



# Peppercorn Micropayments

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# Outline

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- ◆ Micropayment examples
- ◆ Challenges
- ◆ Aggregation methods
- ◆ The "Peppercoin" method  
(In England a *peppercorn* is smallest amount that can be paid in a contract)

# What is a "micropayment"?


- ◆ A payment in the range 0.1¢ to \$10.
- ◆ A payment small enough that processing it is relatively costly.  
(Processing one credit-card payment costs about 25¢ ...)
- ◆ *Processing cost* is the key issue for micropayment methods.

# Lydians invented coins 640 B.C.

- ◆ Before 640 B.C.: *gold bars, barter*  
small purchases difficult.
- ◆ After 640 B.C.: *coins*  
small purchases easy.
- ◆ Before 2003: *credit cards*  
small on-line purchases difficult.
- ◆ After 2003: ...

# Generic Payment Framework

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# How we'll make small payments

- ◆ Web download
  - Music (even streaming)
- ◆ Mobile phone
  - Map
  - Ringtones
- ◆ Physical POS
  - Vending machine

Artist	Album	Price	
Matchbox 20	Mirrorball	\$.99	BUY NOW ▶
Matchbox 20	Mirrorball	\$.99	BUY NOW ▶
Matchbox 20	Mirrorball	\$.99	BUY NOW ▶
Matchbox 20	Mirrorball	\$.99	BUY NOW ▶



# Challenges:

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- ◆ Ease-of-use
- ◆ Low-Cost
- ◆ Extending existing payment framework
- ◆ Security
- ◆ ... (many other issues, too)


# Aggregation

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- ◆ To reduce cost, micropayments must be aggregated into fewer macropayments.
- ◆ Possible levels of aggregation:
  - None: Every payment deposited with PSP
  - Merchant-level: A consumer's payments are aggregated by merchant
  - MicroPSP: Monopoly service that disintermediates existing payment services; doesn't scale well
  - Universal: Payments aggregated across all users and merchants, even those supported by different cooperating PSPs

# No Aggregation


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# Previous Work: Digital Cash

- ◆ Example: Chaum's digital coins
- ◆ Emphasis on *anonymity*:  
Withdrawals use blind signatures
- ◆ Problem of double-spending handled by having doubler-spenders revealed (e.g. Brand's protocol)
- ◆ No aggregation: every coin spent is returned to the PSP.

# Merchant-Level Aggregation




# Previous Work: PayWord

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- ◆ Rivest and Shamir '96
- ◆ Emphasis on reducing public-key operations by using per user/merchant hash-chains instead:  
$$x_0 \leftarrow x_1 \leftarrow x_2 \leftarrow x_3 \leftarrow \dots \leftarrow x_n$$
- ◆ User signs  $x_0$  over to merchant and releases next  $x_i$  for next payment
- ◆ Merchant-level aggregation only.

# MicroPSP Aggregation



# Universal Aggregation

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- ◆ Universal aggregation dramatically reduces processing cost, independent of spending patterns.
- ◆ Also called many/many/many aggregation: Aggregates payments from
  - Many consumers
  - Many merchants
  - Many PSP'sin any combination. No need to aggregate sales per consumer.

# Universal Aggregation Idea

- ◆ Would merchant prefer:
    - (a) twenty *50 cent payments*, or
    - (b) *\$0 for 19 payments, and \$10 for one?*
- No difference to merchant, on average*

# Universal Aggregation Idea

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*No difference to merchant, on average.*

What if processing costs 20 cents per payment?


- (a) nets only 30 cents per payment
- (b) nets 49 cents net per payment!

*Merchant strongly prefers (b)!*

# Peppercoin's Universal Aggregation

- ◆ One micropayment in 20 is "cryptographically selected" by merchant, and deposited for 20x its value, as a macropayment!
- ◆ Yet consumer pays *only* for what she has spent: each micropayment records cumulative amount she has spent at all merchants.

