DATABANKS ARE NOT SAFE
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The bibliography associated with the talk "Technical Possibilities
and Problems in Protecting Data in Computer Systems," which was given
by Professor Jerome H. Saltzer at Linz, Austria points out that the problem
of information protection is being seriously discussed in scientific circles.
The most often cited sources are: protocols of the ACM and IEEE conferences,
dissertations from M.I.T. and Stanford, Air Force reports, etc. Professor
Saltzer and his co-workers at the Laboratory for Computer Science at M.I.T.
(which has since early 60's been a ground breaking facility for time sharing
systems under the name Project MAC) count as authorities in the field of
data security in computer systems. Saltzer is not just anyone speaking;
he is to be taken seriously when he warns of the inadequacy of presently
available on-line systems which base their security against penetration by
highly qualified system specialists on passwords and subscriber lists.
Saltzer said in Linz "so far all attempts by so called "Tiger Teams" to
penetrate the security measures of interactive systems have proved success-
ful even in the case of systems considered to be most secure."

Appearances Deceive

The Pentagon and giant firms are appropriately disturbed. Accordingly
very large sums -- multi-million dollar contracts -- are given to a number
of research teams in the United States, among them Saltzer's famous labora-
tory, in order that help may be found -- and Saltzer is optimistic.

As for the possibility that information may be "protected" on the level
of operating systems (and of necessity also on the level of micro programs
and restricted access techniques) similar results are reported in a recently
completed and strongly classified study for the military by IABG of Ottobrun.
They too issue an urgent warning not to rely on false security.

Two consequences

1. Until further developments, information whose aquisition is worth the
    application of considerable know-how, even in the face of great risk,
    is not to be stored in giant interactive time sharing systems. The
    payroll records of executives of large firms are in any case generally
    stored in medium data processing installations, administered by special
    sections of the firms' personnel departments. In fact dedicated systems
    can also provide a temporary solution to the problem faced by the
    research and special documentation sections of firms. As Saltzer
    himself mentioned in side remarks, such systems can at least be physically
    secured behind locked doors.

2. The credibility of manufacturers has once more collapsed. Have those
    who write in the slick house-organs understood that all that appears
    there about access protection and password controls is of no help whatever
    against highly motivated and competent system invaders? Naturally not.
    Such honest statements would be damaging to their businesses.