Index of /silvio/Selected Scientific Papers/Mechanism Design

[ICO]NameLast modifiedSizeDescription

[PARENTDIR]Parent Directory  -  
[DIR]Knightian Analysis of Mechanisms/2015-10-09 10:03 -  
[DIR]Tight Revenue Bounds with Possibilistic Beliefs and Level-K Rationality (ecta12563)/2015-07-28 07:35 -  
[   ]Perfect Concrete Implementation of Arbitrary Mechanisms.pdf2010-04-12 14:47 235K 
[   ]The Query Complexity of Scoring Rules.pdf2014-07-20 10:06 244K 
[   ]Perfect Implementation.pdf2010-01-07 09:58 296K 
[   ]A New Approach To Auctions And Resilient Mechanism Design.pdf2009-09-17 11:10 308K 
[   ]Collusive Dominant-Strategy Truthfulness.pdf2012-01-17 10:31 313K 
[   ]Collusion, Efficiency, and Dominant Strategies.pdf2014-03-23 18:21 328K 
[   ]ParametricAuctions.pdf2012-12-01 17:22 329K 
[   ]Robustly Leveraging Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions.pdf2009-11-16 09:45 349K 
[   ]Mechanism Design with Possibilistic Beliefs (JET final version).pdf2015-12-23 09:55 350K 
[   ]Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions.pdf2012-11-11 12:51 378K 
[   ]Delegating Computation On Costly Data.pdf2015-09-10 09:45 411K 
[   ]The Order Independence of Iterated Dominance in Extensive Games.pdf2012-01-18 10:47 453K 
[   ]Knightian Analysis of The Vickrey Mechanism.pdf2015-04-21 13:52 503K 
[   ]Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions.pdf2011-08-04 11:17 533K 

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