\HeadingLevelA{Conclusion}
\label{sec:conclusion}

This manuscript is the first of a two-part review of secure processor systems that aims to enable remote computation with guarantees of privacy and integrity.
\S~\ref{sec:architecture_background} introduced computer architecture concepts relevant to the work's discussion of trusted remote computation, and enclaves in particular.
An understanding of the intended and unintended properties of virtual memory, cache hierarchies, fine-grained multithreading, and data structures managed by Operating System is instrumental to a rigorous discussion of the security properties of a trusted system.
\S~\ref{sec:security_background} discussed practical cryptographic primitives and protocols, as well as attack vectors exposed by modern computer systems. It provided concrete context against the threat models employed by secure processor systems can be evaluated.
\S~\ref{sec:sgx_related} is a brief survey of a large body of secure processor systems, including commentary on their threat models, design decisions, and success against real-world adversaries.
Finally, \S~\ref{sec:sgx_model} presented a practical approach to and programming model for a secure enclave with a small trusted computing base.

Part II of this work presents a deep dive into the design decisions and resulting quirks of SGX and an analysis of the system's security properties and threat model.
Given this discussion, the work will present MIT's Sanctum, an enclave-capable secure system with a stronger security argument under a software threat model than
SGX.

While this work does not seek to prescribe any specific solution to the security needs of a given application, we invite the reader to carefully examine the software and hardware included in the trusted computing base of the services they rely on.
Security implies some overhead, and the tradeoff between cost, performance, design effort, and security must be carefully considered in any application.
A claim of security of a given system is meaningless without a corresponding threat model and rigorous analysis of the system's trusted computing base.
With a principled, transparent, and well-scrutinized approach to system design, practical guarantees of privacy and integrity for remote computation are well within reach.
