

Metior

A Comprehensive Model To Evaluate Obfuscating Side-Channel Defense Schemes

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Side-Channel Overview




Victim's Secret



Victim's Modulation Pattern



Attacker's Modulation Pattern



Attacker's Reconstructed Secret




Attacker's Observation
(e.g. # of Misses)

Side-Channel Defenses

Partitioning Defense Schemes


e.g. Cache Partitioning



✓ *Completely Block Leakage*
✗ *Poor Performance*


Obfuscating Defense Schemes

e.g. Randomized Caches, Traffic Shaping, Noise Injection




🌀 ***Unclear Leakage***
✓ *Reasonable Performance*

Analysis Example








Analysis Example



Does adding non-determinism increase security? If so, *by how much?*

What About the Attacker?


Victim Modulation Patterns



Attacker Modulation Patterns

The attacker's strategy is critical in understanding leakage

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


Prior Work: Customized modeling solutions for specific defenses and victims

Metior's Goal: A unified solution for varying channels, victims, and attackers

Metior's Unified Representation


Obfuscated side-channels can be represented as *random variables* and the relationships between them!




Metior's Case Studies





Obfuscation Schemes



Victim Applications



Attack Strategies



Case Study – Randomly Mapped Caches


Using Metior, we can explore the leakage of state-of-the-art randomized caches.

In doing so, we are able to:

Better understand the
root causes of leakage

Demonstrate the
importance of studying
real victims

Case Study – Types of Attacks



We study two attacks

① Cache Occupancy

Random Addresses \rightarrow Prime + Probe

Capacity
Misses

② Probabilistic

Prime + Probe (PPP)

Calibration \rightarrow Eviction Set \rightarrow Prime + Probe

Targeted
Set Conflicts

Leakage Expectation: PPP $>$ Cache Occupancy


Case Study – Results

RSA Encryption Victim

Secret 0 → 10 Cache Accesses

Secret 1 → 26 Cache Accesses

Probabilistic P+P ≈ Cache Occupancy!




Takeaway #1

Metior helps in understanding the root cause of obfuscating scheme leakage

Takeaway #2

Mitigations should broadly consider different dimensions of victim modulation patterns

Metior's Key Contributions



- ① A unified model for representing and evaluating obfuscating defense schemes
- ② Multiple case studies revealing unintuitive insights into state-of-the-art victims, attacks, and defenses

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