked to confirm that you are 16 years or older before you download the app.

2. The Data Controllers

Terms & Conditions

Please read these terms of use carefully. By downloading the COVID Tracker App, you agree to these terms.

Introduction

These are the terms of use for the COVID Tracker App (also referred to as “the App”) which is being made available by the Irish Health Service Executive in conjunction with the Irish Department of Health, for people across the island of Ireland. The App is designed to assist in tracing cases of Covid-19 and to provide information about the virus and steps for controlling the spread of the virus.

Please read these terms of use in conjunction with the Privacy Information Notice for the App, available to view here http://www.covidtracker.ie. See further about the Privacy Information Notice below.

References to “we”, “us” or “ours” in these terms of use are to the Irish Health Service Executive (HSE), which is the owner and licensor of the COVID Tracker App. References to “you”, “your” or “user” refer to the person who has downloaded the App onto their device for their own personal use and who uses the Services.

What the COVID Tracker App does

The COVID Tracker App provides the following services (the Services):

1. Contact Tracing

   The app gives you the option to use some or all of these features and you can enable or disable each of these features separately within the app settings. App settings also gives you the ability to remove or update any information you provided to the app, at any time.

App Metrics

The HSE would like to understand your use of the App for the purpose of improving it.

The app will collect anonymous metrics about how you use the app and the effectiveness of Contact Tracing processes.

This information is gathered by the HSE directly and does not use any third parties to gather metrics. This information is only gathered with your consent and cannot be used to identify you.

Share app usage statistics

You can read the Data Protection Information Notice here

Leave

Thank you for helping us fight COVID-19. We’re sorry to see you go. When you tap ‘I want to leave’ we will remove all data stored by the app from your device including a mobile number; if you have shared one, symptom data and any demographic health data you may have shared. Non-identifying authorisation tokens stored on the server will also be deleted.

Random IDs created or collected by Exposure Notification Services cannot be removed by the COVID Tracker app. If you wish to remove these Random IDs you can do this via your device Settings.

You can read the Data Protection Information Notice here

I want to leave
About the App
Stay safe. Protect each other.

To help the country through this crisis the COVID response app has three functions: contact tracing, symptom tracking, and news & information.

Contact Tracing
The app records if users are in close contact with another app user. If an app user tests positive for COVID-19 the app will alert other app users that have been closer than 2 meters for more than 15 minutes. If users choose to share their phone number, the HSE can phone to tell them what they need to do to keep themselves and others safe.

Symptom Tracking: Daily Health Check-in
Users can help slow the spread of COVID-19 by telling the HSE how they are feeling every day. Anonymous information about how many people have symptoms at any time, helps to map and predict the spread of the virus. If users do have symptoms, the app will give them advice on what to do.

Definitive Source of News & Information
The app will also give users easy access to the latest facts and figures about COVID-19 in Ireland and signpost them to information that will help them care for themselves if they are sick.

Contact Tracing using the app reduces the time it takes to alert close contacts once someone tests positive for COVID-19. The app helps inform close contacts who are unknown to each other or who may have been forgotten by the person.

First time use
The first time anyone uses the app they are prompted to allow the app to collect and share the anonymous data transmitted by nearby mobile phones that also have the app installed.

Optional follow-up call service
When someone first uses the app they are asked how they would like to contact them. If their phone sees that they have been in close contact with someone who has tested positive, our Contact Tracing Team can call them if they have chosen to share their contact phone number with us.

Using the capabilities of mobile operating systems
Apple and Google have developed a method that allows specific government-only COVID-19 apps to make use of Bluetooth technology on phones that would otherwise not be available. As the app will need to use the most current version of the phone’s operating system, users may be asked to upgrade the first time they use it. None of the information in this app is ever shared with Apple or Google.
Contact Tracing
How it works on the app

Continuous scanning
Two phones that have the app installed use their Bluetooth signals to remember each other anonymously. Each then logs the nearby phone at least every 5 minutes. This activity happens in the background on users' phones all day.

Alerting others
If someone later tests positive for coronavirus they can decide to share their anonymous IDs. This is so other app users can be alerted if they are at risk. The app then uses those anonymous IDs to determine whether a user has been in close contact with that positive person; while never revealing the positive person's identity. A close contact is logged on each app users phone only if they have been within 2 metres of each other for more than 15 minutes. This matches the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control definition of a close contact.

Privacy
Location data is not of interest in contact tracing. So, to preserve privacy, the app does not use GPS or any other method to track people’s movements or location. As the app uses a de-centralised system, no data is held centrally by the HSE. The identity of anyone who tests positive for coronavirus is always protected by the app.

Network size
Every additional contact that the app can trace will improve our existing contact tracing operations and help to stop the spread of the virus. The more people that use the app, the more effective it will be.
Contact Tracing
Positive Test Result

Sharing
If someone has tested positive and they have the app on their phone, we will ask them to upload the list of anonymous IDs that the app has stored on their phone. They can choose if they want to do this.

Uploading
If they choose to do so, the HSE Contact Tracing Team send them a unique upload code by text message. This unique code unlocks the upload functionality within the app. Then the user is able to upload their own anonymous IDs for the last 14 days. This method prevents people from undermining the system with fake positive self-diagnoses, as upload codes can only ever be issued by the HSE.

Benefits for everyone
The app will enable citizens to play an active role in the contact tracing process. The app enhances the existing process by reducing the time it takes to alert people that they are close contacts of someone who has COVID-19. Contact tracing relies on someone that has tested positive knowing and remembering all the people that they have been in close contact with so we can get in touch with them with information and advice. The app will help us inform close contacts of people that have tested positive who are unknown to each other or who may have been forgotten.

1. Messages
   COVID Tracker
   Your upload code is 02847
   Unique upload code received by text message

2. Using unique code to upload last 14 days of anonymous IDs

3. Share random IDs with "COVID Tracker"?
   Sharing IDs from the past 14 days helps the app identify who should be notified that they’ve been exposed to COVID-19. Random IDs are anonymous and no other data will be shared.

4. Upload complete
   Thanks for uploading your random IDs to help the fight against COVID-19.
Contact Tracing

Close contact alerts

**Day-to-Day Activity**

The app will continuously download the anonymous IDs of app users who have tested positive for COVID-19. These are then compared to the unique set of anonymous IDs collected on app users' phones. This all happens in the background and users are not interrupted.

**Close Contact Alerts**

If the app finds that an app user was close enough (2 metres or less) for long enough (15 minutes or longer) to someone who has the virus, they will get an alert as soon as their app detects that they were in close contact. This alert is called a ‘Close Contact Alert’. The app will also display a persistent in-app warning to ensure that the user sees that Close Contact Alert.

**Phone call from Contact Tracing Team**

If the user chooses to also want a phone call if the app detects they are a close contact, the app will share their phone number with the HSE. The user will still receive a persistent Close Contact Alert displayed within the app. If the user has chosen to self-manage (by not providing their contact phone number), then the app will provide information to the user about what to do next and what to avoid doing.
Inside the App
COVID Check-in: symptom tracker

App users can also choose to share information about how they are feeling each day, whether they have symptoms or not. This collective information can create a real-time overview of the spread of the virus. All information shared with the COVID Check-in is anonymous.

