


Pensieve: Microarchitectural Modeling for Security Evaluation

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


I. Why Do We Need Security Evaluation?

The Endless Cat-and-Mouse Game




II. Challenge: Bridge the Gap




III. Pensieve Microarchitectural Modeling

- Decouple timing and functionality using the hand-shaking interface
- Represent a space of timing behavior with uninterpreted function




IV. Pensieve Security Evaluation Framework




What is Uninterpreted function?

- A UF represents space of functions with same input/output types
- Example: Bool UF(Bool, Bool)



- UF helps us
 - state "what" affects the output,
 - abstract away the details on "how" the input affects the output
- Use UF to represent a space of timing behavior
 - Memory_latency = UF(historyOf(in_valid, in_addr))

V. Checking Time and Scalability



- Microarchitecture Setup
 - 5 types of instructions
 - 4-entry register file
 - 4-entry data memory
 - 16-entry instruction memory
 - 8-entry ROB
 - GhostMinion defense
- Problem: Checking time increases exponentially as the number of simulated cycles increases
- Future work: Combine Pensieve with more powerful formal verification backend


VI. New Attack Variant on GhostMinion

V-1. Spectre is MITIGATED by InvisiSpec


```
if (false)
  ld sec // transmitter
```

```
y = ... //delay
ld y //transmitter
if (false)
  ld sec //interfere
```

V-2. Speculative Interference Attack BREAKS InvisiSpec




V-3. Speculative Interference Attack is MITIGATED by GhostMinion



"ld sec" is after "ld y" in program order

V-4. New Attack Variant BREAKS GhostMinion



No program order between "ld sec" and "ld y"

V-5. Summary