

# Compass: Navigating the Design Space of Taint Schemes for RTL Security Verification


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
## I. Overview

### Hardware Security Problems:

- Side channel attacks
- Spectre attacks
- TEEs root-of-trust key leakage



Violations of  
**Information Flow Property**




We verify them with  
**Taint Analysis**

### Our Work:

- Observation: There is a large design space of taint schemes
- Goal: Find taint schemes that are simple and precise
- Solution: An automated, iterative approach to find efficient taint schemes

### Technique:

Counterexample-guided Taint Refinement




## II. Background

**Information flow property** checks whether a secret can influence the value of attacker observable signals



### Taint analysis

over-approximates information flow using taint bits and logic



## III. Design Taint Schemes



### For a single AND gate:



Naïve taint logic introduces false flow


| A | B | O | Leakage ? | O_taint |
|---|---|---|-----------|---------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | No        | 1       |
| 1 | 0 | 0 |           |         |

### For the whole design with many gates:



## IV. Advantage of Mixing Taint Schemes

### Example Design:




**Property:** Prove that if `inst_type==ADD`, then `commit_taint==0`

### Challenge:

How to automatically discover gates that need precise taint logic?


## V. Compass Framework

### Automated Counterexample-Guided Taint Refinement:



### Refinement Algorithm:

- View circuit as a graph
- Color edges based on the taint propagation in the false counterexample
- View taint refinement of a gate as a "cut" on graph



## VI. Evaluation Results

### Setup:

- Processors Designs: Sodor, Rocket, BOOM (with Spectre defense), ProSpeCT
- Security Property: Secure speculation (software-hardware sandboxing contract)
- Baseline: CellIFT (generates precise taint logic for the whole design)

**Result 1:** 84% fewer taint gates, 85% fewer taint bits

**Result 2:** 32% less simulation time

**Result 3:** Faster model checking

- Unbounded Proof:

|       | CellIFT    | Compass    |                           |
|-------|------------|------------|---------------------------|
|       | Proof Time | Proof Time | Time to Find Taint Scheme |
| Sodor | 2 h        | 10 s       | 5 min                     |

- Bounded Proof:

|          | CellIFT           | Compass         |                           |
|----------|-------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
|          | Bound with 7 days | Bound with 24 h | Time to Find Taint Scheme |
| Rocket   | 41                | 159             | 1 h                       |
| BOOM     | 26                | 28              | 31 h                      |
| ProSpeCT | 29                | 29              | 35 h                      |