Optional Information Sharing
The app asks users to provide some optional demographic information the first time they use the COVID Check-in, and to opt-in to sharing that information with the HSE. The optional demographic information is their sex, age range, and their county or town. The option to ‘Prefer not to say’ is available for all three requests in the app.

Daily Check-in
Choosing ‘I’m good, no symptoms’ completes the user’s check-in for that day. If users select ‘I’m not feeling well today’ they are prompted to answer 4 questions related to fever, breathing, loss or changed sense of smell or taste, and coughing symptoms. Based on their answers the app presents relevant feedback advice in line with the current HSE case definition. The app also uses age range as a factor for giving feedback advice.
## Appendix H - Data Retention

The following table sets out further details in relation to the justification for the retention of each of the personal data fields and also the measures to ensure that the retention policies are adhered to.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Retention</th>
<th>Retention Justification</th>
<th>Retention Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phone number</td>
<td>This phone number is securely held on the app until the user removes it via settings; selecting the Leave function; or uninstalling the app.</td>
<td>The justification to store the phone number on the app until a person removes it via settings;Leave/uninstalling is to carry out the wishes of the person to receive a call back if they get a close contact warning, which could happen at any stage.</td>
<td>The removal of the phone number from the app is self-managed by app users. If the phone number and date of last exposure has been sent to the HSE to perform a call back due to an exposure notification alert, the app backend will immediately delete your number once it is transferred to the HSE CTC. The HSE CTC will then process your number in line with the current contact tracing operations for contact tracing purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of last exposure</td>
<td>The phone number, if sent from the app to the HSE contact tracing operations (CTC) for call back, will be processed as per the procedures for all identified close contacts via CTC.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>This data is securely held on the app until the user removes it via settings; selecting the Leave function; or uninstalling the app.</td>
<td>The justification to store the demographic data on the app until a person removes it via settings;Leave/uninstalling is to facilitate its sharing with the daily check-in data in line with the user’s choice to do so. This is a convenience so that users are not asked if they would like to enter this demographic data each time.</td>
<td>The removal of demographic data from the app is self-managed by app users. The removal of uploaded data to the HSE is automatically removed 1 day after receipt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Range</td>
<td>This data is held by the HSE for 1 day after receipt to facilitate its transfer to the CCO.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>This data is retained by the CCO as anonymous data for statistical and research purposes in line with the CCO’s data management policy.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town (&gt;500 population)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19 Symptoms</td>
<td>This data is securely held on the app for a maximum of 28 days, or until the user removes it by selecting the Leave function; or uninstalling the app.</td>
<td>The justification to store the symptom data on the app until a person removes it via settings;Leave/uninstalling is to support the person reviewing their symptoms as an aide-memoire, and to facilitate the sharing of the 28 days’ worth of symptoms at each daily check</td>
<td>The removal of symptom data from the app is automatic after 28 days or self-managed by app users on Leave/uninstall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diagnosis Keys</td>
<td>Mobile number Date (symptom onset minus 48 hours)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This data is held by the HSE for 1 day after receipt to facilitate its transfer to the CSO. This data is retained by the CSO as anonymous data for statistical and research purposes in line with the CSO’s data management policy.</td>
<td>As soon as the SMS is sent, the phone number is deleted, and only the code is preserved with the symptom data. This app backend has no way of knowing the phone number of a person that either uploads their keys, or chooses not to upload their keys.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each phone holds up to 14 of daily random IDs to potentially upload and publish on the registry to allow other app users to check if they were in close contact in the last 14 days. 14 days is considered a window of epidemiological significance that generally covers the period of symptom onset through to recovery. The registry stores IDs for 14 days.</td>
<td>The code is processed long enough to authorise diagnosis keys upload, and also to retrieve the symptom data to determine the appropriate window of diagnosis keys to upload to the registry. It is deleted once the purpose is fulfilled or within 10 minutes, whichever occurs first.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The removal of uploaded data to the HSE is automatically removed 1 day after receipt.</td>
<td>The justification for retaining the mobile number for the period set out, is to send the SMS to enable a user to upload their diagnosis keys. The data is retained for the purpose of stripping out diagnosis keys prior to this date when they are uploaded. The epidemiological window of significance (viral shedding) is from this date onwards. The code is retained for the purpose of authorising the upload to ensure the diagnosis key registry does not get polluted with false submissions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phones generating random IDs retain the data for 14 days unless the user deletes ENS data via phone settings. The registry stores IDs for 14 days. Apps download and process IDs to check for exposure events only for as long as is required to determine if there is a match or not.</td>
<td>The data and code are removed automatically once they are used, or after 10 minutes – whichever comes first.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The registry automatically deletes random IDs after 14 days. Downloaded IDs to phones are deleted after checking for a match is performed.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metrics</td>
<td>This data is retained by the HSE as anonymous data for statistical and research purposes for a minimum of 7 years and reviewed for further retention at that stage. This data is retained by the CSO as anonymous data for statistical and research purposes in line with the CSO's data management policy.</td>
<td>This data is retained for the purposes of monitoring the efficacy of the app and improving it.</td>
<td>This data is manually reviewed by the HSE and the CSO in line with their policies for the retention of statistical and research data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP address and app security tokens</td>
<td>IP address is held in a transient manner on the networking layer for networking and security reasons. It is not persisted, nor logged on the app backend in any other way. The app security tokens are deleted on selection of the Leave function, or the deletion of the app (immediately on the phone, and after 60 days of not being used by the app backend as the backend is not aware of an app being deleted.</td>
<td>This data is retained for as long as it is needed for the purposes of network communication. Security tokens are retained on the app and the app backend to protect the API layer of the app backend from being subjected to attacks and pollution of fake data.</td>
<td>The IP address is automatically removed after it has served its primary networking purpose. Security tokens are deleted when a user selects Leave or automatically after 60 days of lack of use.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I – Conditions of Consent

As set out in the document, the use of the app is entirely voluntary in nature and will continue to be so. The controllers have no means to detect use or lack of use of the app by any identifiable individual’s phone. A supporting governance mechanism is provided to oversee the fulfilling of this principle in practice, ensuring that the voluntary nature is protected, and that consent is freely given. Article 7 of GDPR set out a series of conditions when the processing of personal data is based on consent. An assessment of these conditions are set out as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Demonstration of Consent</th>
<th>Clearly Distinguishable</th>
<th>Right to Withdraw</th>
<th>Conditionality / Freely Given</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phone number</td>
<td>The phone number is shown in settings, which can be accessed at any stage, and demonstrates that the number has been recorded under users’ own volition and a call back will be triggered if the data is present.</td>
<td>The phone number is collected on a screen of its own, setting out the reason for its collection, its optional nature, and for consent to the specific purpose for its processing – the option of a call back from the HSE.</td>
<td>Users can change their mind regarding consent at any stage via the app settings. Deleting the phone number via app settings, clicking Leave or uninstalling the app are the means to withdraw consent at any stage. If the phone number and data has been shared with the HSE for call back as part of CTC, the app backend automatically and immediately deletes the phone number and data once it has transferred to CTC. Once with CTC the data is processed in line with existing contact tracing purposes.¹³</td>
<td>Phone number entry is optional and is not conditional on the functioning of Contact Tracking function within the app. Furthermore, there is no dependency on, or conditionality relating to, the processing of this data beyond the specific purpose for its processing – the option of a call back from the HSE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of last exposure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹³ HSE CTC data processing, and data subject rights and their exercising, can be found at - [https://www.hse.ie/eng/gdpr/data-protection-covid-19/](https://www.hse.ie/eng/gdpr/data-protection-covid-19/)