# Peppercoin's Universal Aggregation



Alice (\$8.50 cumulative)




50 cents




**Bob's Tunes**


19 / 20




# Peppercoin's Universal Aggregation



# Peppercoin's Universal Aggregation



# Peppercoin Extends Existing Payment Systems to Micropayments




# Dimensions to consider:

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- ◆ Aggregation (*universal*)
- ◆ PSP on-line or off-line? (*off-line*)
- ◆ Interactive vs. non-interactive (*non*)
  - (e.g. anti-spam payment in email)
- ◆ Computation Cost (*cheap*)
- ◆ User-fairness (*fair*)
- ◆ ... (many other issues, too)

# Previous Work: Lottery Tickets

- ◆ "Electronic Lottery Tickets as Micropayments" - Rivest FC '97 (similar to "Transactions using Bets" proposal by Wheeler '96)
- ◆ Payments are *probabilistic*
- ◆ First schemes to provide universal aggregation: payments aggregated across all user/merchant pairs.



# "Lottery Tickets" Explained

- ◆ Assume micropayments are for ten cents.
- ◆ Merchant gives user  $y = \text{hash}(x)$  for random  $x$ .
- ◆ User writes check: "Pay Merchant \$10 if two low-order digits of  $\text{hash}^{-1}(y)$  are 75." (Signed by user, with cert from his PSP.)
- ◆ Merchant "wins" \$10 with probability  $1/100$ . Expected value of payment is 10 cents.
- ◆ Bank sees only 1 out of every 100 payments.  
(A plus for user privacy!)



# Non-interactive

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- ◆ Revised check:  
"Pay Merchant \$10 if  
two low-order digits of  
*the hash of Merchant's digital  
signature on this check are 75.*"
- ◆ Merchant's deterministic signature  
scheme unpredictable to user.
- ◆ Merchant can convince PSP to pay.

# Computation Cost

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- ◆ Digital signatures are still relatively expensive --- but much cheaper than they used to be!
- ◆ It now seems reasonable to base micropayments on digital signatures. (E.g. Java card in cell phone)
- ◆ User and merchant are anyways involved with each transaction; digital signatures add only a few milliseconds.
- ◆ On-line/Off-line signature can also help.

# Optimization for less Signing

- ◆ "Pay Merchant \$10 if the two low-order digits of the hash of Merchant's digital signature on *the date of* this check are 75."
- ◆ Merchant only signs once a day.

# Variable-sized payments

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- ◆ To make micropayment of size  $m$ :
  - Chance of "winning" becomes  $m / M$   
where  $M$  is the macropayment size.
- ◆ For example, a \$1 micropayment converts to a \$10 macropayment with probability  $1/10$ .
- ◆ A one-penny micropayment converts to a \$10 macropayment with probability  $1/1000$ .

# Is revenue variance an issue?

- ◆ **Theorem.** If Peppercoin reduces merchant fees by  $R$  percent of transaction value, then merchant will be ahead (with probability  $999,999/1,000,000$ ) after only  $(5 / R)^2$  macropayments have been received.
- ◆ **Example:** micro = 0.10, macro = \$10, otherfee = 0.03, peppercoinfee = 0.01,  $R = 0.20$ ,  $(5/R)^2 = 625$  or \$6250 total value.

# Fraud models

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- ◆ Security is challenging to achieve given that PSP has only partial information, parties may collude, and payment schedules are decoupled.
- ◆ For example, consumer and merchant may try to collude to defraud PSP's.
- ◆ One effective countermeasure is to make micropayment to merchant only from revenues from that specific consumer (perhaps deferring payment if necessary).

# Conclusion

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- ◆ Peppercoin micropayments are
  - Easy to use
  - Low-cost even for small payments
  - Flexible  
(interface with existing payment systems)
  - Secure
- ◆ [www.peppercoin.com](http://www.peppercoin.com)

Thanks!

(The End)

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