

T+D in Multics

Outline of ideas -

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- General Pattern:
- a. Initial T+D will be primitive
 - a. Use available T+D programs
 - b. Take system down when necessary ^{can}
 - b. Later will be sophisticated
 - a. Special integrated T+D programs
 - b. System rarely, if ever, down for T+D.

What does Multics have to offer the T+D programmer already?

1. Reconfiguration + Partition. While the system is running, it can "pause" and reconfigure ^{itself} to ~~stop~~ ^{bring in} certain hardware (Memory Controller, Processor, ^{Drum Module,} etc.)
By throwing switches, the disconnected units can be turned into a standalone computer and run host T+D programs.
This T+D is done simultaneously with Multics operation, but independently. (Multics is ^{running} "else" in the interim)
2. Resource assignment. While the system is running, it can ~~assign its resources~~ ^{can reassign} any user the exclusive use of an I/O device (typewriter, tape drive, card punch) on a sign-up basis.
The T+D programmer can write a program which operates on any other process in Multics, and exercises the assigned device it has signed out. This concept can even be

extended to processes without reconfiguration for those tests which can be run in slave mode and ^{other} can withstand interrupts.

3. ~~Process~~ Periodic Checkout without human intervention. The T+D programmer can create a "daemon" process which, using the real-time clock, will wake up periodically, ~~and~~ perform some checks, and go back to sleep if everything is OK. ~~This technique could be applied, for example, by having the process~~
~~not~~ An interesting extension of this technique is to have the daemon, as its last action of each period, reset an alarm clock ^{alarm} which will warn the operator if the daemon ^{doesn't} wakes up ~~again~~ in a reasonable time.

~~It is desired, and a daemon process~~

4. Special Authority. Multics has provision for administratively assigned authority to perform certain operations not normally allowed. For example, the authority to pre-empt ~~the~~ ^{the user of a device} a ~~priority signal~~ ^{type class} which is acting suspicious might be granted to a ^{process belonging to} T+D. ~~operator~~ ^{engineer}. Although such authorities are easily extensible, there is the difficulty that even a T+D routine cannot be allowed, through a programming bug or dishonest behavior, to "bring down the system". Safeguards to system security must also be applied to T+D ~~processes~~ processes.

5. Multilevel Storage Management. For cases where, ^{for example,} exhaustive checks of a ^{Drum} ~~disk~~ module must be made, the Multilevel Storage Management routines can be requested to remove user files from the area in question. ^{Section A} ~~This~~ request must be made with appropriate authority, and well in advance, since considerable effort may need to be expended to accomplish unloading of a module. (Note the necessity that the ^{stream} files be accessible to ~~the user~~ their owners at all times, and that the contents of the files ~~cannot~~ ^{should not} be divulged, even to the T.+D. person.)

6. System error logs.