Data Protection Impact Assessment – COVID Tracker App
| Town (pop. 90) population | Data has been recorded under users' own volition. Processing involved and asks for consent. The demographic data is collected on a screen of its own, where each field is optional, allowing users to skip the provision of this data. Leave or uninstalling the app are the means to withdraw consent at any stage. Demographic data held by the HSE and the CSO is not reliable to any specific individual, and as such, removal is not possible. Furthermore, there is no dependency on or conditionality relating to the processing of this data beyond the specific purpose for its processing—the sharing of demographic data as part of the optional COVID Check-In function. Demographic data cannot be reasonably used to identify a person and as such the controllers have no means, nor does it seek them, to identify whether a specific person has or has not shared demographic data. |
|COVID-19 Symptoms | The act of entering and sharing symptom data with the HSE is timestamped and recorded on the phone each day, which can be viewed at any time by the user via the COVID Check-In function. This historical record is retained on the phone for 28 days. The only means of sharing symptom data is to first give consent to the sharing of said data. The entering of symptom data the first time requires the user to go through a screen dedicated to describing the data processing involved in the function and asks for consent. Users can change their mind regarding consent at any stage and remove any symptom data held on the phone by clicking Leave or uninstalling the app. Symptom data held by the HSE and the CSO is not reliable to any specific individual, and as such, removal is not possible. Symptom entry is optional and is not conditional on the functioning of the Contact Tracing function within the app. Furthermore, there is no dependency on or conditionality relating to the processing of this data beyond the specific purpose for its processing—the sharing of symptom data as part of the optional COVID Check-In function. Symptom data cannot be reasonably used to identify a person and as such the controllers have no means, nor does it seek them, to identify whether a specific person has or has not shared symptom data. |
| Diagnosis Keys | The phone settings keep a record that a person has consented to turning on or off Exposure Notification Services on the phone. Turning on this service means that diagnosis keys will be stored on the phone. The phone settings screen in relation to the diagnosis keys are provided by Apple and Google and are separate to the app screens. The settings screens are related only to the specific purpose of exposure notification. The user can turn on and off the Exposure Notification Services at any time in the phone settings, and can also delete any ENS data at any time in the same place. Diagnosis keys held by the HSE is not reliable to any The processing of diagnosis keys is optional and is not conditional on the functioning of the COVID-19 Check-In function. Furthermore, there is no dependency on or conditionality relating to the processing of this data beyond the specific purpose for its processing—exposure notification. |
| Mobile number Date (symptom onset minus 48 hours) | Before uploading of diagnosis keys, the app asks on a dedicated screen, which describes the data processing involved, for consent. This is complemented by the phone also prompting the user for consent to allow the app to access the diagnosis keys. | A person is phoned by the HSE on a positive diagnosis and is asked separately and clearly on the phone if they are an app user and if they consent to sharing their diagnosis keys. | The processing of the mobile phone number and date of symptom onset is transient. Once the mobile number has been used to send an SMS it is immediately deleted. Also, the data of symptom onset is deleted once upload of keys has occurred or 10 minutes have passed, whichever occurs first. | CTC ensures that when a person is called to inform them they are positive for the virus, they will be asked if they are a COVID Tracker App user and if they are happy to share their diagnosis keys. This is an optional step and manual contact tracing interview continues as per normal. Furthermore, there is no dependency on or conditionality relating to the processing of this data beyond the specific purpose for its processing – publication of the diagnosis keys on the public registry to support exposure notification. |

| Metrics See Appendix D for full breakdown. | The record of consenting or otherwise to the sharing of metric data with the HSE can be accessed at any time via app settings. During the initial screens of the app after app installation, a user is presented with a screen that is dedicated to asking consent for the recording and sharing of metric data. | The app settings metrics screen supports the turning on and off of the metric recording and sharing at any time. | The processing of metrics is optional and is not conditional on the functioning of the COVID Tracker App. Furthermore, there is no dependency on or conditionality relating to the processing of this data beyond the specific purpose for its processing – support the understanding of the use and efficacy of the app for the purpose of improving it. Metrics cannot be reasonably used to identify a person and as such the controllers have no means, nor does it seek them, to identify whether a specific individual, and as such removal is not possible. | Diagnosis keys cannot be reasonably used to identify a person and as such the controllers have no means, nor does it seek them, to identify whether a specific person has or has not uploaded diagnosis keys. |
Israel
HaMagen
How does it work?

1. Download the app
   The HaMagen app is free to download from the App Store and Google Play. After installation and initial set up, you can close the app.

2. Receive notifications
   The app will send you relevant updates. If you have crossed paths with a COVID-19 patient, it will also show you the exact time and location, and you will be able to review, and confirm or reject the notification.

3. In case of a match
   If you confirm, you will be referred to the Ministry of Health website for information on what to do next, and you will be able to report the exposure to the Ministry.

4. If there’s no match
   If the message in the notification is incorrect, you can reject it and carry on as normal.

2. Relevant notifications

The app will send you relevant updates. If you have crossed paths with a COVID-19 patient, it will also show you the exact time and location, and you will be able to review, and confirm or reject the notification.

3. In case of a match

If you confirm, you will be referred to the Ministry of Health website for information on what to do next, and you will be able to report the exposure to the Ministry.

4. If there’s no match

If the message in the notification is incorrect, you can reject it and carry on as normal.

Israel - HaMagen (Warnings sent to user to reject or accept)
Italy
Immuni
Let's start afresh together
Living a normal life once again is possible

Protect yourself and help slow down the epidemic

Find out if you are at risk of having contracted the virus

Service active
Open Immuni periodically to check its status.

Information
What you can do to protect yourself
Find out more

Risky exposure
Wash your hands frequently with soap and water.
Assess if you are exhibiting symptoms, even mild ones.
Cough and sneeze directly into a tissue or into the crook of your elbow.

Without sacrificing your privacy

Your privacy is safe

Immuini does not collect your name, date of birth, address, telephone number, or email address.
Immuini cannot determine your identity or that of the people you come into contact with.
Immuini does not collect any geolocation data, including GPS data.
The data saved on your smartphone and the connections to the server are encrypted.

Screenshots from 6/28/20: iOS app version 1.2.0 (last update one week ago from 6/28/20.)
1. Informazioni generali

I presenti termini di utilizzo ("Termini di Uso") si riferiscono all'app Immuni ("App") fornita da Istituto Superiore di Sanità e utilizzata dai servizi sanitari dell'Ue in conformità con il regolamento (UE) 2021/944 ("Privacy Notice").

