

## Computational vs. Statistical Tradeoffs

when are there fundamental gaps btwn

① best estimator and

② best estimator that can be computed  
in polynomial time?

Planted Clique [Jerrum]; [Kucera]

First consider an Erdos-Renyi random graph

$$G(n, \frac{1}{2})$$

edges included independently  
w/ this probability

How large is the largest clique?

$$\mathbb{E}[\# k\text{-cliques}] = \binom{n}{k} 2^{-\binom{k}{2}}$$

$$\leq n^k 2^{-\binom{k}{2}} = 2^{k(\log n - \frac{k-1}{2})}$$

Hence if  $k = (2+\delta)\log n$  then

$$\mathbb{E}[\# k\text{-cliques}] \approx 2^{-\delta \log^2 n} = n^{-\delta \log n}$$

Fact 1: whp  $w(G) = (2 \pm o(1)) \log n$

↑  
largest clique

If we plant a large clique in  $G(n, \frac{1}{2})$  can we find it?

Fact 2: There is an  $n^{O(\log n)}$  time algorithm to solve planted clique whenever  $k \geq (2+\delta) \log n$ . Conversely if  $k \leq (2-\delta) \log n$ , it's impossible.

Proof [sketch] Brute-force search for a  $(2+\delta) \log n$  sized clique and find all common neighbors

otherwise, there are too many cliques.  $\square$

What about polynomial time algorithms?

Theorem [Alon, Krivelevich, Sudakov] There is a polynomial time algorithm that succeeds w.h.p if  $k \geq C\sqrt{n}$

Warm-up w/ weaker bound: A node  $u$  has degree

$$\deg(u) = \begin{cases} k-1 + \text{Bin}(n-k, \frac{1}{2}) & \text{if } u \text{ in planted clique} \\ \text{Bin}(n-1, \frac{1}{2}) & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

From Chernoff bounds, we have

① If  $u \notin$  planted clique, w.h.p

$$\deg(u) < \frac{n}{2} \Rightarrow \frac{C}{4}\sqrt{n \log n}$$

② else w.h.p  $\deg(u) > \frac{n-k}{2} - \frac{C}{4}\sqrt{n \log n} + k-1$

thus if  $k \geq C\sqrt{n} \log n$  then whp

highest degree nodes  $\equiv$  planted clique

Let's get tighter bounds via random matrix theory

Recall if  $M$  is  $n \times n$  and

$$M_{ij} = \begin{cases} \text{random } \pm 1 & \text{if } i < j \\ 0 & \text{if } i = j \\ M_{ji} & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

then whp  $\|M\| \leq (2 + o(1))\sqrt{n}$

Now, given  $G$ , let's construct

$$A_{ij} = \begin{cases} +1 & \text{if } i = j \\ +1 & \text{if } i \neq j \text{ and } (i, j) \in E \\ -1 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

### Spectral Algorithm

- Construct  $A$  and let  $x$  be its top eigenvector
- Let  $T = \text{top } k \text{ coordinates of } x \text{ in absolute value}$  and set

$$H = \{u \mid u \text{ has at least } \frac{4}{5}k \text{ neighbors in } T\}$$

Main idea is to decompose

$$A = \begin{matrix} k & n-k \\ nk & \end{matrix} \begin{bmatrix} J & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} + \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} 0 & \pm 1s \\ \pm 1s & \mp 1s \end{bmatrix}}_{E}$$

$S$       all ones

From R.M.T. (need bounds for asymmetric matrices)  
we have  $\|E\| \leq C\sqrt{n}$

Moreover  $\|S\| = k$  since it is rank one and has top eigenvector

$$y = \left[ \underbrace{\frac{1}{\sqrt{k}}, \frac{1}{\sqrt{k}}, \dots, \frac{1}{\sqrt{k}}, 0, \dots, 0}_{k}, \underbrace{0, \dots, 0}_{n-k} \right]$$

From Wedin's theorem, we have

$$\sin \theta(x, y) \leq \frac{2\|E\|}{k}$$

eigenvalue gap of  $S$


thus we have  $\langle x, y \rangle \geq 0.99$ , rest of the analysis is book keeping

Aside: what if a monotone adversary can remove edges in the "random portion" of the graph?

[Feige, Krauthgamer] show Lovasz theta function still works

[Ferge, Kilian]

Another interesting model, [Steinhardt]



adversary  
can delete      arbitrarily  
add / delete edges

No longer possible to find the planted clique,  
but can we find any large clique?

Thm [Buhai, Kothari, Steurer] There is an  $\tilde{O}(n^{\epsilon})$  time algorithm in FK model above that finds a clique of size  $k$  for  $k \geq n^{\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon}$

Actually outputs a list of size  $\approx \frac{D}{k}$  that contains the planted clique

Are there computational vs. statistical tradeoffs for related problems?

Consider the  $k > 2$  community detection case

$$W = \begin{bmatrix} \frac{a}{n} & \frac{b}{n} & \dots \\ \frac{b}{n} & \ddots & \vdots \\ \vdots & \ddots & \frac{a}{n} \end{bmatrix}$$

Let  $\bar{d} = \frac{a + (k-1)b}{k}$  be the average degree

and let  $\lambda = \frac{a-b}{kd}$  = second eigenvalue  
of "transmission" matrix

It satisfies

$$-\frac{1}{k-1} \leq \lambda \leq \frac{1}{k-1}$$

↑  
planted coloring, i.e.  $a=0$

[Conjecture [Decelle et al]] There are computationally efficient algorithms for partial recovery iff

$$\lambda^2 d > 1 \quad (\text{Kesten-Stigum for higher } k)$$

Moreover for  $k \geq 5$ , there is a computationally hard but detectable regime

Consider coloring: K-S bound becomes

$$d > (k-1)^2$$

[Abbe, Sandon] gave matching algorithms

[Thm [Achlioptas, Naor]] The  $k$ -colorability threshold for E-R random graphs with average degree  $d$  grows as  $2k \ln k$


thus we can solve the "distinguishing problem" w.h.p

Note: There are computationally efficient  
distinguishers that beat random guessing for

SBM vs ER

but they do not work w.h.p., e.g. cycle counts

the information-theoretic threshold is called  
condensation b/c the posterior looks like



planted clustering

i.e. it's dominated by clusters correlated with planted one.

[Banks, Moore, Neeman, Netrapalli] showed  
tight bounds for condensation in the planted  
coloring case

Some applications of these sorts of gaps

① Financial derivatives, e.g. CDOs


Assets      tranches



last to lose, low payout



first to lose, high payout



Traditional view: CDOs help resolve information asymmetry b/c higher tranches less info-sensitive

[Anra, Barak, Brunnermeier, Ge]: With computational complexity, can amplify information asymmetry  
if densest subgraph is hard

"Is there a dense subgraph - small set of assets - that make highest tranche more likely to fail?"

The party that creates the derivative has an advantage!

## ② Nash Equilibrium

Find a pair of strategies  $x, y$  so that no player can do  $\epsilon$ -better

Thm [Lipton, Markakis, Mehta] There is a  $n^{O(\log n)}^{O(\log n)}$  time algorithm to find an  $\epsilon$ -approximate Nash equilibrium

Thm [Hazan, Krauthamer] If planted clique is hard, so is finding the best

(i.e. maximize social welfare) approximate Nash equilibrium

[Rubinstein] later showed hardness for finding any approximate Nash