@Article{RSA83a,
author = { R[onald] L. Rivest and A[di] Shamir and L[eonard M.] Adleman },
title = { A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems },
acm = { 712859 },
journal = { CACM },
OPTyear = { 1983 },
OPTmonth = { January },
date = { 1983-01 },
volume = { 26 },
number = { 1 },
pages = { 96--99 },
publisher = { ACM },
issn = { 0001-0782 },
doi = { 10.1145/357980.358017 },
acmid = { 358017 },
keywords = { authentication, cryptography, digital signatures, electronic funds transfer, electronic mail,
factorization, message-passing, prime number, privacy, public-key cryptosystems, security },
abstract = {
An encryption method is presented with the novel property that
publicly revealing an encryption key does not thereby reveal the
corresponding decryption key. This has two important consequences:
(1) Couriers or other secure means are not needed to transmit keys,
since a message can be enciphered using an encryption key publicly
revealed by the intended recipient. Only he can decipher the message,
since only he knows the corresponding decryption key. (2) A message can
be ``signed'' using a privately held decryption key. Anyone can verify
this signature using the corresponding pubicly revealed encryption key.
Signatures cannot be forged, and a signer cannot later deny the validity
of his signature. This has obvious applications in ``electronic mail''
and ``electronic funds transfer'' systems. A message is encrypted by
representing it as a number $M$, raising $M$ to a publicly specified
power $e$, and then taking the remainder when the result is divided by
the publicly specified product, $n$, of two large secret prime numbers
$p$ and $q$. Decryption is similar; only a different, secret, power $d$
is used, where $e*d \equiv 1 (\textrm{mod} (p-1)*(q-1))$. The security
of the system rests in part on the difficulty of factoring the published
divisor, $n$.
},
htmlnote = { (This is a reprint of the "RSA paper"
RSA78.) },
}