I dati raccolti nel corso dell'utilizzo dell'App saranno trattati in conformità con il Regolamento (UE) 2016/679 ("GDPR") e con il Regolamento (UE) 2018/1191 ("General Data Protection Regulation - GDPR").

2. Informazioni su Privacy

La gestione dei dati personali avviene in conformità con il regolamento (UE) 2016/679 ("GDPR"). Tutti i dati raccolti saranno processati in conformità con il Regolamento (UE) 2018/1191 ("General Data Protection Regulation - GDPR").

La privacy del singolo utente è assicurata in conformità con il regolamento (UE) 2016/679 ("GDPR"). Tutti i dati raccolti saranno processati in conformità con il Regolamento (UE) 2018/1191 ("General Data Protection Regulation - GDPR").

3. Informazioni sulla sicurezza

La sicurezza dei dati è assicurata in conformità con il regolamento (UE) 2016/679 ("GDPR"). Tutti i dati raccolti saranno processati in conformità con il Regolamento (UE) 2018/1191 ("General Data Protection Regulation - GDPR").

4. Informazioni sulle istruzioni

Le istruzioni per l'utilizzo dell'app Immuni ("App") sono fornite in conformità con il regolamento (UE) 2016/679 ("GDPR"). Tutti i dati raccolti saranno processati in conformità con il Regolamento (UE) 2018/1191 ("General Data Protection Regulation - GDPR").
Select 'Allow' in the pop-up that appears below.

**Protect your device**
Immuni is strictly for personal use. If you haven't done so already, set up a lock code on your smartphone to prevent others from accessing the app's features and any messages the app might send you.

**Watch out for scam messages**
Immuni will only ever communicate with you via the app and the corresponding notifications. Be wary of any text, phone call, email, or other kind of alert that appears to be from Immuni, especially if it asks you for personal information.

Setup complete
How to check that Immuni is working

If you see 'Service active', Immuni is already working properly. You don’t need to do anything else: the app will continue working, even when you close it.

If there are any problems, you will see 'Service not active'. Immuni will provide straightforward instructions to get the app working properly again.

If you come into contact with someone who later tests positive for the virus, Immuni will send you a notification to warn you of the risk of infection. When you open the app, you will receive clear and comprehensive guidance on what to do.

How to disable the service

To protect your health and the health of your loved ones, only deactivate the service if necessary and reactivate it as soon as you can.

In certain cases, it may make sense to temporarily disable the app, such as while at work if you are a healthcare professional in contact with COVID-19 patients.

If you disable exposure notifications, subsequent contacts with other users will not be logged.

To disable exposure notifications:

1. Open Settings using the button below
2. Disable exposure notifications

Find out more

Report a positive result

This feature requires assistance from the healthcare operator, who will inform you by phone of the positive result of the swab test.

Find out more

Give the healthcare operator the one-time code:

RR2 91XR 5LI

Wait for the healthcare operator to confirm

Continue to verify code authorisation

Continue
Malaysia
MyTrace
MYTRACE: A PREVENTIVE COUNTER MEASURE AND CONTACT TRACING APPLICATION FOR COVID-19

A preventive counter measure and contact tracing application for Covid-19.

MyTrace does not track geolocation details. This means that users' private data is not stored nor recorded in the application.

Video: https://www.mosti.gov.my/web/en/mytrace/#1588521436472-b87ce493-175b
MANUAL
English Version

PREPARED BY:
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI),
National Security Council (NSC), Ministry of Health (MOH),
Malaysian Administrative Modernisation and Management
Planning Unit (MAMPU), Malaysian Institute of Microelectronic
Systems (MIMOS) and Malaysian Global Innovation and
Creativity Centre (MaGIC); with the International Islamic
University Malaysia (IIUM) and Google.

MyTrace: Android - Registration

Splash screen

Click "Daftar/Register"

Select Language

Register phone number

Please enter your Mobile Phone Number for us to contact.

+60

We will send your 6-digit One-Time PIN (OTP Code) through SMS.

Setting up for family members, enter their number instead of yours.
MyTrace: Android - Registration

1. Check SMS for OTP
2. Fill in OTP and click "Submit"
3. Click "Close"
MyTrace: Android - Turn On Bluetooth

1. The Bluetooth and location is off at home page.
2. Click "ALLOW ALL THE TIME".
3. Turn on "Bluetooth" & "Location".

*Note: Ensure your location information is NOT restricted in this app.*
MyTrace : Android - Download & Change Language

Click the download button to download Gerak Malaysia and MySejahtera

Click "Globe" icon to change language
MyTrace : Android - Upload Contact Data

- Upload Contacts Data
  - Only click Verify button when medical officer call you with the following verification code.

- Enter Verification PIN
  - Medical officer will provide verification PIN to allow for contacts data submission.

- Click button “Verify” if the verification code matched

- Enter PIN number and click “Submit”

- Click “OK”
MyTrace: Android - Technical Assistance

1. Fill in the form and click "Submit"
2. Click button "i" for FAQ

Click button "x" to close FAQ

1. Click "Help" tab for technical assistance
2. State the problem briefly to ease the process of solving the problem
How it works : MyTrace on iOS
MyTrace: iOS - Registration

Splash screen

Click "OK"

Click Daftar/Register

Choose Language
MyTrace: iOS - Registration

Register mobile phone number

Check OTP in message

Fill in OTP and click Submit
MyTrace: iOS - Turn On Bluetooth & Power Saver Mode

1. Turn on "Bluetooth"
2. Click "Energy Saving Mode"

Click "I understand"

The bluetooth is off at homepage
MyTrace: iOS - Download & Change Language

Click the download button to download Gerak Malaysia and MySejahtera.

Click "Globe" icon to change language.
MyTrace: iOS - Upload Contact Data

Upload Contacts Data
Only click Verify button when medical officer call you with the following verification code.

3 2 2 X J Z

Enter Verification PIN
Medical officer will provide verification PIN to allow for contacts data submission.

5 2 0 7 6 4

Alert
Log submitted successfully. Thank you for your cooperation.

OK

Do not continue when the verification code given does not match with yours.

Click button "Verify" if the verification code matched
Enter PIN number and click "Submit"

Click "OK"
MyTrace: iOS - Technical Assistance

1. Click "Help" tab for technical assistance
2. State the problem briefly to ease the process of solving the problem

1. Fill in the form and click "Submit"
2. Click button "i" for FAQ

Click button "x" to close FAQ
iOS app accessed 07/02/20
No version on iOS. Google Play version 1.0.30.
CovidRadar.mx

¿Qué es CovidRadar?
Es la app móvil que funciona como radar por medio de Bluetooth detectando dispositivos móviles cercanos para analizar información de las personas que están infectadas y alertar a otros usuarios mediante sus dispositivos para evitar posibles contagios.

Es importante que acepte los términos y condiciones de uso

¿Qué tipo de transporte utilizas?
- Vehículo propio
- Metro
- Ecóvia
- Autobuses de transporte público
- Taxis o plataformas (Uber, Didi, ...)
- Otro tipo de transporte

Acepto

Siguiente
Netherlands
PrivateTracer
Anonieme Contact Tracing
COVID-19

https://www.privatetracer.org/
https://www.privatetracer.org/
Contact met geïnfecteerde personen

gedetecteerd

Begin met tracen om je status te vernieuwen

Welke gegevens worden gedeeld?

Blijf nog
14 dagen thuis
Contact with infected individuals

not detected

Start tracing to determine status

What data is shared?

Turn On

Stay at home
Turn on tracing to go out

△ I may be infected...

Turn Off

Please keep this app open

What data is shared?

Contact with infected individual(s)
detected

Last checked: 1 hour ago

What data is shared?

Stay at home
10 more days

If you have symptoms, contact a doctor

△ I may be infected...

△ I may be infected...

https://gitlab.com/PrivateTracer/ux-design

252
Not detected

Last updated: 1 hour ago.

Which data is shared?

Contact registration is off

This app will not function until you switch contact registration back on.

not detected

Last updated: 1 hour ago.

Which data is shared?

Contact registration is on.

If you come into contact with someone who turns out to be infected with COVID-19, this app will send you a notification.

Are you sure you want to turn off contact registration? If you disable contact registration, this app can no longer detect when you are eligible with a COVID-19 infected person. Strive to leave this as much as possible.

https://private-tracer-v0-5-9.now.sh/
The last of the app is 6 automatically controlled or there are risk-free interactions.

Change all data.

Hiermee is a permanent owner of all data in this application.

https://private-tracer-v0-5-9.now.sh/

Battery optimization

The last of the app is 6 automatically controlled or there are risk-free interactions.

Change all data.

Hiermee is a permanent owner of all data in this application.
North Dakota - USA
Care 19
North Dakota Care19
Places You’ve Visited

Congratulations! Your phone is correctly configured to collect location data.

We haven’t detected any visited places yet. Our goal is to collect visits where you stop for at least 10 minutes. This is in line with CDC guidelines.

This version of the app will only detect places you visit with a vehicle. We will not detect walking or bike rides. We plan to add that feature in the future.

Places

Protect

The buttons on this screen will not be enabled until you are confirmed positive for COVID-19.

Once confirmed positive, the Department of Health will contact you and enable the buttons based on applicability and feature availability.

I would like to share my location data with state officials to help with contact tracing.

SHARE LOCATIONS

I would like to notify others who may have been near me. No personal data will be shared.

NOTIFY OTHERS

Information

Coronavirus Cases
Updated around 11:00am daily

Risk Assessment
Take the official ND risk assessment

ND-28468700-7

If you test positive for COVID-19, the Department of Health may ask you to share this code. This code is used to enable the buttons on the Protect screen.

You maintain ownership of your data and may delete it if you choose. This action is not reversible.
Welcome to Care19!

Care19 is a digital diary that helps you remember where you have been over the last 14 days.

Should you test positive for COVID-19, this app can help the contact tracing process be more effective. It’s important to recall everywhere you have been so that contact tracers can contact people that may have been nearby.

You can easily add locations that you have visited. If you enable location services, we can also auto-detect places you visit in some cases. We should detect about half the places you visit automatically, making it easier to maintain the visit list.

Please select your geography

- Covid-19 Contact Tracing State of North Dakota
- Covid-19 Contact Tracing State of South Dakota
- Covid-19 Contact Tracing State of Wyoming
- Contact Tracing Memory Aide Other US States
THANK YOU for taking an active role in slowing the spread of coronavirus and making a difference in the health of your loved ones and your community. Care19 uses state-of-the-art GPS location data to help you trace the places you have visited. If you test positive for COVID-19, with your permission, this anonymous and confidential data will be shared with the North Dakota Department of Health to more efficiently identify others with whom you were in contact and help reduce the spread of COVID-19.

You will not be asked to provide any personally identifiable information within the app. Location data will only be shared with the Department of Health with your consent upon testing positive for COVID-19.

Only people who would seek health care at a North Dakota medical facility should use this app.

This includes residents of North Dakota or bordering states, and visitors to North Dakota.

You consent to allow Care19 to build a history of your locations received through the Location Services on your mobile device by clicking the "I Agree" button below.

Care19 does not want to include your home in the visited places list. Please let us know if you are home right now, so we can exclude this location from your visited places list.

If you wish to skip this for privacy reasons, simply push the "Not at home" button.
Home Detection

Care19 does not want to include your home in the visited places list. Please let us know if you are home right now, so we can exclude this location from your visited places list.

If you wish to skip this for privacy reasons, simply push the "Not at home" button.

Visited Places

Your location settings don't allow us to track recently visited places. The application needs access to your location even when the app is not running to be effective.

Care19 needs your location to effectively track the places you visit. You can go to your phone's system settings and manually enable "ALWAYS" location tracking.

Your current mode

NO LOCATION

Protect

The button on this screen will not be enabled until you are confirmed positive for COVID-19.

Once confirmed positive, the Department of Health will contact you and enable the button. You can then decide if you wish to share your data with the Department of Health.

I would like to share my location data with state officials to help with contact tracing.

Share Locations

United States

Fix It!
North Macedonia
Stop Korona
Следи ја изложеноста на Коронавирусот

Помогни им на здравствените работници

Заштити се од ширењето на Ковид-19

Придонesi за заедницата

North Macedonia
Stop Korona
https://apps.apple.com/mk/app/stopkorona/id1506641869
HOW IS StopKorona ACTIVATED!?

To activate the application, follow these simple steps:

1. Sign up by entering your mobile number.

2. Enter the code you will receive via SMS.

3. Turn on Bluetooth whenever you're on the go.

Note: We use cookies to enable the functionality of the website, but we do not share your information. By continuing to visit, you are accepting the use of cookies.

https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/
Sharing data in case you are infected

The application data is shared only at the request of the Ministry of Health. If the user of the application is positive on the COVID-19 test:

- The Ministry of Health will send an SMS with a CODE, in order for the infected person to send the data from the application on a voluntary basis.
- In the StopKorona application by selecting FIRST DATA, enter the CODE and confirm.
- The officials from the central system will receive the complete list of potentially infected, after which they will take the next steps, in accordance with the procedure, and will have the opportunity to inform them by notification through the system.

https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/
Phone data near you is stored on your phone. In case the user of the application becomes infected with COVID-19, he independently decides whether to give the Ministry of Health access to his data stored in the mobile phone that does not contain mobile numbers but only codes, which can be decrypted exclusively by the Ministry of Health. The sharing of data collected from the use of this application with the Ministry of Health is in accordance with Article 13 paragraph (2) item 9 of the Law on Personal Data Protection.

https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/
How does the power saving mode work on iOS devices?

You can activate the power saving mode on your iOS device if you turn your phone down or put it upside down in your pocket. This way StopKorona! it can scan your surroundings, saving your battery.

https://stop.koronavirus.gov.mk/
Information on possible virus exposure

If someone close to you has COVID-19 and shares the data with the Department of Health, you will be notified to take timely measures for self-isolation, testing, and treatment.

Protect your health and that of your loved ones

By activating the application, you will get information about potentially endangering your health faster, and thus you will take isolation measures, thus protecting your family.
Norway
Smittestop
Hjelp oss bekjempe koronaviruset med mobiltelefonen

Vi trenger deg!

Vi tar hensyn til ditt personvern

og varsler deg tilfelle du har værtsatt smittefaste

Poland
ProteGO
Wszystko w TWOICH rękach. Ta wersja aplikacji korzysta z narzędzi systemów iOS/Android do powiadomienia o możliwym kontaktie z koronawirusem.

Poziom, by aplikacja anonimowo rejestrowała spotkania z innymi użytkownikami. Dzięki temu, gdy użytkownik, któregoś z nich zachoruje, otrzymasz odpowiednie powiadomienie. Zadaj o swoje i swoich bliskich zdrowie.

Wiecej informacji

APPLE

PROTEGO SAFE

Informacja o ostrzegawczych napotkanych urządzeniach nie zawierają żadnych danych o ich właścicielach, są anonimowe i zakończone, a do tego przechowywane tylko w telefonie, przez dwa tygodnie. Później są usunięte.

Do czego przydaje się historia takich spotkań? W momencie, kiedy ktoś z użytkowników, z którego telefonem spotkałeś się na żywo, zachoruje – dostajesz odpowiedniej informacji. Niekiedy informasię o zachorowaniu przesłanej na Twoj telefon, czyli o jakimś zachorowaniu, to jest to znikomy wpływ na Twoje zdrowie.

Przydatność użytkowników aplikacji jest naszym priorytetem. ProteGO Safe zbudowane jest zgodnie z m.in. wytycznymi Komisji Europejskiej.

enable COVID-19 exposure logging notifications

Moduł monitorowania ryzyka

Do czego przydaje się historia takich spotkań? W momencie, kiedy ktoś z użytkowników, z którego telefonem spotkałeś się na żywo, zachoruje – dostajesz odpowiedniej informacji. Niekiedy informasię o zachorowaniu przesłanej na Twoj telefon, czyli o jakimś zachorowaniu, to jest to znikomy wpływ na Twoje zdrowie.

Przydatność użytkowników aplikacji jest naszym priorytetem. ProteGO Safe zbudowane jest zgodnie z m.in. wytycznymi Komisji Europejskiej.
Włącz powiadomienia

Do prawidłowego działania aplikacji potrzebna jest Twoja zgoda na wyświetlanie powiadomień. kliknij poniżej i pozwól ProteGO Safe wspierać ochronę zdrowia każdego z nas.

DALEJ

Nie powiadamiaj mnie o zagrożeniach

"ProteGO Safe" Would like to Send you notifications. Notifications may include alerts, sound and icon badges. These can be configured in Settings.

Don't Allow    Allow

Nie powiadamiaj mnie o zagrożeniach

Powiadomienia o narażeniu na kontakt z COVID-19

Nowość w aplikacji: powiadomienia o możliwym kontakcie z koronawirusem.

DALEJ

Włącz się do wspólnej walki przeciwko koronawirusowi

Dbaj o siebie! Regularnie sprawdzaj, czy jesteś w grupie ryzyka

DALEJ

Uzupełniaj Dziennik Zdrowia

DALEJ
Włącz się do wspólnej walki przeciwko koronawirusowi

**Pomóż sobie i innym. Zaczynamy!**
Dobrze, że zdecydowałeś/ścia się zainstalować aplikację ProteGO Safe.

Dzięki niej dowiesz się, czy istnieje ryzyko, że przebywałeś/ścia w pobliżu osób chorych na COVID-19.

- Oświadczam, że zapoznałem/ścia z Regulaminem ProteGO Safe oraz Polityką Prywatności i akceptuję ich postanowienia.

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- Oświadczam, że zapoznałem/ścia z Regulaminem ProteGO Safe oraz Polityką Prywatności i akceptuję ich postanowienia.

Chcesz dowiedzieć się więcej?
Kliknij poniżej i wykonaj test oceny ryzyka.

- Wypełnij test oceny ryzyka lub zacznij na informacje o kontaktach z zakażonymi.

**Wykonaj test oceny ryzyka**

**Pomną test oceny ryzyka**

**Wykonaj test oceny ryzyka**
Porady
Zostań w domu.
Jedz przychylniej! Użyj zagarówki – skontaktuj się z sanepidem i podaj obwodową 14-dniową karantynę.
Reguluj regularnie uzupełnij jedzą z MÓJ DZIENNIK ZDROWIA: zapisaj w aplikacji objawy i temperaturę ciała.

Pytania i odpowiedzi
Stanowić Państwo Niecodzieni - sytuacja związana z epidemią w naszym w domu nam wszystkim wejścia - jak funkcjonuje i transmisja publiczną, do kiedy są kontrole na granicy, komu przekazuje dodatkową zasiek opiekuńczy na dziecko. Odpowiedzi na te inne pytania zbieramy w jednym miejscu, a zakładka jest na bieżąco aktualizowana. Pytania są podzielone tematycznie, a interesujące nas sprawy można zlokalizować, korzystając z wyszukiwarki.

Szukaj wśród pytań

IV ETAP ZNOSZENIA OGRANICZEŃ
1. Dlaczego utrzymywał stan epidemii, skoro znamy ograniczenia?
2. Czy znamy obowiązująca zasady ust i nosa ma charakter całkowity?
3. Ile osób może przebywać w kinie lub teatrze?
4. Czy w teatrze, kinie lub w operze muszę mieć maszkę?
5. Uprawiam jogging. Czy podczas biegu muszę mieć maskę?

Czym jest koronawirus?
Jaką chorobę wywołuje koronawirus?
Na czym polega leczenie?
Czy są jakieś specjalnie leki zapobiegające powikłaniom koronawirusowi lub lecące go?

Test oceny ryzyka zakażenia koronawirusem
Jedną z głównych funkcji tej aplikacji jest test oceny ryzyka zakażenia koronawirusem. Przygotowaliśmy go zgodnie z wytycznymi Światowej Organizacji Zdrowia (WHO).

Brakuje informacji do analizy Twojego ryzyka zakażenia koronawirusem.
Wypełnij test oceny ryzyka lub zaczepek na informacje o kontaktach z zakażonymi.

Wykonaj TEST oceny ryzyka

Ważne
Test:
- nie jest diagnostyką. Te mogą postawić wyłącznie lekarz i test medyczny na obecność wirusa.
- pomaga monitorować swój stan zdrowia.
- wypełnić go zgodnie z prawdą - robisz to dla własnego bezpieczeństwa.

Dalej
Ile masz lat?
- mniej niż 65
- 65 lub więcej
- nie chcę podać

Dlaczego warto podać tę informację?
Wiek jest ważnym czynnikiem w kalkulacji ryzyka zakażenia. Osoby starsze oraz te o obniżonej odporności są szczególnie narażone na dotknięcie koronawirusa.

Zaznacz odpowiedzi, które Cię dotyczą:
- Zdiagnozowana przewlekła choroba płuc
- Zdiagnozowana niewydolność serca
- Trwająca choroba nowotworowa
- Choroby lub leki obniżające odporność
- Zdiagnozowana przewlekła choroba wątroby
- Zdiagnozowana niewydolność nerek
- Długoterminowy pobyt w domu opieki
- Cukrzyca
- Otyłość
- Żadne z powyższych

DALEJ

Czy masz któryś z poniższych objawów? Wybierz jedynie nowe objawy, niezwiązane z Twoimi przewlekłymi chorobami.
- Gorączka
- Kăsăr
- Duszność
- Żadne z powyższych

DALEJ

Czy masz któregoś z poniższych objawów?
- Oślabienie
- Ból mięśni
- Dreszcze
- Ból głowy
- Biegunka
- Młości
- Ból gardła
- Upopożdżony smak lub węch
- Żadne z powyższych

DALEJ

Czy w ciągu ostatnich 14 dni miałeś/-aś bliski kontakt z osobą z podejrzeniem zakażenia koronawirusem?
- Mieszkam lub opiekowalem/-am się osobą z podejrzeniem zakażenia koronawirusem
- Przebywałem/-am w tym samym pomieszczeniu (biuro, klasa, sikownia) lub podróżowałem/-am w bliskiej odległości (pomiędzy 1 metrem) z osobą z podejrzeniem zakażenia koronawirusem
- Miałem/-am osobisty kontakt przez dłużej niż 15 minut z osobą podejrzaną o zakażenie koronawirusem
- Inny rodzaj kontaktu
- Żadne z powyższych

DALEJ
Gratulacje!
Dziękujemy za wypełnienie Testu Oceny Ryzyka.
Na podstawie Twoich odpowiedzi, nasz system sprawdzi teraz do jakiej grupy Cie zaszkolić.

To bardzo ważne, abyś wypełnił/a testy regularnie. Będziemy Ci o tym przypominać.

Użytkowniku,
przeanalizowaliśmy Twoje odpowiedzi. Wynik testu z **28-06-2020** kwalifikuje Cię do grupy: **Niskie ryzyko infekcji.**

**Wykonaj TEST oceny ryzyka**
Qatar
Ehteraz
iOS App download 6/28/20. Version 5.1
These Terms and Conditions, detailed hereinafter, govern your use of the EHTERAZ Application. By accessing and using the Application you are deemed to have understood and agreed to the terms.

The Application is owned and operated by the State of Qatar and the relevant Government entities.

The Ministry reserves the right to vary, amend or modify or impose new conditions in these Terms and Conditions at any time without any notification to you. Any such variations, amendments or modifications will be reflected by an update on the Application. You are therefore responsible for checking these Terms and Conditions periodically to be aware of any such changes. Your continued access of this service following the posting of any changes to these Terms and Conditions shall constitute your acceptance and agreement of the same.
Singapore
Trace Together
Add screenshots directly from phone
1. Scan QR code or go to tracetogether.gov.sg to download the app.

The app is now available in more languages.

2. Launch the app.

The first few pages explain the benefits of using the app.

3. Register using your mobile number.

Enter the One-Time Pin sent to you via SMS.

4. Select your profile and enter your details.

Your unique ID helps MOH reach the right person when they need to contact you.

5. Enable Bluetooth and other app permissions.

All app Bluetooth data after 25 days will be automatically deleted.

6. Set up completed!

Keep Bluetooth on, and keep your app open in the background until the end of the outbreak.

https://support.tracetogether.gov.sg/hc/en-sg/articles/360043735573-How-do-I-set-up-TraceTogether-
If the main screen on your app says “Your app is active’, it means your app has been set up successfully.

https://support.tracetogether.gov.sg/hc/en-sg/articles/360043735593-How-do-I-know-that-my-app-is-working-

The SafeEntry barcode feature facilitates quick and secure check-ins and check-outs at all SafeEntry locations.

Users may click on the ‘SafeEntry check-in’ button in the home screen for a digital identification barcode, unique to you, to appear. Scan the barcode at SafeEntry locations that accept scanning of barcodes such as on your NRIC, FIN and other forms of identifications cards.

Kindly note that sometimes the barcode cannot be scanned as older scanners that use lasers do not work well with reflective surfaces like mobile phone screens.

Please keep the app running with full app permissions until the end of the outbreak, so we can protect you and your loved ones.

You can disable TraceTogether’s functionality any time by turning Bluetooth off or by pausing the app from the option in your home screen (currently only for Android). We will not be able to help notify you quickly of possible exposure to COVID-19 during this period when your app isn’t working. 😢

We will only use TraceTogether for contact tracing during the COVID-19 outbreak. Once contact tracing is no longer needed, you will be prompted to disable TraceTogether’s functionality.
Would keeping TraceTogether running all the time drain my battery quickly?

The battery consumption on tested phones is only marginally greater with the app running, particularly on phones that already have Bluetooth enabled.

https://support.tracetogether.gov.sg/hc/en-sg/articles/360045311673-Would-keeping-TraceTogether-running-all-the-time-drain-my-battery-quickly-
Participate in community-driven contact tracing

A safe new normal starts with all of us 💪

Get notified quickly if you’ve been exposed to COVID-19

To help you note direct exposure to COVID-19, your phone needs these permissions

1. Bluetooth
2. Let app run in background

[Link to the app store for TraceTogether](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=sg.gov.tech.bluetrace)
What is TraceTogether and how does it work?

TraceTogether is a contact-tracing smartphone app that enables the Ministry of Health (MOH) to quickly track people who have been exposed to confirmed coronavirus cases.

1. Users can download the app on the Apple App Store or the Google Play Store.
2. Users have to input their mobile phone number for MOH to be able to contact them quickly. The number is the only data collected by the Government through the app.
3. During the initial set-up, users have to give their explicit consent to be able to use the app.
4. Users will then have to enable push notifications and location permissions, and keep the Bluetooth function on their phones turned on.
5. This is because the app uses short-distance Bluetooth signals that are exchanged between phones to detect other TraceTogether users in close proximity.
6. Official contact tracers who call users will provide a code that users can match with a corresponding verification code on their app.
   - Once authenticated, users will be given a PIN number that allows submission of logs when entered.
   - Official contact tracers will not ask for personal financial details or transfer of money.

How can we help you?

Latest Updates

General

Using TraceTogether

Permissions and Privacy

How does your TraceTogether app work?

Upload Data

Use only if MOH contacts you

STEP 1

Verify that the contact tracer is from MOH

Make sure they give you a code that matches the one below.

Verification code: (obscured)

Next

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6n9ZsHSc4YA
Singapore - TraceTogether (contact tracers will notify you quickly)
Switzerland
SwissCovid
SwissCovid breaks chains of infection.

The goal

Staying one step ahead of the virus

- By using the SwissCovid app, we can all help to contain the spread of the new coronavirus.
- The app tells you if you might have been exposed to the coronavirus.

Protection of privacy

- Devices only exchange random IDs. The app does not gather location data or data on your identity.
- The random IDs are stored on your device for 14 days and then deleted.

How does the app work?

Recognising encounters using Bluetooth

- The app automatically recognises when two users have been in close proximity for a certain time.
- It uses Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) to do this. No GPS, mobile, Wi-Fi or other location data.

Tips on use

- Here you will find the Data Protection Statement and Conditions of Use

Data Protection Statement & Conditions of Use

Warning: This app does not protect you from COVID-19 infection.

The app is intended for proximity tracing and to warn users of potential exposure to someone infected by COVID-19. It is not a diagnostic tool...

SwissCovid

Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH)
Schwarzenburgstrasse 157
3097 Liebefeld, Switzerland

SwissCovid App Version 10.5
Release Date: 23.06.2020

Accept

Screenshots taken iOS app version 1.0.5 on June 28, 2020
SwissCovid App: Data Protection Statement & Conditions of Use

The Data Protection Statement explains what information is collected, why it is collected and how information is used. The Terms and Conditions of Use informs about the rules you agree to when using the SwissCovid App.

As of 24 June 2020
- SwissCovid App: Data Protection Statement
- SwissCovid App: Conditions of Use
- Technical Information and FAQs

Data Protection Statement of the Federal Office of Public Health FOPH in connection with the use of the "SwissCovid app"

Please read the following Data Protection Statement when using the SwissCovid App.

- Introduction
- 1. Controller

Good to know

Data protection
- Only random IDs are exchanged, not data about your location or your person.

Minor increase in battery usage
- The app operates using as little energy as possible. There is only a minor increase in battery usage.

Activating proximity tracing

COVID-19 Exposure Notifications must be activated to use the app.

Activate

Good to know

Data protection
- Only random IDs are exchanged, not data about your location or your person.

Minor increase in battery usage
- The app operates using as little energy as possible. There is only a minor increase in battery usage.

Report of potential infection

- The app notifies you if you may have been exposed to the coronavirus.
- By responding appropriately, you can break the chain of infection and protect other people.

Allow messages

In order to receive notifications from the app, you must enable messages.

Enable messages

Notified immediately
- In the event of a potential infection, you will receive a message on the lock screen.

Continue
This is how proximity tracing using the SwissCovid app works.

1. Find the SwissCovid app on the App Store or scan the QR code and install the SwissCovid app.

2. Persons A, B, C and D have installed the SwissCovid app on their smartphones.

3. Person A has contracted the coronavirus. Person A is in contact with persons B and C. Smartphones exchange checksums via Bluetooth. Person A is also in contact with person D, but at a distance of at least 1.5 metres. Their smartphones do not exchange any checksums.

4. Person A tests positive, receives the Covidcode from the Contact Management person authorised by the cantonal doctor and enters it in the app. Person A self-isolates.

5. Person A’s temporary keys are sent to the Federal Administration’s server.

6. The SwissCovid app makes regular queries. Persons B and C receive notification that they may potentially be infected. They are asked to contact the Coronavirus Infoline. The app query does not result in a message for person D.
Turkey

Hayat Eve Sığar
This application protects you and your surroundings from Coronavirus T.C. It was developed by the Ministry of Health.

Risk Areas
When you allow location services, the app will alert you when you approach risky areas, and you will be able to see areas on the map that you should not approach instantly.

https://apps.apple.com/tr/app/hayat-eve-s%C4%B1%C4%9Far/id1505756398?l=tr
Turkey
Hayat Eve Sığar
Hayat Eve Sığar

UAE
TraceCovid
Fight COVID-19 together with TraceCovid

TraceCovid helps protect your loved ones

TraceCovid detects users around you

tracecovid is active

2

TraceCovid contacts detected near you

You are helping to stop the spread of COVID-19

Keep the app open, in the background until the Government Authorities announce the end of the outbreak

Fight COVID-19 together with TraceCovid

TraceCovid helps protect your loved ones

TraceCovid detects users around you

TraceCovid is active

Thank you for fighting COVID-19 together.

Keep the app open in battery-saving mode when you are around others, for example in meetings, queuing, taking public transport, or going through crowded public spaces.

TraceCovid helps Government Authorities with contact tracing for the benefit of the whole community.

Okay

https://apps.apple.com.sg/app/tracecovid/id1505485835
Download, and setup, Trace covid
And ask your family and friends to do the same

Youtube video viewed 6/28/20:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Lex5j_wxK4
TraceCovid needs you to grant the following app permissions:

1. Bluetooth

2. Push Notifications

TraceCovid needs Bluetooth to work. Your battery usage may increase due to background processing.

Turn on your, Bluetooth
And that’s ’it!
You have now joined our community, to help fight Covid-19 together, through community-wide contact tracing.
Trace Covid helps the contact-tracing operation, to quickly
Contact those who had close contact with Covid-19 patient, regardless, of whether they know each other or not.
Trace covid utilizes Blue tooth signals, to determine whether any phones, with the application installed, are close to each other.
When 2 phones are nearby, they exchange an encrypted Secure Tracing Identifier, which is then stored on their respective phones.
the relevant authorities will contact you to access the Trace covid data,
which includes a list of Secure Tracing Identifiers that the phone has been in close proximity to.
And that is it!
No personal data is collected.
United Kingdom
NHS COVID-19 App
This app is no longer in use

The Isle of Wight trial is now complete and the app is no longer operational. Please uninstall the app. Thank you for participating in the trial and playing a vital role in supporting the NHS.

I feel unwell

How to uninstall the app

About the app

Users will be asked to enter the first part of their postcode but not their name or other personal details.
The NHS COVID-19 app

Utah - USA
Healthy Together
Utah
Healthy Together Beta
Utah
Healthy Together Beta
iOS app version 1.2.1 on 6/28/20
A Message From Governor Herbert

The state of Utah is working in collaboration with Healthy Together to stop the spread of COVID-19. By taking urgent action, we can all work together to protect the lives of our family members, friends, health workers, and the broader community.

In conjunction with other efforts spearheaded by the Governor's Office, our partnership with Healthy Together will increase the ability of health workers and state officials to track, trace, and contain COVID-19. Healthy Together's mobile application and analysis technology will support Utah's contact tracing plan by giving state health workers a faster and more accurate picture of where and how the virus is spreading in our community.

Protecting the use of citizen data is of utmost concern to the state of Utah and Healthy Together. To ensure the privacy and security of the data of our citizens, we have agreed contractually that data use will follow these principles and limitations:

1. Use of the app is strictly opt-in and voluntary.
2. Users own their data and can delete their data at any time.
3. Only data that is required to combat COVID-19 will be shared with public health officials.
4. Location and Bluetooth data will automatically be deleted every 30 days.
5. Symptom data will be automatically de-identified after 30 days.
6. Healthy Together will comply with state requirements for data security and encryption.

By participating in Healthy Together, you are playing an active and critical role in protecting the people close to you, and everyone in our community. Together, we can collectively fight the threat of COVID-19.
Daily Checkup

Who are you taking this for?

- Me
- Someone Else

Check Your Symptoms
Help slow the spread of COVID-19 and find those at risk.
1. Check your symptoms
2. Find out if you need to be tested
3. Keep track of your symptoms every day

Check Your Symptoms

Invite Others to Help

Next Question

Notifications

- Update Location to “Always”
  Turn on for better tracing
- Turn on Bluetooth
  Improves close proximity detection
- Turn on Contact Syncing
  Choose who to share with
- Turn on Push Notifications
  Get notified if you are at risk

Utah
Healthy Together Beta
iOS app version 1.2.1 on 6/28/20